Trust, training and barriers for Canadian law enforcement in cases of luring, sexual abuse and child sexual abuse images

Child exploitation is not a new phenomenon, but the Internet provides an anonymous platform for individuals to connect with more potential victims and accomplices of child exploitation than they otherwise would in the physical world (Gottfried et al., 2020). The Internet also facilitates logistical coordination, allowing perpetrators to anonymously connect with like-minded individuals online and coordinate plans to commit sexual crimes against children (Canadian Centre for Child Protection, 2016). A meta-analysis found that 1 in 5 adolescents have been exposed to unwanted sexual content online and 1 in 9 have received a direct sexual solicitation online (Madigan et al., 2018).

Online child exploitation has been steadily increasing in the 21st century. Experts have been sounding the alarm for over a decade, reporting an increase in the “number of images shared online and the level of violence associated with child exploitation and sexual abuse… the only place we have seen a decrease is in the age of victims” (Holder, 2011). The Canadian Centre for Child Protection reported a nearly five-fold increase in reports from 7,846 total reports in 2008 to 37,352 total reports in 2015 (2016). The National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (2019) reported receiving over 16.9 million reports of suspected CSAI and 69.1 million CSAI records for review (2019). There has been a substantial increase in CSAI since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Between 2020 and 2021, the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) reported a 20% increase in reviewed reports of CSAI and a 64% increase in confirmed CSAI (2021). The same report found a three-fold increase in self-generated imagery from 7-10 year olds, which was attributed to the increased amount of time children spent online during the COVID-19 pandemic (Internet Watch Foundation, 2021). The numbers are not going down: in 2023, there was a 1816% increase in self-generated child sexual abuse since it was first reported to the IWF in 2019 (2023).

There is significant overlap between online and offline sexual abuse in terms of both perpetrators and victims. A meta-analysis of individuals convicted of online sexual offenses found that 12% had a documented history of contact sexual abuse, while 55% self-reported a history of contact sexual abuse (Seto et al., 2011). A 2020 study analyzing data from federal prisoners convicted of CSAI possession found that 55% reported a contact sexual offense against a minor and nearly 40% of respondents reported having at least 2 victims (Smith, 2020).

Similarly, most individuals convicted of online sexual solicitation of a minor know their victim offline and use the Internet as a tool to facilitate communication (Finkelhor et al., 2021). Children are also more likely to experience online sexual abuse if they have previously experienced contact sexual abuse (Maas et al., 2018).

Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have responded to CSAI in a variety of ways. LEAs can use digital forensics to link a violation to a specific device and its user and IP address (Broadhurst, 2019). However, obtaining results can be challenging due to the anonymous and encrypted nature of the violation being investigated (Lin, 2016). Agents posing as children or offenders has been successful in the past (Jayawardene & Broadhurst, 2007), but LEAs have more recently found success in using network investigation techniques and undercover investigations (Walsh, Wolak, & Finkelhor, 2012).

Countries have approached the unique challenges of identification, investigation, and prosecution in different ways. Some countries, such as Sweden, assign personal IP addresses to all internet users in the country, making it possible to trace online activity back to a specific individual (Sweden, 2015). The United States established the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force Program, which helps LEAs address online child sexual exploitation through forensic assistance and technical training. In 2021, Australia passed the Australian Commonwealth Surveillance Legislation Amendment to increase the power of law enforcement agencies to identify and disrupt serious online crimes, including those committed by CSAI (Parliament of Australia, 2021).

International cooperation has also provided LEAs with certain tools in their efforts. In 2001, the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the “Budapest Convention,” which has been signed by 67 countries, including all 47 European states) was the first international treaty to standardize national laws and promote cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, specifically prohibiting the creation, distribution, procurement, or possession of CSAI and allowing international law enforcement to extradite suspects and retain computer data while intercepting CSAI (Broadhurst, 2019). In response to the dramatic increase in the availability of CSAI and with the aim of promoting international law enforcement cooperation, in 2007 the Council of Europe strengthened its legislation with the Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (also known as the “Lanzarote Convention”), which provides additional assistance to survivors and sanctions for perpetrators, while establishing the offence of recruiting or manipulating children for sexual purposes as a stand-alone offence in an international treaty for the first time (International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children, 2017).

Despite efforts to modernize laws and facilitate international cooperation to combat CSAI, individual LEAs face unique and significant barriers to detecting and prosecuting online child abuse. LEAs must attempt to stay abreast of the ever-changing dynamics of platform delivery to identify the luring and enticement of children that often leads to the production, distribution, and access of CSAI (Quayle & Koukopoulos, 2019). Online child abuse often transgresses national borders, creating challenges for LEAs to collaborate with international law enforcement (Wells et al., 2007). Finally, while at least some law enforcement jurisdictions have adapted new technology and training (Mitchell et al., 2010), LEAs face other challenges, such as the increasingly mobile nature of access to CSAI (Steel et al., 2022), outdated legal definitions of a crime, and the difficulty of identifying the age of children depicted in offensive images (Wells et al., 2007).

Given the rapid growth of online child sexual exploitation, LEAs need to respond with a greater focus on training their officers to identify and investigate the preparatory steps and criminal activity that lead to CSAI. However, the ability of LEAs to identify and investigate sexual abuse involving technology or the internet is unclear. A survey of English and Welsh law enforcement agencies revealed that, among other barriers, officers were not trained to investigate online child abuse quickly enough to keep pace with the pace at which the industry was developing and changing (Jewkes & Andrews, 2005). A survey of four European countries (UK, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) revealed that police are ill-equipped to respond to the increased growth of online child sexual abuse and that frontline police officers who first respond are not adequately trained or confident in their ability to investigate the offence (Davidson et al., 2020). Many participants in a 2018 survey of service providers in the Northwestern United States reported the importance of effective formal training in topics such as platform access and case building when asked about challenges associated with this type of work (Cullen et al., 2020). Similarly, an Australian survey of online CSAM police investigators revealed a significant need for additional training and knowledge needed to investigate CSAM, including greater knowledge of the tools used during investigations and a better understanding of offenders (Leclerc, et al., 2022). Despite groundbreaking and collaborative efforts between industry and law enforcement, as well as national and international work, there is a significant need to train and equip law enforcement in addressing online child sexual exploitation (Steel et al., 2022).

It is worth noting that while this study examined three categories of activity and only one is specifically defined by the use of online technology with a computer, accepted definitions of online child sexual abuse include the use of technology at any point in the offense (Greijer & Doek, 2016). This study sought to understand existing barriers, formal training, and the confidence of law enforcement officers when encountering child sexual abuse, CSAI, and seduction in their policing. The results of this study have the potential to impact policing by providing information to LEAs on the best and most effective use of training resources for their forces.