Shah’s son says regime change possible, offers vision of Iran as West’s ally

Is the Islamic Republic too ruthless to be overthrown? Don’t be so sure. Seemingly invulnerable despotisms crumble at first slowly – and then with lightning speed.

Some 45 years after the Iran hostage crisis, when US diplomats were imprisoned in the embassy in Tehran, Iran is still a hugely negative force in the world. As it spreads jihadist poison throughout the Middle East and menaces the world with a nuclear arms race, it can be hard to contemplate anything different for the country. But the son of the last Shah says a focused Western policy could help topple the Islamist regime, creating an ally.

In an interview (click on the above) from his base in Washington, D.C., Reza Pahlavi sketched out a tantalizing vision of a democratic Iran, with “total separation of religion and state,” prospering from ties with the West, at peace with Israel, and in harmony with its neighbors. “My only goal in life is to see to it that the Iranians can finally go to the election polls and vote their conscience and decide their fate,” he said.

It’s a remarkable posture for a man who still goes by the title Crown Prince and whose father, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, ruled with an iron fist, propped up by Western powers and infamous for his reliance on secret police, until being overthrown in 1979. The 63-year-old son has distanced himself from that legacy and offers himself – by dint of name recognition and a certain nostalgist zeitgeist – as a transitional democratic leader who can guide the country through a post-theocracy phase.

Is it possible? Genuine opposition inside Iran itself is brutally suppressed, so there is no unifying figure in the country – creating an opening for someone well-known (indeed, ironically, a similar dynamic helped propel the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power mere months after the Shah fled the country). If the moment for a decision ever actually comes, there will doubtless be howls of protests from those who remember the brutality of the Shah, especially in later years; but on the other hand, Pahlavi projects a genuinely inclusive and liberal worldview.

My conversations with Iranian dissidents suggest it may be viable – but far from a sure thing. What is clear is that among opposition circles, there is something close to total agreement on the need to end Iran’s absurd enmity toward the West (and especially ridiculously, the Jews).

Pahlavi said the U.S. had projected “weakness” with its efforts to engage the regime, since the Islamic Republic had radicalism in its DNA and cannot be cajoled into better behavior – like giving up its nuclear weapons program. “You should actually understand why it has to be regime change as a solution because at the end of the day, it’s not the gun but the finger on the trigger. It doesn’t matter what they sign. You can’t trust them for a second.”

Pahlavi’s optimism, despite the seemingly unshakeable grip of the mullahs, rests on three pillars.

First, he believes the regime is loathed by at least 80% of the population, who not only would prefer Western-style freedoms but also look to countries like the United Arab Emirates, a few miles away from their shores across the Persian Gulf, and see the prosperity that has eluded them.

Second, he believes that once the people rebel, under the right circumstances they might be joined by key parts of the regime apparatus, including not only the military but also, critically, some parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps – a sort of all-powerful Praetorian guard with a strong and corrupt presence in the economy. They would need be believe they would not be hounded by the new regime and even might play a role in the reconstruction.

“The top echelon is obviously benefiting from … the whole mafia structure,” he said. “But the majority of elements within the military of course the IRGC are not part of these benefiting from it. Some of them have to even have a second job to make ends meet in general. They want out but they are stuck … So one of the scenarios that will facilitate change which is part of my strategy is to include in the process of natural reconciliation and amnesty the maximum possibility of defections of elements tied to the regime.”

Pahlavi said even many Muslim clergy dislike the regime and are “feeling threatened or weakened, as a result of this regime that in the name of Islam have done so much harm.” Islam, he said, “has become not people’s priority.”

He said South Africa’s “truth and reconciliation” process – transparent and rather forgiving – would be a model.

Third, he argues that all these local players must receive the right sorts of encouragement from the United States and the West – providing logistical and moral support to opposition movements, sanctioning regime elites without harming ordinary citizens, and tipping the scales in favor of a peaceful revolution.

