Conflict continues two years into Petro’s presidency in Colombia

Two years after President Gustavo Petro took office, Total Peace, the Colombian government’s main policy to end the country’s civil war, is a reality. Analysis shows that criminal groups have become stronger, but that peace is still far away.

A report by the Foundation for Peace and Reconciliation (Fundación Paz & Reconciliación – PARES), a think tank focused on Colombia’s armed conflict, found that the policy has made little progress in achieving the goal of fully demobilizing the country’s warring parties and criminal groups.

In early August, the ceasefire between the Petro government and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last guerrilla movement, expired, throwing an already fragile Total Peace process into further doubt. Negotiations with this group are at the heart of the Total Peace strategy.

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Talks also failed with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), one of the dissident structures that made up the former FARC mafia, while another, the Second Marquetalia, began talks with the government on July 24.

The Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), also known as the Golf Clan, have consolidated themselves as the main drug trafficking organization in the country and have just agreed to talks with the government. However, as a non-political actor, the talks are taking place under a different legal framework

As challenges persist, InSight Crime spoke to Laura Bonilla, deputy director of PARES, about the findings in their report, which says the development of Colombia’s illegal armed groups is making negotiations more difficult.

InSight Crime (IC): How has violence evolved and how have illegal groups expanded during Total Peace?

Laura Bonilla (LB): Total Peace gets blamed for many of these expansions, but only some of that is true.

The idea of ​​negotiations generated the assumption that sitting down to talk with armed groups would mean an immediate reduction in violence. That assumption might have been true in previous periods of armed conflict, with groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which had the capacity to reduce violence. But that is not the scenario today.

The growth of armed groups in this cycle of violence began in 2018, peaked between 2020 and 2022, and continued to grow in 2023, albeit at a slower pace.

The EMC expanded the most in 2023, while the ELN grew more slowly. The EMC fronts have expanded mainly since 2018, which means before the start of Total Peace. But Total Peace did give them an incentive to unite before negotiations began, and they accelerated that unification as a result.

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The ELN, on the other hand, is a very traditional guerrilla movement with a coherent and more consolidated structure, which has patterns of self-restraint and therefore crosses fewer red lines.

The ceasefires were effective in some places and reduced the level of violence, especially in places where only the armed group and the army were present. Where do they not work? In places where there are disputes over territorial control between different illegal groups. There the role of the public authorities, and therefore the influence of ceasefires, is not so great.

IC: The report says that the EMC has expanded its territorial control by 25%, the AGC by 17% and the ELN and Second Marquetalia to a lesser extent. What is behind this evolution of illegal groups in the country?

LB: The EMC abused the offer of the state during the negotiations. The strengthening of the EMC is also influenced by the creation of the group, when many structures were brought together to create a General Staff. But now, for example, there are two General Staffs, after the division within the group between the wing of “Iván Mordisco” and the wing of Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá”. The group structure was not large, but it seemed large because all the fronts were united under one umbrella. It is very possible that each front expanded equally.

The AGC has grown since 2008. It has been formed, shaped, had internal conflicts and won conflicts. It is now expanding. It has no reason to sit down and talk to the state.

Two questions arise here: Is it possible to win the war against the AGC economically? We have doubts about drug trafficking, but what about winning the war against the other criminal economies in which the AGC participates, such as illegal mining, human trafficking, sexual exploitation and extortion? Winning this war is complicated because we do not know how to combat criminal structures such as the AGC, an entity that focuses on financial, not political, objectives. This is one of the greatest challenges.

I believe that the Second Marquetalia is willing to give up their weapons in exchange for a good reception by civil society and political representation. Negotiations with the group are complicated by the legal framework, since they have already abandoned peace talks.

The ELN is more traditional in its approach. It is a complex group, but you could say that they are pushing for change at the national level, they have agendas on big issues in the context of the peace process.

IC: Why are crimes like extortion on the rise?

LB: One reason is the formation of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. Not all members of the groups have access to the same economic opportunities, and the lower levels must search for resources to expand and survive.

A second reason could be that the military is more active in intercepting cocaine, which causes buyers to move to less complicated markets such as Ecuador or Bolivia. This affects the income of groups, which means that groups look for other sources of financing.

Thirdly, there has been a proliferation of criminal gangs and extortion has become a very attractive new business for such structures.

IC: How do you see Total Peace developing in the future and what challenges remain for the project?

LB: The government should plan a better route to peace, decide where to do it and where to put the effort to achieve it. The name Total Peace can be kept, but in practice peace will only be found in certain regions.

Finally, improving the security situation does not only depend on armed groups. The state must also implement good policies to protect human rights.

*This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.

Main photo: A group of EMC soldiers stand together in Colombia’s Caquetá department in February 2024. Photo: Ernesto Guzmán/EFE.