Strides toward harmony?

On October 2, Myanmar’s military government began conducting a census to register voters for a general election it plans to hold next year, despite the intensifying civil war with ethnic and other resistance forces. The census, scheduled to run until October 15, will measure Myanmar’s population and age distribution for the first time in 10 years. A December deadline has been set for areas with intense fighting. The census is intended to count 56 million people and 13 million households. Census workers look to collect information by visiting every household. Provisional results will be compiled as early as December, with detailed results set to be released in 2025, reports Nikkei Asia. Critics say, through census, the Junta is gathering details of opponents.

It may be recalled that Myanmar’s military declared a state of emergency in February 2021 and took control of the government, citing claims of fraud in the 2020 general elections, in which military-affiliated parties suffered a major defeat. The constitution stipulates that a general election must be held within six months of the state of emergency being lifted. Analysts believe that the military government plans to create a voter list based on the results of the census and hold the election after lifting the state of emergency in February or August 2025. Nonetheless, the growing armed conflict between ethnic groups and the military has made many citizens homeless. As of late September, the country had 3.4 million internally displaced people forced from their homes due to civil war, reports the United Nations.

Myanmar is home to 135 ethnic groups, many with their own ethnic armies and political parties. In the 2020 elections, there were 90 political parties; but, at least 40 were forcibly dissolved by the junta after the coup. Ethnic communities of Myanmar are grouped into eight ‘official’ groups, broadly based upon location, languages and cultures that they encompass. The eight ‘official’ groups are the Bamar (68 per cent), Chin (2.5 per cent), Kachin (1.5 per cent), Karen (7 per cent), Kayah (1.83 per cent), Mon (2 per cent), Rakhine (4 per cent) and Shan (9 per cent).

The country is divided administratively into seven states largely on the basis of ethnicity—Chin, Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Kayah, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan—and seven more administrative divisions (regions) of Myanmar proper—mostly inhabited by the Bamar community. (see Map) These are: Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy), Magway (Magwe), Mandalay, Bago (Pegu), Sagaing, Taninthary (Tenasserim), and Yangon. The geographic homeland of the Bamar is the Irrawaddy River basin.

Election: a Chinese initiative

For the last three years, Beijing has been working towards maintaining a close relationship with the Junta while also trying to balance the rebel groups. In a most recent development, the Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar, Ma Jia, met defence minister General Tin Aung San and discussed ways to strengthen military cooperation, training, and border security. Chinese investments amount to 25 per cent of the total foreign investment in Myanmar. Beijing has also continued to invest in infrastructure, ports, and electricity projects totalling USD 22 billion, reports Deccan Herald.

In July, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invited leaders from four of Myanmar’s political parties to Beijing as part of China’s push for elections in Myanmar. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has promised elections in 2025, and China has pledged its support. Analysts believe that China calls for elections to defuse Myanmar’s Civil War, reports Geopolitical Monitor.

It is interesting to note that China invited four political parties which are registered with the junta’s State Administration Council (SAC) and none are aligned with the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG) in exile. Their proximity to regions of Chinese investments and relationships with the SAC might have made them favourable choices. The four political parties invited by CCP to Beijing are:

(i) The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP): It is a pro-military party closely aligned with the SAC. Founded by the military, many of its leaders are former military officers. Since the coup, the USDP has supported the military’s actions and is not a democratic party. It is aligned with pro-government militias, Border Guard Forces (BGF), and other Tatmadaw (military)-linked groups.

(ii) The People’s Party: It emerged from the pro-democracy movement, but its current role is less defined. After the 2021 coup, its leader, U Ko Ko Gyi, committed to continuing a non-violent political struggle but later endorsed the junta’s proposed election plan alongside pro-military parties. Though less connected to the SAC than the USDP, the People’s Party cannot be classified as a true pro-democracy resistance group.

(iii) The Arakan Front Party (AFP): Based in Rakhine State, it broke away from other pro-democracy parties and rejected the National League for Democracy (NLD). Its relationship with the SAC is complex. While the AFP aims to represent Rakhine ethnic interests, it has shown a pragmatic willingness to work with the SAC, particularly in negotiating for greater autonomy. Political analysts believe that although not explicitly pro-junta, the AFP may collaborate with the SAC when it serves its regional objectives.

