Iran Update, September 30, 2024

Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 6:55pm ET

The
Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored
activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US
forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the
stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical
Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly
based on regional events. Click here
to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW
defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that
Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came
to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state,
semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their
collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the
alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels
of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some
degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional
proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others
are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of
the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives,
which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from
the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these
objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have
become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do
not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are
well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military
operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn
violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these
reports.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced
that it began a “targeted and delimited ground operation in southern
Lebanon” on September 30.(1) The IDF said that ground forces
will operate to target Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in villages
along the Israel-Lebanon border.(2) The IDF said that Hezbollah
infrastructure in these villages represents an “immediate and real”
threat to Israeli communities in the north.(3) Israeli military and
political officials formally approved the ”next steps” of Israel’s
operation in Lebanon on September 30.(4) The IDF said it will act to
achieve its stated war aim of returning the residents of the north to
their homes.(5)

It is unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the time of writing. Western
media reported on September 30 that the IDF conducted several smaller
incursions in the past week (for detailed coverage of these incursions,
see below), but CTP-ISW has not yet observed large Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon.(6) Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen reported on
September 30 that Israeli units are concentrated at several positions
along the Israel-Lebanon border.(7) This report is consistent with
information reported by Western media.(8) Hezbollah claimed cross-border
attacks targeting Israeli forces concentrated near the border on
September 30.(9) Hezbollah mortared Israeli forces gathered in the
border town Shtula.”(10) Hezbollah also claimed that it attacked Israeli
soldiers in groves near the Lebanese towns Kfar Kila and Addasiya.(11)
It is not clear if this attack took place in Israel or Lebanon.
Saudi-owned outlets reported that Israeli tanks entered Ramish in
southern Lebanon, but later deleted the reports.(12) There has been no
corroboration of these now-deleted reports.

The IDF said
that Israeli ground forces will coordinate with the IDF Air Force and
artillery units to attack military targets during this stage of the
campaign. Local Lebanese sources and Arabic-language media
reported that the IDF conducted several hours of artillery shelling and
fired illumination rounds over several Lebanese border towns on
September 30.(13) Arabic-language media also reported that the IDF
called upon residents in Lebanese border towns to evacuate.(14) A
Lebanese security source told CNN that the Lebanese army evacuated its
observation posts along the Israel-Lebanon border and moved into
barracks in border villages.(15)

The IDF conducted several preparatory measures to prepare for its ground incursion into Lebanon in recent days. The
IDF Northern Command issued a closed military zone over the northern
Israeli towns Metula, Misgav Am, and Kfar Giladi, along the
Israel-Lebanon border.(16) The IDF prohibited civilian entry to the
area.(17) The IDF has been preparing for the possibility of a ground
incursion into Lebanon by calling up reservist units and deploying the
98th Division to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent weeks.(18) IDF
commanders from the Northern Command and IDF 36th, 98th, and 91st
divisions recently approved plans for the ”coming days” along the
northern front.(19) These formations have conducted several training
exercises in recent days to prepare for the operation, including
exercises that simulated a ground offensive into Lebanon.(20) Israeli
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited the 188th Armored Brigade (36th
Division) on the border on September 30 and said that the IDF will use
all its capabilities, including ground forces, to return residents to
the north.(21)

Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli
special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border
raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week,
citing unspecified sources.(22) The raids reportedly included entering
Hezbollah tunnels along the border.(23) One such Israeli cross-border
raid occurred near the Lebanese town of Alma al Shaab on an unspecified
date last week.(24) The IDF’s ground operation will take place as the
IDF continues its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities with
the objective of returning residents to the north.

Unspecified
US officials said that the objective of Israel’s “limited” ground
operation is to clear Hezbollah infrastructure near the border that
Hezbollah uses to threaten northern Israel.(25) US State
Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said that Israel had informed the
US about “a series of limited ground operations” it was planning into
Lebanon that would focus on Hezbollah infrastructure near the
Israel-Lebanon border.(26) The term ”limited” presumably refers only to
the specific IDF operations to clear border infrastructure and is not
necessarily applicable to the entirety of a potential Israeli ground
campaign. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi recently
told Israeli soldiers that the IDF is preparing for maneuver operations
that would involve Israeli forces engaging Hezbollah militants and
advancing into Lebanese towns and villages that are Hezbollah “military
outposts.”(27)

