What Will Replace Hezbollah? – UnHerd

The the majority of those killed in the pager attacks were indeed Hezbollah fighters. Yet hundreds of people — working as doctors and teachers, mechanics and shopkeepers – were wounded. Although they had never held a gun in the service of the group, and were by most definitions civilians, they too were caught in the crossfire: Hezbollah’s grip on their daily lives was simply too tight. It is a situation that has parallels elsewhere, with Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and drug cartels in Latin America that serve a similar social function.

Nor is all this relevant only to Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Deciding where to draw the line between combatant and civilian remains a crucial issue in conflicts involving non-state actors, blurring the lines between guerrilla and quasi-government. But with Israel seemingly setting the stage for an all-out war with Hezbollah — now have hundreds of air raids carried out north of the border, which together have resulted in the deadliest day in Lebanon since hostilities began last year — This unresolved ambiguity will continue to have deadly consequences for the Lebanese people. To put it bluntly, many risk being found guilty by association with Hezbollah and its vast, multifaceted network.

“Many are at risk of being found guilty because of their association with Hezbollah and its vast, multifaceted network.”

As the last year of warfare in Gaza has made clear to the world, Israel has no qualms about inflicting devastating civilian casualties to achieve its goals on the battlefield. The policy of putting maximum pressure on Hamas and Gaza even originated in Lebanon. In 2006, the IDF destroyed civilian infrastructure to contain Hezbollah, ultimately resulting in the infamous Dahieh Doctrine. Since the start of the current round of fighting, now nearly a year old, Israel has attacked rescue teams affiliated with Hezbollah, as well as the group’s medical services, suggesting that for Israel, the distinction between civilian branches of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and its military wing is already tenuous.

From a purely military perspective, this brutal policy is understandable. All branches of Hezbollah’s network feed into the same coffers. They play a role in financing the armed wing, so it makes strategic sense for Israel to eliminate the entire organization, despite the immense ethical implications involved. But then the question arises: how far is Israel willing to go? Who, to put it bluntly, will it decide to contribute to Hezbollah’s operations? — and therefore get a target on their backs? Random civilians aren’t the only ones at risk here. After all, Hezbollah has held seats in the Lebanese parliament since 1992 and is currently part of the country’s governing coalition. Although Israel apologized for killing a member of the Lebanese Armed Forces in late 2023, IDF commanders have previously stated that in a future war they would make no distinction between Hezbollah and the formal state.

Analysts have spent the past year often noted that although Israel has achieved tactical victories over Hezbollah — especially the pager attack or the recent to kill by Ibrahim Aqeel — it has no strategic vision beyond these triumphs. The closest it comes is the belief, apparently held by many in Israel’s national security and military leadership since October 7, that the application of overwhelming force will intimidate its enemies into capitulation. This calculation has in effect led to a policy of collective punishment against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank for their proximity — voluntary or not — to Hamas. As we now see, Shiite Muslims in Lebanon are now suffering a similar fate thanks to their (often unwanted) relationship with Hezbollah.

From British Kenya in the 1950s to Syria after 2011, where powerful actors have tried to tame guerrillas and the restive populations that support them, history shows that such a strategy is doomed to fail. Basic group psychology agrees. In Lebanon, punishing people who happen to fall under Hezbollah’s thumb will do nothing but reinforce Nasrallah’s authority. and provide personal support to a group that had previously been more abstract. In the event that Hezbollah can be defeated militarily – and with some difficulty – 20,000 active employees And more than 100,000 rocketsthat is not certain — This inevitably means that Lebanese antipathy towards Israel will continue. This in turn creates space for new villains, especially in the absence of a fully functioning state.

A brave new generation of Lokman Slims can only emerge if Lebanese Shiites are given the choice of which political group to associate with. Hezbollah’s suffocating repression is the main obstacle to this happening — but how Israel behaves is also crucial. If people working ordinary jobs in suburbs like Dahieh can expect to be attacked no matter what they do, why should they stand up to Hezbollah at all?