(iv) The Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP): It represents the Shan people and engages pragmatically with the State Administration Council (SAC) to advance the group’s interests. It is not strongly opposed to the SAC and often takes an opportunistic stance rather than aligning with pro-democracy movements. In Shan State, the SEDP shares common goals with ethnic armies like the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-South) and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-North). None of the major Shan armies are currently engaged in active fighting with government forces. Overall, the SEDP and Shan ethnic armies often cooperate with the military rather than fully opposing it.

It should be noted that the two major pro democracy parties were not present in the Beijing meeting. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the main pro-democracy party, has already been barred, dissolved, and its remaining leaders in Myanmar jailed. Those who fled formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in exile, which is aligned with numerous ethnic armies and represents a large portion of the population. The NLD was not invited to the recent Beijing meeting and is likely to be excluded from the election as well.

Chinese interest in Myanmar is purely economic, claims Geopolitical Monitor. Being a non-democratic country, it is not expected that China is interested in restoring democracy for the wellbeing of Myanmar’s citizens; China’s economic interest gets reflected in the selection of four political parties that were invited to Beijing.

Aligning with the USDP would help China’s investments in Mandalay, Yangon, and Sagaing. In Mandalay, a key transit hub for Chinese goods, Chinese investment in infrastructure—roads, bridges, and industrial zones—supports trade routes connecting Yunnan Province to the Indian Ocean. In Sagaing, Chinese companies are involved in controversial mining operations, particularly the Letpadaung copper mine, which has faced local opposition due to environmental and human rights concerns. In Yangon, China’s involvement in real estate and infrastructure development, such as the Yangon New City project and port expansions, strengthens its foothold in Myanmar’s commercial capital, boosting trade and manufacturing.

The inclusion of the Arakan Front Party (AFP) and Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP) would help to secure China’s investments in Rakhine and Shan States. In Rakhine, the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and deep-sea port are among China’s most crucial projects in Myanmar. The China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines, which originate in Kyaukphyu, are essential to China’s energy security and form a key part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Shan State is home to major Chinese hydropower projects, such as the Upper Yeywa and Shweli-3 plants, which provide electricity for Myanmar and are key to China’s energy strategy in Southeast Asia. The region also has Chinese interests in mining, including rare earth metals, tin, and other minerals vital for China’s technology and manufacturing sectors. Additionally, Shan State’s long border with China’s Yunnan Province makes it a critical area for border trade.

India’s Myanmar policy

India, which shares a long 1,643-kilometer Indo-Myanmar border with four north eastern states— Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh—does not have a clear Myanmar policy at this stage. The Act East Policy has gone for a toss and the much hyped Kaladan multipurpose river project is in deep waters. Manipur and parts of Mizoram and Nagaland are burning for months in civil wars.

While China has been trying to develop good relations with the Junta and the rebel groups, India followed a policy of isolating Myanmar by fencing the Indo-Myanmar border. Speaking on the X platform, the Indian Home Minister said, “The Modi government is committed to building impenetrable borders”. It has decided to construct a fence along the entire 1643-kilometer-long Indo-Myanmar border. To facilitate better surveillance, a patrol track along the border will also be paved. However, there has been widespread resistance from the local communities against the Indian government’s decision to fence the Myanmar border and scrape the ‘free movement regime’ (FMR) along the border, implemented almost five years ago, in 2018, to facilitate the people living in the border areas who share similar cultural ethnic legacy with the people living on the Myanmar side.

While analysing the reasons behind the long violence in these border states, a recent presentation by the Assam Rifles listed several factors that played a role in igniting the conflict: illegal immigrants from Myanmar, the demand for Kukiland, political authoritarianism and ambition of Chief Minister Singh and his war on drugs among others.

On September 23, Reuters reported that India has invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. The parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November. The event would be hosted by the government-funded Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), whose council includes India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar. It may be noted that China did not invite NUG to the Beijing meet during July.

The website of the National Unity Government in exile says, “The Interim National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is the only and legitimate Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar formed by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) with the authority bestowed by the People’s mandate of the all parties’ democratic election held in 2020 in discussion with National Unity Consultative Council. The Interim National Unity Government will implement the goal, objective and steps of the political roadmap as prescribed in Part I of the Federal Democracy Charter in discussion with the National Unity Consultative Council. Interim National Unity Government shall be accountable to the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw”.