Pahlavi called for “maximum pressure that includes even more sanctions, not just economic sanctions but targeted sanctions against officials, their bank accounts, freezing their assets, expelling their representatives or diplomats or people affiliated with the regime who are roaming freely in the Western world doing all the money laundering for the regime.”

In addition, he said the West should help fund opposition activity, especially strike actions, by releasing frozen Iranian funds to be earmarked for the purpose: “The quickest way to paralyze the regime is going to be across-the -board national labor strikes. But such labor strikes have to be funded… We’re not talking billions of dollars having to be injected there, but policy has to change.” He also argued for engaging the Iranian people directly through social media to assure them of the positive future that awaits them once the regime is gone.

And yet, Pahlavi argued against direct Western military moves I recommended on these pages with former US security official Robert Hamilton: presenting Iran’s leadership with an ultimatum to stop nuclear enrichment and hand over enriched materials, halt missile development, and withdraw support for proxy militias – or else face blockades of its ports and destruction of oil installations and nuclear sites, for starters. Pahlavi said it would be better to at least try to encourage a change that comes from within Iran itself. “If we don’t try this before resorting to the scenarios you’ve described you’ll (lose) a very plausible and legitimate … scenario of change.”

Iran has already seen repeated waves of protests in recent decades, from the 2009 Green Movement to the 2022 movement after 22-year old Mahsa Amini died in custody. What’s missing, in his view, was decisive Western support that would exploit the weakness within the regime’s apparatus.

Pahlavi drew an interesting parallel with the fall of communism. In the late 1980s, it seemed impossible that the deeply entrenched communist regimes would ever fall. Yet, when the people rose up, regimes that seemed immovable crumbled with surprising speed. Indeed, in Romania it happened roughly in the way Pahlavi envisions, with the secret police and military forces that had propped up the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu abandoning him as the people’s uprising became impossible to suppress.

When regime change comes, he said, the new Iran would be at peace with Israel – especially since he expected without the threat from Iran’s myriad proxies in the region, including Palestinian rejectionists like Hamas, Israel would be more accommodating to the Palestinians. “Israel is the only exception in the Middle East as a democratic country. in comparison with everything else that we have, it could be an extremely important strategic partner to us,” he said.

Pahlavi seems convinced that the Iranian people — who despite the regime’s mismanagement remain educated, connected to the world via technology, and hungry for freedom — are capable of establishing a functioning democracy along any model, from a republic to a constitutional monarchy.

“Experts in their field right now are contemplating focusing on propositions, ideas and remedies. We have economists studying about what could be done – the first hundred days had we manage the country,” he said. “There’s a whole host of people doing their part in these complex scenario and I am trying to assist as much as I can, and making sure that every component is in place.”

It’s tempting to believe it might come true – but is it human weakness that makes us grasp for an appealing scenario in the face of evidence to the contrary? I am not so sure. I visited Checkpoint Charlie mere months before the Berlin Wall came down – and I did not foresee the coming change. Few did. Horrible regimes crumble very slowly — then suddenly collapse.

“It could happen relatively fast,” Pahlavi insisted. “The nation is ready. But they cannot be kept out there hanging without any other elements happening.”

Checkpoint Charlie in December 1988. There one day; gone the next.

