Is ISIS targeting the Gulf?

On July 15, three men were opened fire at the Imam Ali Mosque in Muscat as worshippers gathered for prayers on the eve of the Shia Ashura festival. The attack, which was later claimed by ISIS, killed at least six people and wounded 30 others. Afterward, many commentators noted with surprise that the three gunmen hardly fit the mold of the ISIS stereotype recruits; they were well-educated brothers from a wealthy family who had well-paid jobs – one of them even worked for the Omani government after obtaining a doctorate. Furthermore, the men had managed to obtain limited firearms and were able to engage in a ten-hour standoff with Omani security forces, suggesting that they had received some form of military training, despite never having served in the Omani armed forces.

The fact that ISIS was able to establish a presence in the country and recruit men of Omani descent is shocking to many. The majority of the sultanate’s citizens are Ibadi Muslims, which don’t search Islamic rule of the state. Although the country’s Ibadi demography has been instrumental in Oman’s skill In an effort to limit ISIS recruitment, the group has still managed to carry out attacks in areas with even lower recruitment, such as Iran and Russia. Despite the government’s ability to remain neutral in regional conflicts, while maintaining a reputation for low crime rates and religious tolerance, ISIS still managed to carry out an attack in the Sultanate.

Implications for Oman

While it is unlikely that Oman will transform into a hotbed for ISIS activity in the near future, some analysts, both Omani and American, who spoke to the author anonymously noted that ISIS ideology could gain traction due to changing domestic dynamics in Oman. Indeed, there has been a growing momentum behind the foundational ideologies of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah; a rise of a patriarchal and conservative form of Ibadi religious discourse; and popular frustration with the ongoing war in Gaza and the failure of regional mediators to address it. These factors have created an environment more conducive to anti-American and anti-Western sentiment than at any time in the Sultanate’s modern history, which ISIS and other extremist organizations could take advantage of if left unchecked.

The foreign connection

Some American analysts have speculated that the ISIS branch in Yemen may have played a role in the attacks due to its proximity and previous presence communication in which ISIS central command asked its Yemeni branch to carry out attacks in Oman. Yet ISIS-Y has largely sleepy in Yemen since mid-2020, and current estimates put its strength at just 100 fighters concentrated in sleeper cells in Aden and al-Bayda. Tellingly, even before its activity waned, the group had never successfully conducted an operation outside Yemen, despite explicit requests from ISIS leadership.

While it is unclear which ISIS affiliate, if any, played a direct role in the planning and execution of the attack, it is important to note that the attack is closely related to others tied to the organization’s notorious Afghan branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-K). Since the group’s territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria five years ago, ISIS-K has emerged as one of the few ISIS affiliates capable of conducting transnational attacks and has been involved in operations targeting civilians in countries that were not previously epicenters of ISIS activity. In January, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for a bombard at a memorial ceremony for Qasem Soleimani in Kerman, Iran, killing more than 100 people. Just two months later, ISIS-K fighters attacked The Crocus City Hall auditorium in Moscow shortly before a concert there, in which 145 civilians were killed. Both attacks have since been linked to the Afghan branch.

Furthermore, the Muscat operation targeted a Shia mosque where mainly Pakistani migrants were gathered, ostensibly to embarrass the Muscat government and portray it as incapable of protecting its migrant population and its Shia minority. This strategy is strongly reminiscent of ISIS-K to attack which in recent years have often targeted Shiite neighborhoods and mosques in Afghanistan to sow discontent among the Shiite population against the Taliban-led government.

Implications for the Gulf

While the Gulf region has been largely spared from ISIS attacks, the attack in Oman, a country known for supplying a few foreign fighters to ISIS and one who consistently arranged as one of the safest countries in the Middle East—is a stark reminder that other Gulf states could be targets for future operations. As ISIS continues to recover from the loss of its territorial caliphate, the storming of the Imam Ali Mosque underscores that carrying out shocking terrorist attacks remains a vital part of the organization’s strategy.

While the government in Muscat will likely focus on strengthening the security sector, particularly around key economic projects in Duqm, and implementing necessary reforms, the rest of the region will undergo similar efforts to ensure they are not the next target. Those concerns are compounded by ISIS’s ongoing threats against previous high-profile events such as the Paris Olympic Gamesthe champions league games in Madrid, Paris and London, and even the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. With this knowledge in mind, large-scale events such as the F1 races in Saudi Arabia and Qatar scheduled for later this year could be particularly threatened.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Gulf International Forum.