The IDF Air Force continued its air
campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s weapons capabilities on September 30
ahead of a potential ground offensive. The IDF struck dozens of
targets throughout Lebanon, including Hezbollah air defense
systems.(28) The IDF destroyed a warehouse of surface-to-air missile
launchers near the Beirut International Airport.(29) Israel’s air
campaign also continued to eliminate Hezbollah missile and rocket system
commanders.(30) An IDF airstrike in Beirut killed the commander of
Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket forces on September 28.(31) The IDF
Arabic-language spokesperson also said on September 30 that the IDF had
also killed the commander of Hezbollah’s precision missile unit in
southern Lebanon, his deputy, and other commanders of the unit in
southern Lebanon.(32) The IDF’s degradation of Hezbollah’s weapons
capabilities and the commanders with knowledge of these systems fit into
Israeli war objectives for Lebanon, which would require the disruption
or degradation of Hezbollah’s ability to fire rockets
into northern Israel. Syrian sources also reported Israeli drones and
explosions near Qudsaya, outside west Damascus, on September 30.(33)
Israel has previously conducted airstrikes in Rif Dimashq and near the
Lebanon-Syria border to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to receive
weapons.(34)

The IDF Air Force also continued to target Palestinian militia members operating in southern Lebanon. The
IDF struck and killed Hamas commander in Lebanon Fatah Abu al Amin in a
refugee camp in Tyre on September 29.(35) Amin coordinated Hamas’
activities in Lebanon and helped to recruit Hamas operatives in Lebanon
and purchase weapons.(36) The IDF also struck and killed two members of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in southern Lebanon on
September 29.(37) Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine acknowledged the death of their members in Lebanon on
September 30.(38) Hezbollah commonly allows Palestinian groups to launch
attacks on Israel from Hezbollah-controlled territory in Lebanon.(39)
Previous IDF strikes in southern Lebanon throughout the war have killed
fighters from multiple Palestinian militias, including Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Resistance Committees.(40)

This
map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on
local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm
ET on September 29 to 2:00pm ET on September 30. This map is not
exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli
strikes.

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim
Qassem re-emphasized Hezbollah’s organizational resilience and its
ability to resist an Israeli assault ahead of a potential Israeli ground
operation.(41) Israeli strikes have severely degraded
Hezbollah leadership in recent weeks, killing Nasrallah and numerous
strategic- and operational-level leaders.(42) Qassem said in his speech
that Hezbollah is structured to enable it to continue operations against
Israel despite the loss of leadership, and deputy commanders are
prepared to step forward to take up their units’ command.(43) Qassem
said that Hezbollah’s “resistance forces are ready” to engage an Israeli
ground invasion and will not “budge an inch from (Hezbollah’s)
positions) regardless of the destruction to Hezbollah’s leadership.(44)
Qassem’s comments likely seek to assuage concerns among Hezbollah’s
rank-and-file that Hezbollah leadership remains strong and able to
survive ahead of potential ground engagements with Israel. Qassem lastly
said that Hezbollah will choose a new secretary-general as soon as
possible and according to the approved party mechanisms.(45) Hezbollah
will likely rapidly promote lower-ranking commanders to take the place
of those Israel has killed, but the loss of long-serving strategic- and
operational-level commanders will create temporary disruption in
Hezbollah’s command-and-control.

Hezbollah continued its attack campaign targeting Israeli civilian and military sites in Israel on September 30. Israeli
Army Radio reported that Hezbollah likely launched a drone targeting
the Karish gas field in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.(46) The IDF Navy
intercepted the drone before the drone came close to the gas field.(47)
Hezbollah has not claimed the attack as of the time of writing.
Hezbollah fired at least 10 rockets targeting the Haifa area, as it has
done repeatedly in recent days.(48) The IDF intercepted some of the
rockets targeting Haifa and others fell in open areas.(49) Hezbollah
fired barrages of rockets targeting Israeli forces in Beit Saida for the
first time since the beginning of the war.(50)

Iran
will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between
Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of
the conflict. The Iranian regime has thus far indicated that it
does not seek to intervene directly in the Israel-Hezbollah
conflict.(51) However, the regime could decide to intervene if it
assesses that Israel’s objective in Lebanon is to significantly degrade,
defeat, or destroy Hezbollah, one of its principal regional allies. The
Israeli Security Cabinet altered an earlier directive on
September 26 by changing the directive from avoiding a “broad campaign
involving Iran” to “reducing the possibility … (of) an all-out
war.”(52) The revision of this directive suggests that
Israel has accepted the risk that Iran might directly intervene in the
conflict. Iran has few military capabilities that could shape the
outcome of the conflict, even if it were to intervene directly.