Here’s a transcript of the interview:Dan Perry: You’ve long advocated for democratic Iran, which is interesting because your late father of course was not a democratic ruler. Do you envision a Western style democracy for the country or does Iran require a more uniquely tailored system that accounts for its cultural historical context? How would you address concerns about the compatibility of democracy with Iran’s religious and traditional side?Reza Pahlavi: Well, I think that’s the most important question that you put your finger on. We have seen all of the various discrimination against women, against ethnic groups, against other religious minorities, against the LGBTQ community, and so on and so forth. And parallel to that, the desired aspiration to be enjoying the same level of freedoms and guarantees of equality that they see in the Western democratic world. Whether or not we have arrived at that stage as a society – I believe we have. I think the sensitivity that you rightly point (is) religion and its role in society. I believe that this sad experience that we have had has, in fact, made it much easier to understand the prerequisite to a secular democracy being a total separation of religion from state. This is something that you could not have taught in university, or this is not something that you can argue philosophically, you have to actually experience it to understand why there is that necessity. I would even argue that clerics in Iran that are not part of the regime … today, they see how much converting to other faiths (there is) including Christianity, which is the fastest growing religion in Iran right now. Even the clergy (are) feeling threatened or weakened as a result of this regime that in the name of Islam have done so much harm. So I feel very confident and optimistic that we will be able to tackle these issues. And if religion was always this factor, I think today, it has become not people’s priority.There’s also a sense of rejuvenation of a sense of national identity and pride in our history and culture that is another aspect that the regime always tried to destroy. So you have an awakening if I could put it this way, that is the result of all this experience, and we are living in the 21st century. I think modernity progress, liberty, participation are a natural demand for every society, and you cannot achieve that without providing people those opportunities. I think we were on that path. Many aspect of what happened pre-revolution in Iran were going in a direction that we could have averted a political crisis, but that’s a long story and that’s perhaps a separate discussion.

Today in 2024 Iran, today’s Gen Z of Iran are completely very clear on these issues. I follow them every day on social media, whether they’re dissidents or activists or what have you. They’re extremely clear in understanding that liberty has a price. It doesn’t come for free, it takes a lot of sacrifice and they have shown that perseverance because their objective this time is very clear. … In 1978 they said the Shah must go and he did. But how many people really knew what they were going to get in return? Very few people had any clue.

Dan Perry: How popular unpopular is the Islamic Republic?

Reza Pahlavi: The latest polls that we had (are) regarding the very low turnout, the lowest turnout ever in elections in Iran, (which) demonstrates how separate the regime is from the rest of the population. We see figures of 12 to 15 percent max in terms of actual participation and support. And I might think that it’s even less than that. That’s a huge line of demarcation. It actually shows how limited the regime has … as a base. And most of them are benefiting financially from this arrangement, whether there are members of the IRGC or government employees who are forced to participate in elections. We have seen weeks upon weeks of protests and demonstrations and strikes by workers. It’s a compilation of all these factors that has brought our society to a point that we can no longer tolerate the situation. And what’s even worse, adding insult to injury, is all the money that the regime obtains is not being spent on the people of Iran. It ends up financing groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Iranians know and the young Iranians today, they say we are starving here. We have to sell our organs to just pay the rent. How far can we stretch this?

Dan Perry: it’s obviously absurd. The reasons why it should be unpopular to a rational mind is clear. But the Islamic Republic has built in apparatus of control so profound, so nefarious, that it may be extraordinarily difficult to topple it, and we’ve seen efforts fizzle because they’re ruthless. So my question is what role if any should the West and the world community have in encouraging an overthrow of the regime?

Reza Pahlavi: That’s a very good question. I didn’t think in my lifetime I’d see the fall of the Berlin Wall but yet it happened. I think there are several factors that we should take into consideration as the ingredients necessary for such a change. I think number one is that if you look at it from the point of view of dissidents and what they’re asking for … the expectation of support looks towards the Western free world first and foremost. We’re not looking to Beijing or Pyongyang for solutions, obviously, or Moscow for that matter. We’re looking to London to Paris to Washington. Why? Because indeed, we see that what brought an end to various dictatorships, whether in Latin America or an end to apartheid in South Africa or what led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the liberation of previously Eastern Bloc countries trapped behind that Wall – most of it if not all of it was due to tacit international Western support for those causes. The second aspect is that, yes, the regime is extremely repressive. So clearly when you are focused on the discipline of civil disobedience and nonviolence as the essential method for change, especially if you’re unarmed and kids are getting shot in the eye by the regime thugs, that’s often to import foreigners to do the dirty job.

