China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 23, 2024

Authors: Matthew Sperzel and Daniel Shats of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 21, 2024

The
China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for
the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update
supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses
Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for
the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to
controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• The
  PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer
  fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan
  Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC
  vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its
  law enforcement activities against Taiwan.
• CCG
  ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on
  August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on
  August 21.
• The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15. The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral in 2018.
• The PRC is taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries.
• A Chinese Coast Guard ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The
PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer
fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan
Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC
vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its
law enforcement activities against Taiwan. The PRC annually
bans fishing along its coastlines and in the South China Sea from early
May to mid-August. Its 2024 fishing moratorium ended on August 16.
55,000 PRC fishing vessels entered the East and South China Sea at the
start of the fishing season. The PRC Ministry of Transport (MOT)
organized a 30.5-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait on August 17 and 18
“to enhance maritime traffic control and emergency rescue capabilities
in the Taiwan Strait, and effectively protect the safety of life and
property of ships, facilities and personnel sailing and operating in the
Taiwan Strait.” Two boats from the Fujian Maritime Safety
Administration (MSA) and one from the East China Sea Rescue Bureau
jointly carried out the patrol. One of the MSA ships was the Haixun 06,
the largest PRC patrol vessel deployed to the Taiwan Strait. The patrol
covered 413 nautical miles (475 miles). The MOT noted that the large
number of vessels in the Taiwan Strait increased the risk of collision
between fishing and commercial vessels. It listed a wide range of
maritime law enforcement activities as the “main tasks” of the patrol,
including “patrolling waterways in the central waters of the Taiwan
Strait,” inspecting high-risk waterways, implementing traffic control,
and checking passing ships.(1)
Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that the three PRC
vessels briefly crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and then
sailed back toward the PRC without entering Taiwan-controlled waters.(2)
A portion of the PRC’s contiguous zone crosses over the median line.
The PRC claims Taiwan and the entire Taiwan Strait as its territory and
denies that any “median line” boundary exists.

The PRC
patrol may expand the PRC’s claimed legal jurisdiction in the Taiwan
Strait to incorporate international waters near Taiwan’s Penghu Islands.
The PRC state social media account Yuyuan Tantian reported in a post
titled “The ability to control the Taiwan Strait is changing” that the
patrol covered a wider area than in previous years, reaching two
nautical miles east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and as far
south as Taiwan Shoal. Taiwan Shoal is an undersea feature southwest of
Taiwan’s Penghu islands.(3)
Director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the
Institute for National Defense and Security Research Su Tzu-yun said
that this is the first time the PRC’s patrol route has included Taiwan
Shoal. He commented that this indicates the PRC intends to expand its
control to the median line and turn the Taiwan Strait into a
“quasi-inland sea.”(4)

The
increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks a greater
number of accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels.
The PRC may use such incidents as a further excuse to intensify its “law
enforcement” operations against Taiwanese nationals or extend the
geographic scope of such operations. Taiwanese fishermen and law
enforcement authorities have reported occasional CCG operations in
waters east of the median line, including attempts to expel Taiwanese
fishermen from international waters near Penghu that are within Taiwan’s
claimed Exclusive Economic Zone.(5)

CCG
ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on
August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on
August 21. Taiwan’s CGA reported that four CCG ships entered
Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen at 9:00 am and again at 3:00 pm
on August 16, three hours before and after the PRC fishing moratorium
ended at noon, respectively. The ships stayed in Kinmen’s restricted
waters for two hours each time. The CCG did not announce the incursions.(6)
The CCG conducted a very similar pair of incursions on August 21. Four
ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four
separate points at 8:50 am and left at 11:00 am. They entered again at
2:50 pm and left at 5:00 pm. The incursions were ten minutes longer on
August 21 than on August 16 but were otherwise nearly identical.(7)
The Fujian CCG announced the August 21 patrols. It said that it had
organized a fleet to “continuously strengthen law enforcement patrols in
the waters near Kinmen” in August, especially after the fishing season
started. The CCG said that it will further strengthen the control of the
waters, “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese
fishermen, including those in Taiwan,” and “effectively ensure the
normal navigation and operation order in the Xiamen-Kinmen waters.”(8)

