The Fall of the Republic: What Factors Led to Its Collapse?

Often, the sudden and unexpected fall of Afghanistan in the final days of the republican regime is investigated, whereas multiple intertwined factors, beginning from the establishment of this regime at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 and continuing until three years ago in August 2021, played a role in its downfall. As the first and most fundamental factor, the Bonn Conference was a flawed foundation that inevitably led to the collapse of a wall that was hoped to rise to the heights.

The Bonn Conference, held after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 in Bonn, Germany, was intended to establish a temporary administration and form the Afghan government. This conference was one of the most important international meetings about Afghanistan, organized to solve the Afghanistan problem, which was essentially the distribution of power.

This conference was held with the presence of representatives from four groups: the “Northern Alliance,” the “Peshawar Group led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani,” the “Cyprus Group led by Humayun Jarir,” and a delegation representing the supporters of Zahir Shah, known as the Rome Group. The Taliban and the Islamic Party of Hekmatyar were excluded from the meeting.

Of the approximately 11 voters in this conference, 9 voted for Mr. Sattar Sirat, and 2 voted for Mr. Hamid Karzai. However, due to considerations deemed necessary by Lakhdar Brahimi and Zalmay Khalilzad, Mr. Hamid Karzai, who was not a well-known figure at that time, assumed power in Afghanistan for a six-month term, and Mr. Abdul Sattar Sirat was forced to withdraw. Mr. Abdul Sattar Sirat, a graduate of Al-Azhar University in Egypt, was a special advisor to Zahir Shah and the Minister of Justice during the premiership of Nur Ahmad Etemadi.

One of the major gaps in the Bonn Conference was the absence of some key political forces. Later, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN special representative at the conference and one of the architects of the Bonn Agreement expressed that the agreement was signed in great haste. Those who signed the agreement did not represent all the important political sectors of Afghanistan. Representatives from some key political areas of the country were absent from the meeting, and many important political issues were not considered.

One of the most significant criticisms of the Bonn Conference was that the Taliban were not considered an opposition group to the future Afghan government, and their representatives were absent from the conference. Representatives of foreign countries and even groups engaged with the Taliban did not understand that the Taliban were part of the Afghan society and should have been involved in the power transition process.

Fahmi Huwaidi, the author of the book “Taliban Soldiers Of God In The Wrong Battle,” points out that the Taliban, with all their good and bad characteristics, emerged from the heart of the Pashtun tribal society and traditions.

Another issue overlooked at the Bonn Conference was accepting the presidential system as the future political system of Afghanistan. This system had previously caused numerous problems. Given Afghanistan’s geographical situation and cultural differences, other political systems seemed to be better alternatives to the presidential system. Most political and social discontent regarding power distribution stemmed from the presidential system, where power is concentrated in the hands of the president.

Another problem was the American model in the process of state-building in Afghanistan. State-building occurred from the top down. Contrary to the European model, state-building did not originate from within the society; rather, the state was first created, and the nation was excluded from the state-building process.

At the executive level, the government and authority were given to individuals who lacked democratic experience, capacity, and the necessary skills for modern governance. Essentially, the foundation of the republican system at the Bonn Conference was not based on an indigenous political philosophy rooted in the realities and necessities of Afghan society; it was practically a distribution of power among the Mujahideen, some technocratic forces, and ethnic leaders, without the presence of the Taliban and the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Since these political forces lacked democratic experience and modern state-building skills, they gathered a group of Westernized Afghans and apparent technocrats around themselves based on ethnic and familial connections, practically initiating a networked government based on patronage and corruption. In the early years, the new leaders used the acquired power and NATO’s support to eliminate and violently suppress political-ethnic rivals and rural Taliban under the guise of “counter-insurgency operations and night raids.” This suppression and elimination, after 2006, led to an escalation and expansion of war from the Taliban’s side.

The spirit and purpose of a democratic system is to break the monopoly of power. Power monopoly leads to corruption. Corruption creates an endless cycle of weakening the rule of law and socio-political inequality and, according to historical experience, ultimately results in the complete collapse of the political structure and social order. The assumption of leadership by ethnic leaders after the Bonn Conference and the appointment of high-level executive positions to individuals who lacked faith in democracy and the democratic system pushed the situation to the brink of complete and comprehensive collapse.