One thing however, that you could concentrate on in the past 40 years is that the separation of each wave and movements (of protest) have become closer and closer in time. But we clearly don’t expect people to be on the streets for months at a time every single day.

The critical question that we should ask ourselves is to what degree is the regime depending on its militia or paramilitary personnel, and I mean the IRGC. Now, I don’t think that we can paint the entire core of the IRGC in one bloc. Because while the top echelon is obviously benefiting from being in that position and their wealth … and the whole mafia structure that it represents. But the majority of elements within the military (and) the IRGC are not part of these benefitting from it. Some of them have to even have a second job to make ends meet in general. They want out but they are stuck and they can be in no man’s land. So one of the scenarios that will facilitate change, which is part of my strategy, is to include in the process of natural reconciliation and amnesty the maximum possibility of defections of elements tied to the regime, not to fear from regime change. As long as they … don’t have bloodied hands.

Dan Perry: And by the way, that’s what happened in Romania roughly.

Reza Pahlavi: It’s interesting you raise this, because when we saw what happened with Vaclav Havel in the Czech Republic at the time, in fact Ceausescu was the only one who resisted and he met a very bloody end.

Dan Perry: Here’s the thing. They lost heart from within. Gorbachev, when push came to shove, wouldn’t fire on the people.

Reza Pahlavi: Yeah.

Dan Perry: I, along with a senior US, former defense official, wrote a story two weeks ago taking a position and basically saying that versus the Trump way, speak loudly carry a small stick in hopes sanctions do the trick, or the Democratic way of trying to engage , convince and persuade, maybe it’s time to do a third way in which the West lays down the law with the Islamic Republic and basically says you’re going to stop all the bad things, the nuclear program, the rocket program and definitely the proxy-supporting all over the region – all this stops. And if it doesn’t we will take steps … essentially warlike steps. I’m not suggesting that they would fold, I am suggesting that would be perhaps a shock and then that might encourage an internal coup.

Reza Pahlavi: I think we’re jumping the gun way too early and I think there are better solutions to have. Let’s just remind you that during the Green movement Khamanei’s plane was fueled and ready to extract him from Tehran. They didn’t know what was going to happen. It was only when the Obama administration failed to actually encourage and support that movement that everything came back to the standstill.

Dan Perry: What would that look like?

Reza Pahlavi: Every time you show weakness, what it was in the Obama administration but even more under the Biden administration, when you actually reward the regime by releasing an extra hundred billion dollars in their hands, they would of course be spending on their proxies including Hamas and Hezbollah. But why be talking immediately about military strikes and bunker bombs? What I’ve been proposing to the world is: Is it sufficient to rely on sanctions only? The reason the sanctions were in fact administered was based in my view on the biggest flaw in Western governments analysis of Iran situation, and understanding the DNA of this regime in terms of behavior, and that’s exactly … an expectation of behavior change, the premise of all these policies of carrot and seek approach, including the JCPOA. But in reality … this regime is what it is. You simply cannot expect it to have a change in DNA. That’s what they are. Therefore, that’s their entire raison d’etre. How can you weaken this regime to the benefit of the population, again in the spirit of nonviolence without resorting to foreign intervention or military strikes, which has always been my red line? The solution that I’m proposing – at least give this one a chance before you resort to something else – is maximum pressure that includes even more sanctions, not just economic sanctions but targeted sanctions against officials, their bank accounts, freezing their assets, expelling their representatives or diplomats or people affiliated with the regime who are roaming freely in the Western world doing all the money laundering for the regime, while targeting citizens in different countries from London to Canada to everywhere else. The regime has to somehow fuel its war machines. Without revenue they cannot have a nuclear program, have proxies, have the instruments of domestic repression, pay all these people off so that they are staying with the regime. The regime was thrown yet again another lifeline in the past two or three years. Parallel to maximum pressure should also be a policy or maximum support (for the opposition). The quickest way to paralyze the regime is going to be across the board national labor strikes. But such labor strikes have to be funded. One of the biggest obstacles we have – when I say we, I mean the diaspora and people who try to help them – is because of the sanctions. And of fact it is very difficult to transfer money on your own right now. It’s interesting that while the bad guys get their money, the good guys cannot be helped. So let’s say, If you’re a student, you need a printer, you have to purchase a smartphone, (or) VPN so you can communicate or organize yourself. You know, it’s not too expensive. If you spend like 500 to a thousand dollars helping a family in Iran, whether it’s a family of a dissident or a political prisoner or a worker going on strike … we’re not talking billions of dollars having to be injected there, but policy has to change, exceptions to the rules have to exist. Now, this is something that is a matter of executive orders by some administration. I think the dust has to settle a little bit regardless of who ends up in the White House in November until we figure out exactly what’s the game plan, and what way we can hopefully have a coordinated strategy. How can we do more in terms of, first of all, access to technology to counter the regime’s propaganda machine? Not only by means of maximizing access to social media platforms which is our biggest tool these days to operate with, but also an orchestrated campaign of countering the regime’s propaganda – not just for the sake of Iranians but most of the people in that region the way they distort facts and the play with people’s mind.