The
PRC normalized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrols around Kinmen in
response to the deaths of two PRC fishermen whose boat capsized while
fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters on February 14. The
CCG carried out incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited
waters an average of five times per month between February and July. The
CCG has continued its incursions into Kinmen’s waters despite the PRC
and ROC recently resolving some disputes related to the February 14
capsizing incident. This indicates that the PRC remains committed to its
long-term campaign of using law enforcement to establish the PRC’s
legal jurisdiction around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) rejected and condemned the findings of a
Taiwanese investigation that exonerated Taiwan’s Coast Guard in the
February 14 capsizing incident. Two PRC fishermen died on
February 14 while fleeing a Taiwanese CGA pursuit in prohibited waters
around Kinmen, a Taiwanese island group two miles from the PRC. The CGA
boat and PRC fishing boat collided during the chase, after which the
fishing boat sank. The Kinmen Prosecutor’s Office released the results
of an investigation into the incident on August 16 and announced it
would not prosecute the CGA personnel. It determined that the CGA
personnel were not at fault in the collision and acted legally during
the pursuit.(9)
TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian rejected the investigation’s findings,
claiming they “disregard facts and deliberately shirk responsibilities.”
She called on Taiwan to disclose the truth about the incident,
“severely punish” those responsible, and prevent similar incidents in
the future.(10)

The
Taiwanese prosecutors released their findings weeks after PRC and ROC
authorities concluded negotiations on June 30 over the capsizing
incident. The ROC released the bodies of the deceased fishermen and
their boat to the PRC and apologized for not recording the incident. The
details of the agreement are not public. The PRC subsequently released
two of the three Taiwanese fishermen it had detained, including a former
soldier it had held since March.(11)

The
TAO’s reaction to the investigation’s findings is consistent with PRC
demands during earlier rounds of negotiations in March, in which the PRC
demanded that Taiwan reveal the truth and apologize for the incident,
in addition to returning the boat and bodies. The PRC may seize on
Taiwan’s decision not to prosecute anyone for the incident as an
outstanding grievance that demands retribution, such as further “law
enforcement” actions against Taiwan around Kinmen’s waters.

PRC
researchers at Xiamen University released and quickly deleted a report
advocating for the establishment of a “shadow government” that would be
prepared to take control of Taiwan after “reunification.” Xiamen
University’s Cross Strait Urban Planning Institute posted the short
article on August 5 on the PRC social media platform WeChat. The article
called for the immediate establishment of a Central Taiwan Work
Committee that would be primed to enter Taiwan as a “shadow government”
as soon as the PRC “reunifies” Taiwan. The committee would deeply study
Taiwan’s existing system to figure out a way to “digest” the system,
determine which institutions to preserve and which to change, and
incorporate Taiwanese elites into the design of the new government to
smooth the regime change process. The committee would also unite
“anti-independence” forces in Taiwan. The post argued that the
Kuomintang (KMT), the relatively PRC-friendly political party in Taiwan,
is softening its “anti-independence” stance and moving toward “implicit
Taiwan independence,” while “pro-unification” forces are generally
disorganized and vilified in Taiwanese society. It said the
establishment of the Central Taiwan Work Committee could systematize and
institutionalize forces against Taiwan’s independence, support them as
the Communist International supported the Chinese Communist Party in its
early days, and make Taiwanese people feel a greater sense of urgency
with regard to unification.

