Opinion: AMLO’s nationalism blinds him to Mexico’s economic needs

David Agren is a freelance journalist writing about Mexico and Latin America.

Canada’s ambassador to Mexico, Graeme C. Clark, likely knew that his comments about Mexico’s upcoming judicial reform would anger the populist president, no matter how softly he expressed them.

“My investors are concerned, they want stability, they want a legal system that works when there are problems,” Mr. Clark told reporters at a recent Canadian Chamber of Commerce event.

His US counterpart Ken Salazar put it more clearly, saying the reform “poses a grave risk to the functioning of Mexican democracy.” He added that the reform’s main proposal, direct election of judges, “would make it easier for cartels and other bad actors to take advantage of politically motivated and inexperienced judges.”

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who will hand over the presidency to his protégé Claudia Sheinbaum on September 30, immediately criticized the ambassadors for their “interference.” He then announced a “pause” in relations with the two countries — only to clarify later that relations would continue, but that he would not have any contact with the ambassadors.

“The treaty,” he said, referring to the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), “is not intended to give up our sovereignty. It is intended to have very good commercial, economic relations that are beneficial to both countries. But it is not that Mexico becomes an appendage, a colony, an associated state.”

Both countries then reiterated their respect for Mexican sovereignty — a reflection of the sensitivities of dealing with the nationalist president, better known as AMLO, who insists that countries stay out of Mexican affairs even as he meddles in Latin America. It also reflected the leverage he wields over the U.S., which relies on Mexico for migration enforcement in an election year.

But the ambassadors’ warnings are well-founded. The reform push has scared off investors, sent the once-strong peso plummeting and raised concerns that the country is returning to the worst vices of one-party rule — with a weak separation of powers and the president wielding power over the courts.

“He’s playing hardball with our biggest trading partners,” said Brenda Estefan, a professor of international politics at the IPADE business school. “His priorities have always been internal.”

The reform comes at an unfortunate time: CUSMA is up for review in 2026. Mexico also stands to benefit from nearshoring, as companies move their supply chains from China to countries with easy access to the U.S. But the judicial reform—part of a larger package that would also eliminate or strip the independence of Mexico’s autonomous agencies, such as the competition agency and the telecom regulator—“makes it harder to achieve a successful review,” said Diego Marroquín Bitar, the Bersin-Foster North America scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

AMLO’s reforms would remove all judges, including Supreme Court justices, and allow them to run for re-election in 2025 and 2027. While some U.S. states elect judges, federal states do not; only Bolivia elects Supreme Court justices.

As economist and political analyst Manuel Molano wrote in El Financiero, “the independence of the judiciary would depend on the goodwill of sponsors and promoters of the candidacies of judges.” Those sponsors would inevitably include drug cartels, which have killed more than 30 candidates in the 2024 election cycle.

Much of the unrest in Mexico has been fueled by the president’s perceived motives as much as by its substance. The judiciary has issued injunctions against his flagship projects, such as a railroad around the Yucatán Peninsula that runs through environmentally sensitive areas, and his efforts to place the National Guard under military command, despite constitutional requirements that it be under civilian control.

There is also a sense of personal resentment for AMLO, for whom politics revolves very much around him. He opposed the selection of Norma Piña as president of the Supreme Court; his supporters took offense when she refused to stand and applaud during one of their few public appearances together.

But ultimately, AMLO is a nationalist concerned with domestic issues who has made little effort to promote investment in Mexico. He idealizes the time before what he derides as the “neoliberal period” ushered in by NAFTA, which transformed Mexico’s previously closed economy into an export-driven one. More than 80 percent of its exports now go to the U.S. and Canada.

He supported CUSMA, which was signed just before his inauguration in 2018. But in AMLO’s Mexico, nationalism transcends regional integration and the economy.

The question remains how Ms. Sheinbaum—who won office on a promise to continue AMLO’s political project but wants to capitalize on nearshoring—will navigate this dilemma. Will she pursue a nationalist path, or break with her mentor and pursue closer continental ties? Mr. López Obrador’s influence looms large over her incoming administration, making it difficult for her to choose the latter.