Criminal Capital in Durán, Ecuador

Durán’s street gangs are vilified for their current role in violence and criminality in the municipality, but their relationship with the communities in which they operate is complicated.  Some gang leaders invest in social capital by filling in for absent, corrupt, and inept state institutions to provide security and even offer services in exchange for benefits to their operations. 

Over the past two decades, most of Durán’s street gangs have also evolved into more sophisticated organizations. Increasingly, the municipality’s criminal actors have focused on amassing political capital by infiltrating municipal institutions. They then use this political capital to secure lucrative public works contracts, legalize land deeds, stake out new development projects, exploit citizens who do not have access to basic public services such as water, and collect bribes.

This transformation in Durán comes as Ecuador’s role as a major transshipment point for cocaine is rising. Durán’s gangs, now tied to national and international criminal networks, leverage these connections to access financial resources that further entrench their power.

*This article is part of an investigation exploring criminal dynamics in Durán, Ecuador’s primary organized crime hotspot and one of the world’s most violent cities in 2023. Read the other chapters of the investigation here or download the full report (PDF) here.

Criminal-Social Capital in Durán

As noted, Durán has developed in a disorganized, informal way, and the municipality’s chaotic evolution has led to a host of other, cascading problems. It has a poor tax base, making it harder to fund public schools, social services, and infrastructure. The presence of law enforcement is scant and uneven. Basic municipal services such as water and housing have become extremely predatory businesses. And the legitimate industry that is based in Durán is scattered, seemingly at random, without regard to the public’s needs and without a strong chamber of commerce to help push public-private partnerships.

The haphazard, ad hoc nature of the municipality has made it difficult to foster a sense of community. It is, as its nickname suggests, simply a place to sleep rather than to live – or, more recently, because of the violence, a place to escape from. Within this transient, unsettled environment, civil society and religious groups struggle to build sound financial and social bases. And more ambitious efforts like the Durán Fair and educational programs like the local trade school have fizzled.

To some extent, criminal organizations have stepped into this void, residents, experts, and current and former officials told InSight Crime. In part, this is related to their economic capital and control of economic resources, and in part it is related to their willingness to use violence. They have, in some instances, created their own social contract with the communities where they operate. Sometimes it is the leaders of these groups who foster these arrangements; other times, the contracts are a byproduct of the groups’ ethos and rules that forbid predatory criminal activities in their own communities.

The most prominent example of these informal social contracts comes from Cerro Las Cabras (Goat Hill). There, the local gang leader, Carlos Humberto Silva Vinueza, alias “El Llorón,” and his criminal group have become the de facto law enforcement and a major benefactor in the community. El Llorón’s organization forbids extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and violence, and punishes transgressors, such as drug users and petty thieves. 

“If the boys in the gang catch you stealing, they make you find and return all the stolen items, beat you with sticks, and tell you to never show your face here again,” a resident told InSight Crime. 

Local residents and community leaders also say the gang organizes community events and, around Christmas, hands out food and gifts. El Llorón’s group may also be financing youth activities. One community leader who has organized social events around Durán told InSight Crime that El Llorón offered to finance his events; the community leader said they refused the offer.

In return, some residents of Cerro Las Cabras provide a regular stream of intelligence, including alerting them when unknown vehicles and outsiders enter the neighborhood. They also let the gang know if there are security forces in the area and hide members from government forces during security operations. 

El Llorón is one of Durán’s longest-lasting gang leaders, having operated from Cerro Las Cabras for well over a decade. And it is unclear what would happen if El Llorón were to be killed – whether the reciprocal relationship between the Cerro Las Cabras community and his organization depends on the man, or whether, over time, it has become the status quo between his organization and the community.

In the northern neighborhood of El Arbolito, a Chone Killers leader, Gutemberg Andrés Rodríguez, alias “Bob Marley,” has made a similar investment in his community, according to a local resident and media reports. Marley prohibits robbery, kidnapping, and extortion of residents in the neighborhood and is known to exact punishment on perpetrators, which can include cutting off the limbs of suspected criminals, according to media coverage. His faction does extort local businesses, but they frame it as a “protection tax.” And in exchange, his group keeps other gangs and security forces at bay, so they do not extort residents or businesses.

“All the businesses in Arbolito pay vacunas, every single one,” a sociologist and political science expert living in Durán told InSight Crime. “But the people are happy because there are no robberies. The gangs are the government in the territory.” 

SEE ALSO: Dealing with the Devil: How Latin Kings in Ecuador Sought Peace, Waged Crime

However, the situation in Durán is dynamic, and priorities have shifted in recent years, especially as the competition and violence have increased between criminal groups. Residents and authorities said that gangs in disputed territories, like Cerro Redondo and Los Helechos, are more predatory and violent towards local residents. 

The sources also differentiated between the Latin Kings and the Chone Killers. In neighborhoods controlled by the Latin Kings, such as Una Sola Fuerza (an area of 288 Hectáres), Primavera 2, and Recreo 4 and 5, there are fewer reports of extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and assaults, area residents, former gang members, and government officials told InSight Crime. 

