Perspective: Colombia’s Security Crisis – An Emerging Dilemma for US Foreign Policy

Perspective: Colombia’s Security Crisis – An Emerging Dilemma for US Foreign Policy

Caesar the Young

Colombia is currently facing a significant national security crisis, which is hampering territorial consolidation and strategic advancement against both internal and external threats. The “Total Peace” (““Peace total”) policies implemented by the government of President Gustavo Petro have suffered critical shortcomings, endangering both Colombian security and regional stability. Key issues include the paralysis of the armed forces amid negotiations with armed groups, the proliferation and expansion of criminal organizations that threaten national stability, and a diminished deterrent capacity against external threats.

Colombian Military Police Welcomes US Army Chief of Staff, Bogotá 2012.

Public domain, DVIDS

Bogotá has long been a key ally of the United States in the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. For decades, successive Colombian governments have maintained a strong diplomatic relationship with the United States, facilitating the exchange of intelligence, strategies, and doctrines to achieve shared goals. One notable collaboration is the various phases of Plan Colombia, which significantly advanced the professionalization of Colombia’s security forces. It also improved their strategic capabilities to conduct combat operations in asymmetric conditions and to effectively counter threats from armed groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Naciona – ELN) and paramilitary organizations.

However, this close relationship has led to tensions with neighboring countries, particularly Venezuela and Ecuador. Under the governments of Hugo Chávez, Nicolás Maduro, and Rafael Correa, these countries saw the Colombian governments of Álvaro Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos, and Iván Duque as adversaries representing U.S. interests in the region. The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas offered hope for resolving problems related to security, criminality, and terrorism. Nevertheless, even during the peace negotiations, dissident factions emerged, leading to the resurgence and revitalization of armed groups. These factions forged criminal alliances with former rival organizations and contributed to new forms of violence and criminality.

The State of National Security in Colombia

Under the presidency of Gustavo Petro (2022-2026), the government designed a security policy focused on the human security dimension. This policy argues that meeting the basic needs of the population has a positive impact on national security and reduces violence. However, official government documents do not clarify the national security concept it aims to achieve. Paradoxically, security remains an unresolved problem in Colombia, as decision-makers developed a Total Peace policy without a thorough understanding of national security. This oversight has created strategic uncertainty for the security forces and decision-makers, as they have set up simultaneous negotiating tables with FARC dissidents, the ELN, criminal gangs and other groups. Meanwhile, the groups that negotiate with the government continue to be involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal mining and terrorism. For example, the ELN and dissidents led by the alias “Iván Mordisco” control more than half of the cocaine trafficking routes out of Colombia, especially to the United States and Europe.

Despite the demobilization of the FARC, peace in Colombia remains an elusive goal, while insecurity is increasing. The ambitious project “Total Peace” aims to achieve lasting peace in the country. However, the current security situation and increasing violence reflect a crisis in the implementation of this project. New criminal actors have emerged, massacres have increased, marginalized communities are facing increased incarceration, and ambushes against security forces continue. A major challenge is the gap between the Total Peace policy and security and defense strategies. This lack of coordination has led to armed groups becoming stronger and criminal actors not adhering to certain agreements in the negotiation processes. While violence directed at the state has decreased, criminal violence against civilians has increased, suggesting an armed peace rather than true Total Peace.

Several regions in Colombia are experiencing an increased presence of illegal armed groups, including the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC or Clan of the Gulf), the ELN, FARC dissidents and both domestic and foreign organized crime structures. Of these groups, the AGC has shown the greatest expansion, increasing its influence from 253 municipalities in 2022 to 392 last year. FARC dissidents (Estado Mayor Central and Segunda Marquetalia) follow, expanding from 230 municipalities to 299 in the same period. This expansion indicates a displacement of the state within its own territory and suggests that the capacities of state security have been insufficient to prevent the criminal recycling and geographical expansion of these groups, which control strategic areas.

The state of the Colombian armed forces

So far this century, Colombia has allocated an average of 3.2% of its gross domestic product to security and defense, a figure comparable to the 3.8% spent by the United States. This allocation is the highest in Latin America and reflects a long history of armed conflict that has driven military investment, along with the US alliance to combat transnational threats. This partnership has earned Colombia a priority position as a global NATO partner. The Colombian military’s experience in irregular warfare, asymmetric conflicts and complex operations such as humanitarian mine clearance has made it a reference in contemporary hybrid warfare and military diplomatic cooperation projects. However, defense spending has fallen significantly in the past two years. Under President Petro’s administration, it has fallen to 2.8%, despite the country’s ongoing conflict and growing security challenges. The proliferation of armed groups in different regions of Colombia, together with the involvement of international criminal actors, means that, despite having robust military forces (456,000 troops, the second largest in Latin America after Brazil), security remains paralyzed and in crisis. Although Colombia does not face existential external threats, such as a hypothetical invasion or nuclear tension, its military capacity has not significantly reduced internal threats. Although armed groups are negotiating with the government and some ceasefires have been agreed, it appears that the security and defense system has suspended its offensive capacities to confront these groups.

In recent months, the ELN, FARC dissidents and other organizations have begun using drones to deliver explosives to the military and civilian populations. This method has allowed for precise and lethal attacks on specific targets, including strategic infrastructure. Custom drones carrying explosive charges have become a weapon of war, complicating national security due to their low cost and the difficulty of detecting their use. These attacks pose a significant challenge to state defense capabilities and raise concerns about escalating violence and the increasing sophistication of tactics used by non-state actors. While the Petro government has introduced a new project called the System Integral of Defense Nacional (SIDEN), or Integrated National Defense System, aims to renew military equipment for defensive and offensive purposes to protect the country’s energy, industrial and strategic assets in a conflict situation. However, the project does not seem to be responding effectively to the dynamics of national criminality.

Why should the next US administration care about this?

The insecurity plaguing Colombia is a national security concern for the United States. Drug trafficking and organized crime in Colombia should be a central focus of the next U.S. administration’s foreign policy. For example, events in Colombia’s Cauca Department have significant implications for the geopolitical dynamics of crime in the hemisphere. The interactions between armed groups transcend the deterrent and strategic capabilities of states, making it crucial for Washington to prioritize understanding the regional criminal order, which has a significant starting point in Colombia. Moreover, Colombian armed groups are developing dangerous network relationships with extracontinental terrorist organizations, such as the ELN’s interactions with Hezbollah in the Arauca region, near Venezuela. Moreover, Colombia serves as a corridor for transnational crime, as evidenced by the Aragua trail (Aragua Train), which has set up criminal franchises throughout South and Central America, posing a significant risk to the United States.

Colombia’s foreign and security policy approach should emphasize greater cooperation to improve internal and intelligence capabilities. It should also pressure the Petro government to define a national security concept that addresses the territorial and social specificities of each region in Colombia. In the strategic framework between Washington and Bogotá, it is important to recognize the existence of criminal governance and sovereignty. Ultimately, the security risks in Colombia and Latin America come from deaths by crime, not from nuclear threats, although these crimes are no less deadly.