‘Holy’ Philadelphia Route Will Be Paved With Hostages’ Bodies As Israel Retakes Gaza

The Philadelphia corridor near Rafah in Gaza in July.

Zvi Bar’el writes in Haaretz on September 3, 2024:

Few Israelis needed Joe Biden’s blunt “no” when asked if he believed Benjamin Netanyahu was doing enough to reach a hostage-release deal. Israelis have known the truth for months.

The prime minister did not shoot the six hostages in the head last week, Hamas terrorists did. But Netanyahu systematically created the circumstances that led to the killings.

Darn it, Israel’s control of the Philadelphia Route—the border between Gaza and Egypt—has been labeled “a diplomatic and strategic issue.” And last week, the security cabinet (except for Defense Minister Yoav Gallant) rightly voted to leave Israeli troops there. The chilling result became clear the next day in the dark tunnel where the bodies of six hostages were found.

The decision of the security cabinet not only reflects the shame of the dishonest people who considered this hollow “strategy” more important than human life, as if it were a holy place or a symbol of the return to the Promised Land. It also ignores the position of the army and the Shin Bet people who believe that Israel can give up control of the route, at least for a limited time. But most importantly, the decision maliciously ignores the history of the route.

Malicious, because it is impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that the army controlled the Philadelphia route before, and that this did not prevent Hamas’s weapons supplies and attacks, including terror attacks. It is also impossible that no one in the security cabinet remembers that even when the army fully controlled Gaza between 1967 and 2005, the year of the withdrawal, Israel was still hit by mortar shells and Qassam rockets from the Strip.

According to data compiled by the human rights group B’Tselem, the Shuvi women’s group that supported the Gaza withdrawal, the Yesha Council of Jewish Settlements, and the Palestinian organization representing families of the dead, 230 Israelis and about 2,600 Palestinians were killed in Gaza between 1967 and 2005. From December 1987, when the first intifada began, until the signing of the Oslo I Accord six years later, 29 Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed. From 1993 to 2000, when the second intifada began, 39 Israelis were killed.

Over a year and a half, from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s announcement of his plan to leave Gaza until the actual withdrawal, 52 Israelis were killed in Gaza. And during the second intifada, some 500 rockets and 6,000 mortar shells were fired from the Gaza Strip. During that entire period, Israel had complete control not only of the Philadelphia route, but of all of Gaza.

Under the noses of the army, tunnels were dug and weapons, ammunition and fighters from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other groups were smuggled in. They crossed the Sinai as if they were driving on a highway.

Based on data analyzed by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terror Information Center, between 2000 and 2005, 15,057 terrorist attacks were carried out in Gaza or were carried out in Israel and launched from Gaza (compared to 9,495 for the West Bank).

People on the right talk about the “era of silence” before the withdrawal, when the army’s presence in Gaza allegedly prevented terrorist attacks and rocket fire. They also talk about the “era of war” that the withdrawal allegedly brought about. This is a completely baseless, fraudulent story that the government and the prime minister are trying to recycle and sell to the public.

Whether to remain in the Philadelphia corridor or withdraw is a major issue that hinges on the fate of the hostages. But when Netanyahu calls it a “diplomatic issue” or “strategic,” these are rhetorical flourishes designed to overshadow the lives of dozens of people. And when he uses these phrases, he portrays the route as a linchpin for a continued occupation of Gaza.

That’s because it’s impossible to control the Philadelphia route without controlling the routes leading to it. And there’s no way to defend the soldiers patrolling it without defending the adjacent spaces and neighborhoods — and southern Gaza is densely populated.

The Philadelphia Trail is not a goat trail used by amateur hikers. The official reason for controlling it is to combat smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, but when Netanyahu and his cabinet decided that the army would stay there, it became a whole package including an occupation. As Netanyahu put it: “We will stay in Gaza as long as it is necessary.”

That is the “strategic” translation of controlling the corridor, for which the hostages can be sacrificed. It is above all a sacred goal, because wherever the army is, settlements can be built, restoring the crown and glory.

Hamas understands this, Egypt fears it, the United States knows where the Philadelphia route is leading Israel, and paradoxically, the hostage deal is the only factor that can save Israel from getting bogged down in the sands of Gaza. But the hostages are an obstacle to realizing the strategy of returning to Gaza, and they will be sacrificed on the altar of the “corridor” that has become a symbol of supposed total security.

The proof that the presence of the army is no guarantee of security is found in the argument that settlers in the West Bank shout: The army does not protect them. It is impossible to claim that the army is not “present” in the West Bank, but weapons flow there from Jordan, are stolen from army bases, and reach terrorists via Israeli criminal gangs. Car bombs do not require advanced Iranian technology or rare earth metals.

The first intifada emerged and expanded during the occupation, when the army controlled the Philadelphia route. The army’s presence did not prevent the kidnapping and murder of three teenagers in the West Bank in June 2014.

And the army’s magical “presence” in Lebanon did not help the Galileans when Hezbollah fired hundreds of Katyushas and rockets into Israel in the 1990s. The daily war in Israel’s self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon, which lasted until 2000, was not enough. Israel had to launch two major campaigns, Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, to try to stop the rocket fire. Still, the barrages continued until 1999.

Israel is not the only country to argue that a long-term occupation guarantees security. On May 1, 2003, then-President George W. Bush gave a speech on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner reading “Mission Accomplished.”

“Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle for Iraq, the United States and our allies have won” because “the regime (of Saddam Hussein) no longer exists,” Bush said.

But in 2007, the United States was forced to send 20,000 additional troops to Iraq as part of a “surge” strategy to combat al-Qaeda, which had mobilized Sunni forces against the international coalition. The Americans did not withdraw from Iraq until 2011 under a deal Bush signed with the Iraqi government in 2008, only to return in 2014 when the Islamic State overran parts of the country.

But at least the Americans had an exit strategy that relied on training an Iraqi army and police force that could handle the security problems (an army that had failed at the beginning of the war against the Islamic State). The Americans also planned to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and provide economic aid to the new Iraqi governments.

However, Israel has no intention of establishing an alternative Palestinian government to Hamas, and the route to Philadelphia will end up as a highway paved with the bodies of the hostages.

This article has been reproduced in its entirety