“They hang around smoking, but they’ve never done anything to me. Their fights are between them,” a Durán resident told InSight Crime. “They look intimidating, but they never do anything to scare the residents.” 

But in Chone Killer-controlled areas, locals suffer more from extortion, kidnappings, and violence, area residents and authorities said. In the central Oramas González sector, for example, the local Chone Killer faction terrorizes locals, as is evident from the homicide statistics InSight Crime obtained. According to one teacher, local schoolkids, as well as their parents and teachers, are targets for robbery and express kidnappings as soon as they step outside of school doors.

“The school has become an island surrounded by contract killers and death,” the teacher said, echoing what authorities told InSight Crime.

The difference may, in part, stem from the way each group governs its own members. The Latin Kings’ internal rules forbid their members from taking part in predatory criminal activities in their own neighborhoods. However, the Chone Killers, as an organization, do not appear to have internal rules or norms about how they treat civilians living in the areas under their control, residents, security officials, and community leaders repeatedly told InSight Crime. In fact, whether the Chone Killers victimize the local community seems to be at the whim of the individual leader.

Of course, criminal groups also leverage their economic resources to gain favor in their communities. Residents, experts, and security officials told InSight Crime the gangs regularly employ locals as lookouts, informants, messengers, vendors, and debt collectors. During our investigation, we also heard multiple accounts of children seeking to work with the local criminal gangs. The pandemic may have exacerbated this co-dependence.

“Before, we were a poor country, but we weren’t hungry,” a former government advisor and organized crime expert focused on Durán told InSight Crime. “Then the pandemic arrived and, especially in areas where the economy was mostly informal, it was brutal. There was no public policy to avoid hunger in these territories, and the mafias used that to recruit.” 

But this leverage is not limited to the illicit economy. As gangs have matured, they have also begun employing people in their legal and semi-formal businesses. These include jobs for their own members, relatives, and allies who work with the municipal government, as well as those working with utilities, water services, and public works projects. As noted in the political capital section below, the gangs have expanded these employment opportunities in direct proportion to their political connections.

The gangs’ recent expansion into land trafficking is also notable in this regard. According to current government officials, a local sociologist and political scientist, and residents, many gang leaders have a greater say and control over land invasions, development, and legalization of residential areas within their strongholds. As they have increased their role and displaced the former land traffickers, they have become the gatekeepers of perhaps the ultimate community prize: a home.

Criminal-Political Capital in Durán

In recent years, criminal networks have gained political capital by seizing key government positions, transforming these roles into sources of economic and social power. Control over these posts not only opens new revenue streams and facilitates money laundering—detailed in the next section on economic capital—but also enables criminals to build social capital. They create jobs within the government, influence public works, and exert control over land tenure, solidifying their grip on local communities.

One of the ways that criminal actors achieve influence in local government is through direct political and financial support for mayoral campaigns. Criminal actors, including Durán’s gangs and criminal brokers, approach candidates before and during the election cycle and offer to deliver the vote in specific neighborhoods or even directly finance a candidate’s campaign in exchange for influence, according to residents, police officials, and experts. In return, elected leaders appoint allies of the criminal groups to key positions in the municipality, including in public safety, transit, public works, and public services.

During former Mayor Alexandra Arce’s administration (2014-2019), several dozen members of the Latin Kings were employed by the mayor’s office in street cleaning and construction projects. Others held full-time jobs in administrative positions, including in land legalization, according to Arce, though she did not specify which department employed them. At the time, some Latin Kings were also transitioning into more direct political activity on a national level, most notably Ronny Aleaga, a Durán native and staunch Arce ally, who later became a congressional representative.

When former Mayor Dalton Narváez took over from Arce, a new era of criminal penetration began in the municipal government. While Latin Kings continued to hold influence in public works and land legalization, according to current and former municipal officials, Narváez opened the door to another powerful criminal actor: Washington Sellán Hati, alias “Washo.”  

Washo began building his corruption network in the buildup to the 2019 election by cultivating a close relationship with Dalton Narváez, according to former Narváez administration officials, business community leaders, and other former and current government officials with first-hand knowledge of the scheme. Narváez vehemently denied that Washo was in any way supporting his campaign.  

Yet Washo was able to put members of his inner circle, including close friends and family members in government jobs, including in the Potable Water and Sewage Authority (EMAPAD), the transit authority (ATD), the firefighters, and the property registry, the sources said. Narváez told InSight Crime that he would never have knowingly allowed anyone with criminal links to be hired by the municipality.

“Never. I was in constant contact with my staff, who acted as filters, (telling them) to maintain control so that no illicit money should slip through,” he said. 

Washo was murdered in Durán in May 2023 under mysterious circumstances. And Julio Alberto Martínez, alias “Negro Tulio,” who leads a break-off faction of the Chone Killers, seems to have inherited at least part of Washo’s municipal infrastructure. The gang leader has had relatives and members of his inner circle in mid-level positions in the property registry, the firefighters, and the ATD, according to current security officials, former government officials, a one-time member of current Mayor Luis Chonillo’s campaign, and business community leaders.