The post also advocated for
the establishment of a “Taiwan governance pilot zone” to conduct policy
experiments, train cadres, and demonstrate what post-unification
governance might look like. It proposed to situate the pilot zone in the
districts of the cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou nearest to Taiwan’s
Kinmen islands and to incorporate retired Taiwanese military,
government, and education personnel as consultants for the pilot zone.
Xiamen and Quanzhou are in Fujian Province, which is already the center
of many cross-strait integration initiatives due to its location
directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. The paper argued that the
One Country, Two Systems model of governance that the PRC applied to
Hong Kong may not be suitable for Taiwan and that the PRC should aim to
fully integrate Taiwan right away.(12)

It
is unclear the extent to which the post reflects the views of CCP
officials. The names of the authors were not listed on the article and
the post was deleted soon after posting without explanation. Hong
Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that the Xiamen
research institute said it would republish the article later. The
research institute has not done so as of August 21.(13)
Mainland PRC media did not report on the article. Xiamen University is
one of at least 75 public universities subordinate to the PRC Ministry
of Education.(14) The Cross-Strait Urban Planning Institute is part of its architecture and civil engineering school.

China

The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15.(15) The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral to the economy and national security in 2018.(16)
Antimony has a variety of military applications, including night vision
goggles, strengthening shielding materials, explosives, flares, nuclear
weapons, and infrared sensors.(17)
The export controls on antimony follow a pattern of the PRC’s
increasing securitization of critical minerals. The PRC implemented
export restrictions on gallium and germanium in August 2023 and
high-grade graphite in December 2023.(18)
All three minerals are US-designated critical minerals. Gallium and
germanium have applications in aerospace, military, and
telecommunications due to their use in the manufacture of optoelectronic
devices and fundamental inputs such as integrated circuits,
semiconductors, and transistors.(19)
Graphite has extensive industrial and military applications, including
the manufacture of missile guidance systems, artillery components,
firearms, and military aircraft.(20)

The
PRC’s export controls will complicate the United States’ access to
antimony. The PRC is the world’s leading producer of antimony,
accounting for 48% of global production in 2023. The PRC accounted for
63% of US antimony imports from 2019–2022.(21) The United States has not mined its antimony since 2001.(22) The United States’ annual demand for antimony is greater than any other single country’s mine production.(23)

The PRC is also taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries.
PRC Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua publicly urged the PRC
to increase production of strategic minerals to guard against
“unexpected domestic or external emergencies that could bring negative
impacts.”(24)
Improving access to strategic minerals for national security purposes
was among the policy measures that the PRC outlined in a resolution
following the Third Plenum in July.(25)
PRC Premier Li Qiang toured Australian lithium processing plants on
June 17, following an agreement to repair ties after several years of
trade tensions.(26) The PRC Ministry of Natural Resources designated lithium as a strategic mineral in 2016.(27)

The
PRC encountered a recent setback regarding its access to rare earth
minerals in Australia, however. Australian Treasurer Jim Chalmers
ordered the PRC national-owned Yuxiao Fund from an Australian rare earth
mining company on June 3 after using apparent proxy companies to
increase its stake, despite denial by the government’s Foreign
Investment Review Board.(28)
A corporate filing from 2023 reveals the head of the Yuxiao Fund, Wu
Tao, as a mining magnate with connections to the PRC government.(29)

Southeast Asia

Philippines

A Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19.
The collisions caused significant damage to the hull of the PCG ship.
The PCG ship continued its mission to supply personnel at other
Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea, however.(30)
The Sabina Shoal is 75 nautical miles from the Philippine island of
Palawan and is within the Philippines’ United Nations-recognized
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Sabina Shoal belongs to the Spratly
Islands, which is a semi-submerged archipelago that the PRC and
Philippines both claim in its entirety. CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia
(CMM) boats frequently resort to ramming against rival claimants in the
South China Sea to deter their presence in PRC-claimed waters without
escalating to outright violence.(31)

The
CCG and PRC MFA stated that the Philippines was responsible for the
incident and that the PCG ship deliberately caused the collision.(32) PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela denied the PRC’s version of events and blamed the CCG for the collision.(33)
The US Department of State issued a press statement that condemned the
PRC for deliberately colliding with the PCG ship and reaffirmed the
United States’ commitment to defending the Philippines in the South
China Sea under the two countries’ mutual defense treaty.(34)