According to the constitution, the President of Afghanistan was the head of the three branches of government, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and had special powers and authority. In the government of Ashraf Ghani, especially in the second term after September 2019, we witnessed a severe monopoly of power.

Mr. Ghani, a stubborn, obstinate, suspicious, and repeated violator of the constitution, was the main factor in exacerbating the crisis, especially in the last years of his administration. Mr. Ghani was surrounded by a mafia circle of technocrats from the West, whose mechanism for being appointed to significant executive and policymaking positions in the country was unclear, lacking any political understanding or historical awareness of Afghanistan’s situation. This was because most of these individuals did not emerge from the lower social strata or the core of Afghan society. The indolence and financial and sexual corruption of this circle, known as the “Palace Boys,” repeatedly made national and international headlines.

In the last three years of Ashraf Ghani’s administration, the republican system was in the grip of three individuals: Mr. Ghani, the president; Hamdullah Mohib, the national security advisor; and Fazel Mahmood Fazli, the head of the presidential administration. This group became known as the Ghani-Mohib-Fazli triangle. The people, political opponents, and even the Taliban occasionally sarcastically referred to it as the “three-person republic.”

Ashraf Ghani and his associates, by repeatedly violating the constitution and the principles of the rule of law and national participation, reduced the republican system to three individuals. In reality, without the will and desire of Mohib and Fazli and ultimately Mr. Ghani, no one could hold any government position or office. Each of these gentlemen (Mohib and Fazli) had mafia and economic networks for corruption, embezzlement, and pressuring and eliminating their political rivals. This concentration of power was so entrenched that Mr. Mohib and Fazli decided who could be a member of parliament and who, despite having enough votes, should be removed from the list. It is obvious that Ghani, Mohib, and Fazli, all three, belonged to a specific ethnic group and tribe.

Afghanistan’s economy, at least over the past 200 years, has been dependent on foreign aid and mainly on superpowers, whether during the reign of a strong and famous ruler named Abdul Rahman Khan, who practically sold a large part of Afghanistan’s territory to British India in exchange for money and weapons to suppress the people inside the country, during the communist regime of the 20th century that was dependent on Moscow and the Soviet Union or during the post-Bonn regime, which was built on the ruins of a collapsed country and relied on NATO and international organizations for about 90% of its military and non-military expenses. This economy, based on foreign aid, operated in contrast to an endogenous economy based on production. In this economy, various layers of society, especially the 75% rural population of Afghanistan, had no role, and the money was concentrated in the hands of political networks and corrupt leaders, with no transparent and institutionalized mechanism for accountability. Conversely, there was no significant civil pressure or demand from the people to force the system to be accountable.

Billions of dollars of foreign aid money flowed into the country and ended up in the hands of individuals who lacked the infrastructure and capacity to absorb and manage this investment.

In the economic-political relations that a collection of ethnic networks formed with technocrats from the West, NATO’s windfall money resulted in nothing but patronage and corruption. Appointments and allocations of government positions were based on personal connections.

In reality, relationships always outweighed regulations. For example, in the last three years, when the republican system was engaged in war with several military and terrorist groups in the most insecure and war-torn country in the world, the national security advisor of this country lacked any military expertise and experience. Mr. Hamdullah Mohib held a doctorate in animation and special effects and had never served a day in the military or intelligence. Nevertheless, in the last three years, Mr. Mohib had unlimited authority in managing and conducting the war in Afghanistan. According to President Ashraf Ghani’s decree, even a district police chief could not be appointed or dismissed without Mr. Mohib’s approval. In that system, only those who had the money or the necessary connections to buy and seize a government position had power and influence. That unwritten law was taken for granted in the social psyche because people had witnessed such actions and a vicious cycle by the government hundreds of thousands of times over 20 years.