Myanmar: the opium capital of the world

Myanmar’s opium production, along with heroin exports, has skyrocketed since the 2021 coup, as economic and social turmoil leaves many farmers with few alternatives. The military regime, along with drug traffickers, often compels farmers to cultivate opium. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s 2023 Southeast Asia Opium Survey, the land dedicated to opium farming was projected to be 47,100 hectares, an increase from 40,100 in 2022. Myanmar now has the largest volume of opium suppliers worldwide. The average estimated opium yield grew to 22.9 kilograms per hectare, surpassing the previous record of 19.8 kilograms per hectare set in 2022. An estimated 154 tonnes of heroin was exported from Myanmar in 2023, valued at up to USD 2.2 billion. The most substantial increases in poppy farming have been in Shan state, part of the so-called Golden Triangle—a notorious hub for drug production and smuggling. Shan is poor and remote, but has fertile soil with the right altitude to cultivate opium. Cultivation has risen by 20 per cent. Simultaneously, cultivation has risen by 10 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, in the Chin and Kachin states, which border India, reports East Asia Forum.

The remote Wa region of Shan state in Myanmar’s east is a place few outsiders have seen. The people who live in this unofficial, effectively autonomous state within Myanmar used to be called the Wild Wa. It borders China and Thailand. Wa is considered as the epicentre of the illicit drug industry of the South Asian region. This Myanmar’s most ‘secret’ area is famous for drug money and wildlife, reports BBC.

One of the few things that are widely known about Myanmar’s Wa State is the central role that it plays in Southeast Asia’s multibillion-dollar narcotics trade. But for the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the group that administers remote in Myanmar’s Shan State, drugs have been an engine not just of profit but of survival, helping Wa State transform itself into “a bona fide nation with its own laws, anthems, schools, and electricity grid” – one of the few truly independent ethnic states in Myanmar. In Myanmar’s revolutionary war, the UWSA likes to play big brother to its indigenous allies – the Ta’ang, the Kokang, the Arakan – but it sees no benefit from direct conflict. They’ve already achieved what many ethnic minority groups dream about: a state of their own. Taking advantage of the civil war in Myanmar, the Golden Triangle, and specifically Shan State of Myanmar, is believed to emerge as the largest methamphetamine producing area in the world.

The United Nations on Drug and Crime (UNODC) has claimed that in an attempt to circumvent detection, organised crime groups in the Golden Triangle – the largely lawless region where the borders of northern Thailand, Myanmar and Laos meet – have moved considerable amounts of crystal methamphetamine through the central region of military-controlled Myanmar to the Andaman Sea.

Manipur and Mizoram: the traditional drug trafficking route

Manipur and Mizoram serve as major transit hubs for drug trafficking from Myanmar, utilising two primary routes: One from Mandalay through Moneoa and Kalewa to Tamu-Moreh (Manipur) or Rih-Champhai (Mizoram), and another from Bhamo through Homalin to Nagaland, onward to Assam, Kolkata, and beyond in India. Illicitly-produced opium along the Indo-Myanmar border, particularly in Manipur, is transported to Myanmar for heroin production and then smuggled back into India. Medicinal preparations are also smuggled from India to Myanmar through similar routes. It is also reported that recent years have seen an alarming rise in drug seizures in India’s north eastern states bordering Myanmar. The Manipur Police seized contraband valued at approximately USD 126.94 million between July 2022 and July 2023. Between January 1 and April 25 this year, the Excise & Narcotics Department in Mizoram made significant strides in apprehending individuals involved in drug trafficking and alcohol-related activities—2,297 individuals were arrested, and 30 vehicles linked to these illicit activities were seized. The department confiscated substantial amounts of illegal substances, including 26.494 kg of heroin, 384.1001 kg of ganja, and 112.528 kg of methamphetamines, reports ORF.

Observations

NUG’s vision and values promise, among other things, protection of minority rights. Its vision is: “build a peaceful Federal Democracy Union which guarantees freedom, justice and equality”. Without the involvement of the NUG, elections in Myanmar would fail to address its major issue of sharing of power between the ethnic Bamar community and 135 odd ethnic and religious minorities (including Rohingyas) who reside in seven states located at the periphery. By inviting NUG to Delhi, the Indian government has provided a gesture about its stance for democracy.

Unless this political issue—sharing of power between the majority and minority ethnic groups who live at the periphery of Myanmar—is properly addressed and solved, Myanmar’s drug cartels will continue with their flourishing business, taking advantage of the prolonged civil war the country is fighting for decades.

Views expressed are personal