There are several ways in which these positions can make money for Negro Tulio or whichever criminal faction controls them. Both the ATD and the firefighters are known to solicit and collect bribes, and the gang takes a percentage of those, according to former and current government officials, business community leaders, a local sociologist and political scientist, and residents. The gang also uses official firefighting vehicles to move drugs and illegal arms, government officials say.

The ATD also provides intelligence. It manages a sophisticated system of traffic cameras, which can provide operational support for criminal activity, according to former government officials and community leaders. And it often has information on security operations ahead of time.

Many of these institutions, including the firefighters and the ATD, manage government contracts, which sources say is the biggest potential source of income for criminals, who simply siphon money from these contracts.

“These institutions  – the ATD, the firefighters – control their own resources. They generate their own money,” a government official told InSight Crime. “That is attractive (to criminal actors) because they manage their own contracting process.”

Another key institution where Negro Tulio exercised his influence was in the municipal property registry. This access facilitated his faction’s takeover of the land trafficking business, a vital source of economic and social power in Durán. It may have also provided an inside look at the development and infrastructure projects under consideration, thus positioning Negro Tulio to secure public works contracts in those spaces. 

Criminal actors like the Chone Killers also use threats of violence and bribes to steer the municipality towards giving public works contracts to companies linked to its leaders, a former member of Chonillo’s campaign, a former government official, a sociologist and political scientist, and the owner of a construction firm that works on government contracts told InSight Crime.

SEE ALSO: Plata o Plomo: Ecuador’s Public Servants in Gangs’ Crosshairs

In the wake of Negro Tulio’s arrest and extradition to Ecuador, his municipal operatives also took a hit. In August 2024, Ecuador’s police arrested 23 people, including alleged members of the Chone Killers belonging to Negro Tulio’s faction with influence in Durán’s municipal government, the property registry, the firefighters, and the ATD. 

“(Some of those detained) had a long history of working in Durán municipality with a tenure lasting the last three mayoral terms,” Freddy Sarzosa, Director General of Investigations of the National Police, said in a press conference following the raids.

As discussed above, one of the most important institutions for keeping corrupt public officials in their posts is the workers’ union, which wields influence over hiring and firing practices in the municipality. Chonillo and members of his administration claim that the union has made it almost impossible for the current administration to purge the workforce. In fact, hundreds of workers joined the union “at the last minute,” right before Chonillo took office, according to the sitting mayor. However, other sources – including former members of Chonillo’s campaign – say his administration has been slow to open up investigations into suspected Chone Killers allies working in City Hall.

Two former government officials told InSight Crime that Negro Tulio’s influence stretched as far as the administration of the workers’ union — none of whom were reported arrested in the raids.  

As such, it remains to be seen whether the August operations will do any lasting damage to Negro Tulio’s corruption network or whether these positions will simply pass into the hands of other criminal factions as happened after Washo’s death. 

Durán Institutions in Crime’s Crosshairs

Criminal-Economic Capital in Durán

As Ecuador’s role in transnational drug trafficking grew and staggering sums of illicit money began to pour into the country, its national structures gained the ability to corrupt high-level political, judicial, and security officials while outgunning and outspending the country’s security forces. Some of this wealth and sophistication has trickled down to Durán’s local gangs, which have become service-providers for these larger criminal groups. The economic capital used to get involved in political campaigns, public works contracts, and other businesses comes, in part, from the relationship Durán’s gangs have cultivated with larger criminal networks.  

SEE ALSO: Ecuador: A Cocaine Superhighway to the US and Europe

Gang leaders own a range of businesses, from laundry mats and hair salons to shrimp farms and construction companies, according to security experts, business community leaders, and current and former government officials. The companies are sources of revenue and provide the means for the groups to launder illicit proceeds, especially construction and service-provider companies that work with the government on public works contracts, contractors, lawyers, and former and current government officials told InSight Crime.

In fact, public works contracts are an important example of the interplay between the criminal networks’ political, social, and economic capital. Washo, for example, held shares in various companies, including those specializing in freight transportation and sewage system construction — among others —  which competed for public works contracts. According to sources close to Washo and several organized crime experts, Washo was a very close ally of Narváez. And the sources say that Washo used this influence to secure public works contracts for his companies. In an interview with InSight Crime, Narváez denied any personal or professional connection to Washo.

Whether Washo used these companies to launder proceeds from his criminal activity and the  process by which he could have done this is worth a deeper look, as they are part of a larger story about criminal equilibrium in Durán. According to sources close to Washo and several analysts and organized crime experts, Washo would hire members of whichever gang had a stronger presence in the territory to execute contracts in that area. The result was a kind of pax mafiosa in Durán, the sources said, as each of the gangs were benefitting.

The analysis helps us understand why Washo’s death was a watershed moment in Durán. He was not only at the intersection of gangs and political power, he was also the architect of a de facto cease fire. Whether this cease fire would have held given the outside forces increasingly infringing on Durán is impossible to say. In fact, he may have been a casualty of this larger war in Ecuador. 

Durán’s Criminal Power Market