So the West has to do more than just talk about the virtues of freedom and liberty and human rights.

And also, what could be the roadmap to recovery? Now this happens to be also another preoccupation of mine. We’re not talking just about liberty and freedom and democracy and the obvious, but the average man on the street has to understand in what way with my life is being impacted … would there be opportunities from all these investors and companies coming to invest in Iran? Our tourism industry will be a great source of revenue, well beyond oil and gas. What plans do we have for that? How can we align the best expertise to come and help us? When I went to Israel last year, one of the reasons was to talk to water experts because as you know we’re facing very drastic water shortages in Iran, and this kind of expertise can put Iran back on track.

Dan Perry: So, what is the best-case scenario for this sort of a non-military political intervention and encouragement of the regime collapsing from within? What’s the timeline, considering that they’re about to go nuclear?

Reza Pahlavi: Twice the West has prevailed over its adversaries. The first time was in the Second World War when Roosevelt and Churchill were key leaders and put an end to the Second World War and the Nazis in Germany. Same thing in the case of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, countering Moscow and Beijing. When it comes to strong leadership in the West, we don’t have that. That’s why the regime is exploiting that. That’s why Putin has the audacity to invade Ukraine – because there are no consequences to that. That’s not conducive to peace… The ideal scenario is to have a strong leader here in Washington that understands the mechanics of change and why is it necessary. And in fact, it avoids escalation to military conflicts by helping the best army on the ground – which are the people of Iran themselves.

Dan Perry: How long will it take?

Reza Pahlavi: It all depends on how quickly we can overcome the technicalities … to be able to support the campaigns inside Iran … It could happen relatively fast … the nation is ready. But they cannot be kept out there hanging without any other elements happening. But you can create momentum, you can perhaps even accelerate the process. Put yourself in the shoes of elements that are looking at the scene to decide when and how can they commit to support the people and not be stuck in No Man’s Land. I go back to the military which is more traditional and much more on our side, and the big question is the bulk of the IRGC. When can they jump ship against the regime … in support of the people, they’re looking at all these developments and they want to see: Are the people on the street all by themselves, or is there actually international support behind it?

Dan Perry: Should the US and the West declare that our aim is to topple the regime and replace it with the democracy?

Reza Pahlavi: That’s the trick, of how you word it, because I don’t think it would be appropriate for any foreign government to announce their policy to be one of regime change. Because the first question is: What business is it of yours? However, if the point is “We are responding to the aspiration and legitimate demands of the nation who are asking for self-determination. They are asking for elections so that they can determine their form of government democracy” – (then) it’s not the first time that Western governments have been the support of such movements.

Dan Perry: Can you put a number on how many people want that in Iran? Is it 80%? Is it 70%?