The
PRC and the Philippines both accuse each other of attempting to
establish footing at Sabina Shoal to assert control over the feature.
PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated on May 11 that the PCG was
committed to maintaining a presence at Sabina Shoal to monitor PRC
attempts at land reclamation, which he claimed aimed to build an
artificial island on the shoal.(35) The PRC MFA stated that the accusation was an attempt to mislead the international community.(36) The CCG anchored its largest ship near Sabina Shoal on July 3 and remained there for 38 days.(37)
The PRC communicated its intent to stop the Philippines from adding to
its presence there days before the incident. State-owned tabloid Global Times reported on August 14 that the PRC would not allow the Philippines to “expand its occupation” of the shoal.(38)

PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated on August 16 and 19
that the Philippines’ presence at Sabina Shoal violates the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).(39)
The DOC is a non-binding document between ASEAN countries and the PRC
that affirms the signatories’ commitment not to act in an escalatory
manner or resort to violence in territorial disputes.(40)
The PRC’s accusation possibly refers to a provision of the DOC that
states that members will refrain from inhabiting previously uninhabited
features in the South China Sea. The PRC’s ramming of the PCG ship
represents its own violation of the DOC’s provision not to use violence
in territorial disputes. The parties have failed to solidify a binding
code during the last two decades amid the PRC’s aggressive
militarization of the South China Sea. The PRC denied the validity of
alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’
calls in November to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea code of
conduct.(41)

A
PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would improve the PRC’s ability to assert
its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal and other nearby features in the
South China Sea. The PRC has built military infrastructure on
the features of the Spratly Islands that it occupies to counter the
Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. For example, the PRC’s two
most militarized features in the Spratly Islands are Subi Reef and
Mischief Reef, both of which are directly adjacent to the two most
militarized Philippine-controlled features, Thitu Island and Second
Thomas Shoal, respectively. The infrastructure on both of the
PRC-controlled features enables the PRC to sustain deployments of naval
ships and aircraft in the South China Sea.(42)

Controlling
the shoal, which is near the Philippines as one of the easternmost
features in the Spratly Islands, likely would enable the PRC to more
easily intercept Philippine vessels sailing from Palawan to prevent them
from accessing or establishing a presence around other disputed
features. PRC infrastructure on the shoal, especially facilities that
accommodate CCG or naval vessels, would better position CCG ships to
frustrate Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre military outpost on Second Thomas Shoal, which is 35 nautical miles to the west.

Vietnam

The
PRC and Vietnam signed fourteen economic deals and pledged to increase
diplomatic efforts pertaining to the South China Sea. These agreements
reflect Vietnam’s desire to avoid picking sides in South China Sea
disputes. Vietnamese President To Lam met with Xi Jinping on
August 14, during which they signed fourteen bilateral agreements,
mostly focusing on infrastructure and trade regulations. The PRC and
Vietnam also issued a joint declaration on August 20 that reiterated
their desire to diplomatically resolve issues in the South China Sea and
cooperate to build a “China-Vietnam community of shared destiny with
strategic significance.”(43)
The two countries agreed that they would implement the Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and push for the
negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). The COC is an
agreement between the PRC and ASEAN member states that has been under
negotiation for over a decade. The COC will provide guidelines for state
behavior in disputed waters to reduce maritime tensions in the region.(44)
The PRC and ASEAN have had difficulty completing negotiations due to
disagreements on the proposed geographic scope of the COC and the
binding nature of such an agreement.(45)
This led to the completion of the non-binding DOC in 2002, with
sporadic negotiation attempts taking place up to the present day.(46)
Defense ministers and public security officials from the PRC and
Vietnam also met and promised to continue bilateral engagement on
security issues.(47)

These
high-level meetings occurred only a few weeks after the announcement of
joint coast guard exercises between Vietnam and the Philippines and the
corresponding agreement to expand coast guard cooperation between the
two countries. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have experienced PRC
incursions into their territorial waters, but the two countries have
pursued very different courses of action regarding the PRC. Vietnam’s
engagement with CCP leadership indicates that they see positive
relations with the PRC as a key component of their national security and
economic development.