The United States, disregarding and ignoring the protests and warnings from various Afghan sectors and experts, marginalized and isolated the Afghan government by negotiating and signing an agreement with the Taliban. This act gave the Taliban internal, regional, and global legitimacy. When the U.S. Secretary of State attended the signing ceremony of the Doha Agreement in Qatar, the Taliban sang songs of victory and triumph. Meanwhile, the defeat and withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan were seen as inevitable. Especially after the U.S. began negotiations with the Taliban, other countries such as Iran, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, and others hosted the Taliban.

The United States placed the Taliban on an equal footing with the government, which was a major victory for the Taliban. This allowed them to mobilize religious school forces from tribal areas with the support and logistics of Pakistan’s intelligence to partake in this significant victory. This is why Ashraf Ghani and his small circle, contrary to U.S. wishes, engaged in secret meetings and negotiations with some Taliban members and Pakistan to, in some measure, counter the blow they had received from the United States. According to the Taliban, the transition was not supposed to result in a complete collapse, but Ghani and his inner circle coordinated the surrender of Kabul to the Haqqani network. This shocked the United States and all progressive forces in Afghanistan, even though the U.S., under Trump’s leadership, had effectively declared the end of the republican system and Ghani’s government in Afghanistan by signing the Doha Agreement and the full withdrawal of American forces. With Joe Biden’s accession to power and the unconditional withdrawal order for American forces, this process advanced to the complete collapse of the system.

High-ranking U.S. military officials, including General Lloyd Austin, the Secretary of Defense, General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Kenneth McKenzie, head of the United States Central Command, clearly stated in a question-and-answer session before the Senate Armed Services Committee in late September 2021:

General Kenneth McKenzie said, “The fall of the Afghan government was rooted in the Doha Agreement. The signing of the Doha Agreement had a detrimental impact on the Afghan government and its military forces.”

General Lloyd Austin, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, affirmed General McKenzie’s remarks, adding that the Doha Agreement pledged to cease U.S. airstrikes against the Taliban: “As a result, the Taliban became stronger, intensified their offensive operations against Afghan security forces, and Afghans lost many people weekly.”

Finally, General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in the Senate session, “The U.S. faced a strategic defeat in Afghanistan, and this defeat is the result of decisions made over the past 20 years.”

The main body of the Afghan army comprised the underprivileged and impoverished segments of society, whose sole reason for joining the army was to earn a livelihood. They were mostly illiterate and lacked any historical awareness or military motivation to defend their homeland.

Mr. Ghani, three days after fleeing, stated in a video message from Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, that his security officials told him his life was in danger. To prove this claim, he said that his exit from the presidential palace was so sudden and swift that he didn’t have time to take his laptop or put on his shoes.

However, no security official, on whose word Ghani relies to justify his escape, has confirmed this claim in any media or to any journalist—not the head of the National Directorate of Security, nor the Minister of Defense, nor the Minister of Interior, nor the commander of the PPS (Ghani’s protection force or presidential guard), nor any other officials from his government’s military and security institutions. Instead, later, with the disclosure of money transfers, suspicions grew that this escape was pre-planned.

Mr. Ghani’s flight remains a mystery, but it is clear that he departed with several helicopters from an area entirely controlled by U.S. forces to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, it is said that Mr. Ghani, as the situation worsened, and political figures contacted Taliban representatives in Qatar, and the Taliban assured them that they would not enter Kabul. Additionally, the Taliban issued an official statement during those hours stating that they would not enter Kabul until a political agreement was reached. Ashraf Ghani and his accompanying team, particularly Hamdullah Mohib, the National Security Advisor, and Fazl Mahmood Fazli, the head of the Administrative Office of the President, nailed the final nail in the coffin of the regime and army with their escape, leaving thousands of commando and special forces units stationed in Kabul and millions of Afghans in a power vacuum and historical uncertainty.

The collapse of Afghanistan has various causes, the most significant of which, as mentioned, are rooted in the past twenty years and the involved factors in the country’s politics.

The fall of the republican system in Afghanistan was not sudden and swift but gradual, occurring over the past twenty years, from 2001 to 2021. In every stage, it had its ebbs and flows, but it stood because of the presence and necessities of the United States and NATO.

We conclude with this quote:

Republicanism will become trivialized without democrats.

You can read the Persian version of this analysis here:

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