Why is it difficult for US or coalition military intervention in Venezuela? | The Gateway Pundit

This article originally appeared on GatewayHispanic.com and was republished with permission.

First, let us clarify; it is not about discouraging the legitimate struggle of Venezuelans, but rather the opposite. The struggle they are undertaking is more realistic than repeating that “the demonstrations are useless, we must use military means” and reviewing the way they chose to seek change.

On the other hand, there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers, police officers and assassins armed to the teeth and unarmed Venezuelans know it and are suffering right now. They also know, after 25 years of waiting for an external military intervention, much of the information in this article.

Let’s start with the possibility of American intervention, which is most often requested by many. Before we start talking, let’s understand that we are not talking about Russia, where Putin can command the invasion of someone else’s territory with a gesture. Let’s move on to the mechanism of the use of force in the US.

In the US, there is the War Powers Act of 1973, which was created to limit the president’s power to declare war or order military action in undeclared wars. The text defines the conditions for sending troops abroad in a very precise way. You can do it only under two assumptions:

The declaration of war by Congress against another state or states. The president cannot declare it himself and therefore Biden or his successor is bound by a decision of legislators.

That the country is facing “a national emergency created by an attack on the United States, its territories, possessions, or its armed forces.” In Venezuela’s case, that situation does not exist, at least not for now. Maduro would have to create a reason.
Let’s move on to the political situation. The US is in the election period. Democrats have a majority in the Senate and Republicans in the House of Representatives. They should agree after finding a reason for consensus to authorize an action in Venezuela. In the campaign it was clear that MAGA, the Republican wing, emphasized that the US should focus on protecting its borders and reducing spending on external conflicts, which led to the six-month blockade of aid to Ukraine, Taiwan and Israel, an ally. priority and under attack.

This position, which has even led to confrontations with NATO partners, makes it difficult for the United States to obtain a license to intervene in Venezuela, with all the costs and political complexities that come with involvement in a conflict that does not directly affect the national interest.

It can be argued that one can intervene “under the desk”, as was done in the past. It is not that simple and we go back to history to explain it, making it clear that we can only refer to the period after 1973, when a legal limit was set on this practice.

When Washington launched Operation Just Cause on December 20, 1989, and invaded Panama, it did so with Congressional authorization and citing the risk Noriega posed to control of the Panama Canal, then administered by the United States.

In the case of Iran, there was an invasion of the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, followed by the kidnapping of American citizens by Hezbollah and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 as justification.

The invasion of Grenada, dubbed “Urgent Fury” and carried out on October 25, 1983, was justified by the protection of 600 American students and 400 citizens of the same nationality present on the island, as an excuse to also overthrow the pro-Soviet government of Hudson Austin.

The US invasion of Afghanistan, which began in October 2001, was a direct result of the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001. A direct interest was invoked, as in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, because of the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction.

When the Nicaraguan Contras were supported and trained, the risk of a Soviet advance in a strategic area was invoked. In any case, in 1982, Congress imposed the “Boland Amendment” so that the aid would not be aimed at overthrowing the Sandinista government. This background is valid to understand why in that same year the Ronald Reagan administration decided to look for another way to finance these operations with money obtained from the drug cartels and the sale of weapons to Iran, which gave rise to the “Iran-Cons” scandal.

The affair ended with prison sentences for one of the operation’s ideologues, Colonel Oliver North, and national security adviser John Poindexter. In Washington, they know the history, and it’s an additional hurdle to take into account. This factor goes directly to the question of sending weapons to Venezuela or arming opposition guerrillas. Neither the US nor the rest of the West can do that so easily. The CIA or the NSA have real limits; we’re not in a Tom Clancy book.

Arming and training a dissident group requires significant budgetary resources and, again, we return to Congress, which must authorize items and review expenditures to ensure funds are not diverted. Again, it is not Russia or Cuba that is not being held accountable.

They also wonder why no drone or missile is sent to tackle the problem at its root. An action of this nature falls into the same category as a military intervention with foot soldiers. That is how the system works, not the way we want it to.

Chavismo was careful not to attack US interests and since January 2019 there is no embassy or diplomatic staff due to the expulsion ordered by Maduro. North American companies in Venezuela could be an interest to protect, but until today they were not a sufficient reason.

After explaining the issue of US intervention, we will assume an international intervention. By this we refer to the coalition formed to remove Saddam Hussein’s troops from Kuwait in 1991. It is a precedent that many use as a reference.

This military operation against Iraq, which brought together troops from 34 countries, was the result of UN approval through Resolution 660, backed by the Security Council and the support of two of its permanent members: China and Russia.

Moscow and Beijing recognized Maduro as the winner of the elections and are allies of Chavismo. Therefore, we can rule out a UN mandate, because from their position in the Security Council they can veto any attempt to repeat the experience of 1991.

Sending a military force of blue helmets must be approved by the Security Council. China and Russia cannot possibly contribute to weakening the authority and repressive capacity of Chavismo. In February, Chavismo expelled the UN High Commissioner for condemning the atrocities of Chavismo.

Another armed coalition that intervened abroad was the coalition that bombed Yugoslavia in 1999. Although not authorized by the UN, this coalition relied on a request from NATO to intervene in a regional conflict that it claimed threatened collective security.

In that case, there was a political base in the European Union and a military arm that was NATO, as well as a network of regional defense agreements that do not exist in Latin America. This brings us to the question of the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Defense, the TIAR.

The TIAR was created in September 1947 in the context of the beginning of the Cold War at the request of the United States to ensure the support of the continent in the event of a Soviet attack. The possibilities of using it to solve the Venezuelan crisis are limited and we will see why.

First, because it is a treaty that must be invoked in the event of external aggression against America and what happens in Venezuela is an internal matter. Denouncing the presence of Wagner’s Russians on Venezuelan soil is not enough to activate the TIAR.

Another problem is that the TIAR mechanism requires the attacked country to request its implementation. Although Maduro is not recognized as an authority, Edmundo González would not be accepted as a legitimate president by all members of the Treaty.