Myanmar

The PRC promised to support the Myanmar junta’s upcoming elections and plans for government transition. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar from August 14–15.(48)
Wang met with top leaders from Myanmar’s State Administration Council
(SAC), who took control of the country in a military coup in 2021.
During this meeting, Wang reiterated the PRC’s support for the SAC and
expressed his desire for the SAC to bring about an end to the conflict.
The PRC has supported the SAC since the coup occurred, and the two
governments have been working together on a number of cooperative
efforts including building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor,
maintaining existing oil and gas pipelines, and reducing transnational
crime.(49)
The PRC brokered a short-lived ceasefire between the SAC and a group of
militias known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance after the militias
conducted the massive Operation 1027 joint offensive along the PRC
border last October.(50) Since the resumption of fighting this June, resistance forces have taken even more territory within the border areas.(51)

The
PRC has promised additional support for the SAC’s upcoming census and
elections. Wang Yi reiterated the PRC’s support for democratic
transition in Myanmar during an August 16 meeting with leaders from
Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.(52)
During this meeting Wang also stated the PRC’s support for the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ “Five-Point Consensus,” the
organization’s peace plan for Myanmar. Pro-democracy forces in Myanmar
widely criticized the Five Point Consensus and claimed that it was a way
to legitimize the junta’s control. The junta’s proposed elections have
been widely criticized, as the junta has forcibly dissolved almost 40
political parties in Myanmar and banned several others from
participating in the upcoming election.(53)
The dissolved parties include the National League for Democracy (NLD),
whose overwhelming electoral victory in 2021 sparked the military coup.

The
United States met with representatives from Myanmar’s opposition
movement after Wang’s statements. US State Department Counselor Tom
Sullivan and USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Schiffer met with
leading members of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the
National Unity Consultative Council, and representatives for key Ethnic
Resistance Organizations.(54)
During this meeting, the US representatives voiced their support for
the opposition and stated that they would continue to expand direct
support to pro-democracy actors and improve their ability to provide
humanitarian aid and public services to those in need. While the US
representatives also called for an end to the crisis, analysts believe
that recent rebel victories will embolden opposition groups to move
towards areas in central Myanmar.(55)

Indonesia

Indonesia
and the PRC agreed to organize joint military training as part of their
first “2+2” diplomatic and military dialogue. Indonesia will host a
US-led regional military exercise next week. Senior PRC and
Indonesian foreign ministry and defense officials met in the two
countries’ first “2+2” dialogue in Jakarta on August 12 to discuss
strengthening diplomatic and defense ties. A statement that the
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on August 13 announced
cooperation on various issues including joint military training.(56)
It did not provide any details on the arrangement. Indonesia will host
the US-led Super Garuda Shield exercises from August 26 to September 5.
The exercises will include dozens of other countries including Japan,
Australia, South Korea, Germany, Singapore, and Malaysia.(57)

Indonesia
has participated in separate joint military exercises with the PRC and
the United States as part of a policy of engaging with both major powers
to avoid being drawn into one side of the geopolitical rivalry.(58)
Indonesia’s push for military modernization, spearheaded by Defense
Minister and incoming president Prabowo Subianto, may lead to closer
defense cooperation and new arms deals with other countries including
the PRC. The South China Morning Post cited analysts who said
Indonesia has been “lukewarm” about developing a defense partnership
with the PRC, however. Indonesia procures most of its military equipment
from European and other Western-aligned countries.(59)

Europe

Germany

The
PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the scheduled transit
of two German warships through the Taiwan Strait in September. The German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and replenishment ship Frankfurt am Main
are visiting ports in East Asia and awaiting orders to transit the
Taiwan Strait in September. The United States and other nations have
sent warships through the Taiwan Strait several times in 2024, including
a Canadian transit on July 31. The upcoming German transit will be
Germany’s first since 2002, however.(60)
MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the news and said that “China
has always opposed undermining China’s territorial sovereignty and
security under the guise of ‘freedom of navigation.’”(61)
The PRC perceives itself as surrounded by a coalition of US-aligned
nations that seek to contain it. It has repeatedly criticized “external
interference” in the region and especially in the “Taiwan question,”
which it considers to be its internal affair.