Iran
could take other measures to harm Israeli and US interests in an effort
to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah. These actions would
likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current Israeli operations in
Lebanon. Iran could take the following actions:

1) Iran could conduct a large-scale drone and missile attack targeting Israel. The
Iranian regime currently appears unwilling to conduct a direct attack
targeting Israel, and thus risk a large Israeli retaliatory attack on
Iranian territory. Iran recently dismissed a request by Hezbollah to
conduct a direct attack on Israel, stating that the “timing (wasn’t)
right” for such an attack.(53) The Biden administration recently warned
Iran via an unspecified third country that it would likely not be able
to “restrain” Israel if Iran conducts a direct attack on Israel,
according to an unspecified Western official.(54) The official added
that the Biden administration warned Iran that Israel would conduct a
“broader and greater” attack on Iran than it did in April 2024 if Iran
directly attacks Israel.(55) Israel conducted retaliatory airstrikes
targeting an Artesh Air Force base in Esfahan Province, Iran, on April
18 in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack targeting
Israel.(56) It is also not clear that a major drone and missile attack
would impact Israeli calculations, given that the vast majority of
Israelis support the war in Lebanon and the Israeli cabinet appears
willing to retaliate heavily against Iran in an attempt to deter any
hypothetical Iranian attack.

2) Iran could increase assassination attempts targeting senior Israeli officials.
The Shin Bet announced on September 30 that Iran has “significantly”
increased its efforts to conduct assassinations in Israel.(57) The Shin
Bet stated that it recently thwarted several Iranian assassination
plots, including some that were in the “advanced stages” of
planning.(58) The Shin Bet previously announced on September 19 that
unspecified Iranian officials planned an assassination plot targeting
the Israeli prime minister, defense minister, or other senior
officials.(59) An assassination of a senior Israeli official would have
no serious impact on military operations in Lebanon.

3)
Iran could order attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria to try to
coerce the United States to pressure Israel to halt its operations in
Lebanon. The Iranian regime has previously operated under the
theory that it can coerce the United States to alter Israel’s behavior
if Iran hurts US interests in response to Israeli actions.(60) Israel
acts independently of the United States, and therefore Iranian-backed
attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East would likely fail to
disrupt Israeli operations in Lebanon.

4) Iran could further expand its nuclear program. An
Iranian parliamentarian stated on September 29 that Iran should expand
its nuclear program, including increasing production of 90% enriched
uranium, in response to Israel killing Nasrallah.(61) An Iranian
decision to significantly expand its nuclear program, or even pursue
weaponization, risks an Israeli or US military or economic response but
would likely not cause Israel to suspend its campaign in Lebanon.
Expanding the nuclear program also runs contrary to recent Iranian
efforts to pursue negotiations.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed the following:

• An Arqab cruise missile attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Israel(62)
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa(63)
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” at the port of Haifa(64)
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in central Israel(65)

Key Takeaways:

• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The
  Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a “targeted and
  delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon” on September 30. It is
  unclear where or if the IDF has entered southern Lebanon in force at the
  time of writing. Western media reported on September 30 that Israeli
  special operations forces have already been conducting cross-border
  raids “to gather intelligence” ahead of the operation since last week,
  citing unspecified sources.
• Iranian Response to Israeli Operations in Lebanon: Iran
  will likely not be able to intervene in the ongoing conflict between
  Israel and Hezbollah in a way that meaningfully impacts the outcome of
  the conflict. Iran could take other measures to harm Israeli and US
  interests in an effort to stop Israeli operations against Hezbollah.
  These actions would likely also fail to meaningfully disrupt current
  Israeli operations in Lebanon.
• Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed four attacks on Israel on September 30.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas command-and-control site in the northern Gaza Strip on September 29.(66)
The IDF reported that the site was based in the former Abu Jafar
Mansour school in Beit Lahiya and that Hamas fighters used the site to
plan and conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip and
into Israeli territory.(67) The IDF added that it took steps to minimize
civilian casualties in the airstrike.(68)

Palestinian
militias including the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) conducted four attacks targeting Israeli forces along the
Netzarim Corridor on September 29 and 30.(69) PIJ fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces near a hospital along the Netzarim Corridor.(70)

Israeli
forces reportedly operated in Zaytoun and Tal al Hawa neighborhoods of
Gaza City on September 30.(71) A Palestinian journalist reported that
Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias south of Zaytoun, and
near University College in Tel al Hawa neighborhood.(72)

Hamas fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis on September 30.(73)

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The
IDF conducted overnight raids in several locations across the West Bank
on September 29 and 30 and detained more than 20 wanted persons.(74) The IDF also confiscated a firearm during the raids.(75)

The
IDF 877th Division Commander Yaakov Dolf conducted a situational
assessment in the West Bank on September 30, following the launch of
Operation Summer Camp in late August.(76) The 877th Division is
responsible for the West Bank. Dolf met with regional Israeli military
and civilian officials to review the security situation in the West
Bank. Dolf said that Israeli forces have not operated in the West Bank
at the same pace at which Israeli forces are operating now.(77) The IDF
launched Operation Summer Camp on August 27. Operation Summer Camp is a
large-scale counter-terrorism operation to degrade Palestinian militia
networks in the West Bank.(78)