Reza Pahlavi: I would say conservatively at least 80%, if not more.

Dan Perry: And do you think in such a future Iran would be at peace with Israel?

Reza Pahlavi: Look at the writing on the wall: The day after the October 7th attack the regime tried everything to boost this pro-Palestinian movement. Even in soccer stadiums they were raising the Palestinian flag. I invite you to observe for yourself what people were chanting – slogans pro-Israel, and telling where to shove that flag to the regime. The relationship with the Jews, long before even Israel existed as a state, is biblical. It goes back 25 centuries, and Iranians know. Israel is the only exception in the Middle East as a democratic country (and) it could be an extremely important strategic partner to us. Why should we be in conflict?

The biggest elephant in the room is what happens with the Palestinians of course. But the question is under what kind of climate? Can we also have a situation that is conducive to peace? Certainly not with a regime that wants to destroy a country, or the entire Jewry. And that’s why I’m saying that the relationship with the two countries, when we benefit as strategic partners and we include in that partnership the rest of the region … then everybody benefits from it. I think (Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince) MBS to a great extent should be on board.

And I think the Iranians are the first people to realize that because they see they see the loss of opportunities. They look at what’s happening in Dubai across the Gulf … and what Iran could have been today. I mean, everybody says Iran should have been (if) not the Japan of the Middle East at least the South Korea. Instead we have the North Korea.

Dan Perry: If Israel ceased to be so menaced by the proxies and by Iran itself, it would be more reasonable vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

Reza Pahlavi: Of course. The two-state solution remains on the table as the probably most desired outcome, but the climate has to exist. Israel cannot be constantly under attack by proxy groups that Iran is provoking. Now if, let’s say, the circumstances for true peace finally exist, then shame on Israel and its government not to take that opportunity. But until that situation exists, shame on those who are blaming Israel for protecting itself. It’s just an existential threat.

Dan Perry: People speak of you as a potential at least transition figure. Would you see yourself as that at least in the short term, or as one of the people who can lead this process once it reaches fruition?

Reza Pahlavi: My only goal in life is that the Iranians can finally go to the election polls and vote their conscience and decide their fate. But that needs leadership, to reach that stage, and I offered my leadership in this transition to offer a role of unit as a unifier that doesn’t take sides, that stays the above the fray. I don’t get into the argument of republic versus monarchy or right versus left. I believe in a constitutional process that should determine the outcome. So we have two phases that will lead us to that outcome – the first phase in which we are today, which is what we do until the regime is no longer there … hopefully with those ingredients that I indicated earlier … and saying what they want after the collapse of the regime, what happens in Iran in terms of the transition, how do we have the transitional government, how do we prepare the stage for the elections of the constitutional assembly? … It’s a constitutional process, so we have to manage that process. It includes a lot of practical elements. Let me give you a simple example. For the first two or three years, because I think realistically speaking it will be hard to do it in shorter time than that, but hopefully not more than that, there are cases of divorce, cases of death, inheritance and all that – what is it going to be based on, the rules of laws of the Sharia laws of the regime? Do we revert back to previous laws? What about transitional justice? How do we deal with the remnants of the regime? These are elements that experts in the field right now are contemplating … We have economists studying about what could be done in the first hundred days … So there’s a whole host of people doing their part in these complex scenarios and I am trying to assist as much as I can, and making sure that every component is in place. But most importantly, that while we know that politically there are differences of opinion our objective should be one and the same irrespective of where in the spectrum we are as monarchists or Republicans, or centuries or rightists or leftists.

All of this requires process and a transitional role. So I’ve offered that. I told my confidants, look, I’m not running for any office. Nor am I interested in any post. But you trust me for a number of reasons, let me offer in return of your trust the kind of leadership you need. That will guarantee full participation. No one left behind so long as we’re committed to the discipline of free and fair elections, and we let the ballot box be the only measure determining the outcome for the nation.