Russia

PRC
Premier Li Qiang traveled to Russia to meet with Russian Prime Minister
Mikhail Mishustin for the 29th meeting between PRC and Russian prime
ministers on August 21. The PRC readout called for the PRC and
Russia to strengthen coordination in international affairs, better
safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Russia and China, and
promote the continuous development of the comprehensive strategic
cooperative partnership between the two countries in the new era.(62)
The two prime ministers signed an updated version of the PRC-Russia
investment cooperation planning outline as well as cooperation
agreements spanning education, science and technology, chemicals, green
construction, maritime search and rescue, cross-border cargo
transportation, and facilitation of citizen exchanges.

Mishustin
stated that the two countries should jointly defend their interests and
the principles of the multipolar world order in the face of pressure
from Western sanctions. Mishustin claimed that Western countries wanted
to contain the PRC and Russia’s economic and technological potential to
maintain their global dominance.(63)

Li
met with Russian President Vladimir Putin after meeting with Mishustin.
Li expressed the PRC’s interest in expanding cooperation with Russia
outside of traditional areas to include scientific and technological
innovation in emerging sectors.(64) Li signaled the PRC’s willingness to strengthen multilateral coordination with Russia and promote multi-polarization.

Iran

Iran
is seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies
specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution
imagery.(65)
This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering
capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes. The Washington Post,
citing unspecified Western security officials, reported on August 16
that Iran is seeking a partnership with two Chinese satellite companies
specializing in manufacturing and operating small, low-cost satellites
with optical equipment capable of producing high-resolution images. The Washington Post
reported that the optical equipment of the Chinese satellites is “at
least twice as sensitive” as the most advanced satellites currently
operated by Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and
the Chinese companies have exchanged multiple delegations over the past
few months in an attempt to secure these partnerships.

Higher
resolution satellite imagery could allow Iranian military services to
improve their targeting practices for future operations targeting US,
Israeli, and Arab military bases. Iran would also almost certainly share
this targeting information with its proxies and partners to enable
their attacks. Iranian state media previously reported in July 2020 that
the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military
positions in the region.(66)
The United States previously sanctioned one of the companies Iran is
pursuing a partnership with, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., due
to its support for Russia’s Wagner Group.(67)

(1) https://www.mot.gov dot cn/jiaotongyaowen/202408/t20240820_4150709.html

(2) https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202408180206.aspx

(3) https://military.china dot com/news/13004177/20240819/47059286.html

(4) https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202408180206.aspx

(5) https://news.ltn.com dot tw/news/politics/paper/1655032

https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202407200085.aspx

(6) https://www.cga.gov dot tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=161289&ctNode=10278&mp=9996

(7) https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202408210365.aspx

(8) http://www.81 dot cn/ss_208539/16332684.html

(9) https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/acn/202408160386.aspx

https://www.taiwannews.com dot tw/news/5920437

(10) http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202408/t20240816_12643128.htm

(11) https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202408130017

https://www.cna.com dot w/news/acn/202408070234.aspx

(12) https://web.archive.org/web/20240808155431/https:/mp.weixin.qq.com/s/qcwSJ05fUELOzNIPYst4gQ

(13) https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3273700/academics-suggest-beijing-set-shadow-government-thats-ready-run-taiwan

(14) https://web.archive.org/web/20220611022011/http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_zzjg/moe_347/

(15) https://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_a4711acb06364199a3c5a06d7f2be6d8.html

(16) https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/interior-releases-2018s-final-list-35-minerals-deemed-critical-us

(17) https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/ebot_a_critical_material_probably_never_heard_of.pdf

(18) http://www.mofcom dot gov.cn/article/zwgk/gkzcfb/202310/20231003447368.shtml

http://m.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zwgk/gkzcfb/202307/20230703419666.shtml

(19) https://www.usgs.gov/publications/gallium#:~:text=GaAs%20is%20able%20to%20change,and%20industrial%20and%20medical%20equipment.

https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/pp1802I

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(21) https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024-antimony.pdf

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(67) https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1978