How Algeria is Trapped in a Presidential Groundhog Day

On September 14, Algeria’s incumbent president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, was officially re-elected in a landslide victory, capturing more than 80% of the vote. While such an emphatic victory might indicate popularity, it rarely reflects a democratic race.

Since Tebboune, a former minister under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, took office after low turnout in the 2019 elections, he has increasingly adopted his predecessor’s style.

During the campaign, opponents withdrew, citing “unfair conditions.” Those who opposed his policies were tried under broad anti-terrorism laws or forced into exile.

For many Algerians, these elections felt like déjà vu: a repeat of the four presidential victories of Bouteflika, who was ousted by the Hirak uprising just as he was preparing to run for a fifth term.

At the time, the presidential election results were almost a formality; Bouteflika was widely expected to remain in power despite his deteriorating health and reliance on a wheelchair.

Andrew G. Farrand, author of The Algerian Dream, believes Tebboune is likely to follow in Bouteflika’s footsteps.

“In Algeria, the political system fears change and prefers continuity,” Farrand said The New Arab.

After Independence: The Army, Islamists and Politics

It is no secret that the military has played an important role in Algerian politics since independence.

After 132 years of colonization, the FLN (National Liberation Front) and its military wing, the ALN (National Liberation Army), finally defeated French colonization in 1962.

The leaders of the liberation movement then established a one-party state, which eventually led to riots and civil war in the country.

Ben Bella, Algeria’s first post-independence president, was deposed three years later by his defense minister Boumediene after he failed to unite the various factions of the ALN. Boumediene ruled until his death in 1978, when he was succeeded by another ALN member, Chadli Bendjedid, who ended one-party rule but still rejected political competition.

In 1991, however, the army intervened to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power. Bendjedid was ousted and a long, bloody civil war ensued.

Bouteflika, who was foreign minister in Boumediene’s government, became president two decades later when the country sought to unite after the civil war. He remained in office even as his health deteriorated, and military leaders are said to have drafted his letters and decisions.

When Algeria gained independence, the ALN proclaimed the people as “the only hero” and refused to idolize individual militants.

But history tells a different story. The ALN, whether in the foreground or in the background, has for more than half a century relied on its historical legitimacy to play a decisive role in the political and economic direction of the country.

In 2019, however, Algerian people took to the streets chanting, “The system is corrupt, all of you out!” The FLN’s historical legitimacy was no longer enough to justify a faltering economy and the revolving door of presidential positions while the military maintained its upper hand.

As with most regional revolutions, the Algerian Hirak was crushed, its leaders arrested, and elections were held with low turnout, eventually leading to the Tebboune elections.

Unlike his predecessors, however, Tebboune lacks charisma, charm and public speaking skills, making him unlikable — even among military personnel. “There are reports that some military leaders are critical of his potential,” explains Farrand, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Middle East Initiatives.

During his first term, Tebboune took a number of decisions to regain the trust of skeptical military leaders. On June 27, he signed a decree allowing military officers to hold high positions in sensitive state sectors related to national sovereignty and interests.

The move is expected to lead to “greater military influence in civilian areas,” defense specialist Akram Kharief warned in an article for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

Under Tebboune, the military appears more important than ever, as the leader spreads stories about alleged threats from neighboring Morocco, the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK) and the Islamist-conservative Rachad movement – ​​both labeled “terrorist” by the authorities.

In line with these perceived threats, the defense budget rose to nearly $20 billion in 2023, making it the country’s largest expenditure.

“In Algeria, the political system fears change and prefers continuity”

‘No uprisings in the near future’

On the streets of Algeria, freedom of expression may not be at the top of the wish list, but what is essential for the country’s 45 million citizens is a better economy, more jobs and higher wages. The incumbent president has stumbled on all these fronts.

Although Algeria’s economy has grown at an annual rate of about 4 percent over the past two years, it is still heavily dependent on gas to finance its social programs. This dependence makes the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil prices, stifles non-hydrocarbon employment, and depletes resources.

“There is no room for public debate in the country now. At least during Bouteflika’s era there was a semblance of dialogue,” Farrand said. The New Arab.

The political expert argues that Algeria needs a free space for debate and political dialogue, especially regarding the problems of a gas-rich country that still has to figure out how to unlock its full potential.

There are currently 228 prisoners of conscience in Algeria, most of whom have been charged with “terrorism” for criticizing Tebboune’s regime, according to human rights activist Zaki Hannache. Repression has deepened apathy among the population, which often calls the political elite a “mafia.”

The turnout for this election was less than 50%, according to official figures. An article from the French daily The world predicted that the actual figure could be lower than 25%.

Despite all this, to those familiar with the political dynamics in Algeria, it seems unlikely that a new Hirak movement will emerge in that region.

“I don’t think we’ll see another Hirak in the near future. At least that’s not how the political dynamics have developed throughout the country’s history,” Farrand concludes.

Basma El Atti is Morocco correspondent for The New Arab.

Follow her on Twitter: @elattibasma