Medina v. Lumpkin – CourtListener.com

Case: 23-70003            Document: 91-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/15/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________                                 FILED
August 15, 2024
No. 23-70003
____________                            Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Anthony Medina,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:09-CV-3223
______________________________
Before Smith, Stewart, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Anthony Medina, a death row inmate, seeks a Certificate of
Appealability (“COA”) from the district court’s resolution of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and his constitutional claims. Because Medina
does not show that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his claims, we DENY the petition for a COA.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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BACKGROUND
I. The Murders
On New Year’s Eve there was a party going on at the Rodriguez family
home in Houston, Texas. In the early morning hours of January 1, 1996, the
adults were inside and most of the children were outside playing in the
backyard. Nine-year-old David sat on the trunk of Veronica Rodriguez’s car,
and his fifteen-year-old sister Diane stood nearby. Around 2:30am, a car
came down the dead-end street and, as it passed the house, used an assault
rifle to spray the children with bullets. Both David and Diane died, and their
cousin was injured. A witness to the shooting identified the hand holding the
assault rifle as “white or Mexican” but definitely not “black.”
About six months prior to the murders, someone had previously shot
at the Rodriguez home, and the next day, someone painted gang-related
graffiti on their garage. In two other incidents, someone vandalized Veronica
Rodriguez’s car, and another time someone threw a Molotov cocktail at their
house. Although no one in the Rodriguez family belonged to a gang, the
violence ultimately stemmed from Veronica’s two-year relationship with
Marco “Blue” Martinez, a member of the H-Town Crips (“HTC”).
Throughout the time that Martinez dated Veronica, a gang war
brewed between the HTC and its rival gang, La Raza (“LRZ”). The tension
between the two gangs intensified after an HTC member killed an LRZ
member. Personal animosity built between Martinez and Medina, an LRZ
leader. This animosity led to the two exchanging a series of dirty looks,
flashing gang signs, and threatening each other with weapons. There was no
question that it was Veronica’s relationship with Martinez that brought
violence upon the Rodriguez house, culminating in the New Years murders.
Although Veronica and Martinez were not home at the time of the murders,
her marked car was parked outside the home which the children were dancing
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around when they died from gunfire. The only people able to identify the
shooter, came from those inside the car. The prosecution ultimately fingered
Medina as the shooter, while the defense claimed Dominic “Flaco” Holmes,
a Black “peewee” or junior member of the predominantly Hispanic LRZ
gang, was the killer.
II. Trial Testimony
Trial testimony revealed that at the same time the Rodriguez family
met to celebrate the new year, Medina and his fellow LRZ gang members
began to party at the house of Candelario “Candyman” Guerrero. Around
11:00pm, Medina and others went to a different party at the house of a former
LRZ member, Michele “Chicona” Aguenta. While there, a dispute erupted
when LRZ members accused another person of having a brother affiliated
with the HTC. When that person looked as though he was going to hit
another leader in LRZ, Medina brandished a gun. The LRZ members left
after Chicona’s brother put an end to the tension. Back at Candyman’s
house, around 2:00 or 2:30am, a group left Candyman’s house to carry out
the drive-by murders.
A. The Prosecution
The prosecution’s theory was that Medina left in James Moore’s car,
a non LRZ member, with Johnny “Pelon” Valadez, Alex “Slim” Perez,
Veronica “China” Ponce, Scharlene “India” Pooran, and Holmes. Medina
was the only leader in the car. Moore, the driver, Pelon, and Holmes, each of
whom testified for the prosecution, admitted to being present in the car, and
all identified Medina, Slim, India, and China as also being there. The gang
members directed Moore to the Rodriguezes’ street, stopping to allow
Medina to get a semiautomatic assault rifle from the trunk of the car and
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move to the front passenger seat. Moore, Pelon, and Holmes all testified at
trial that Medina fired at the Rodriguez house.
Around 3:00 am, Medina and the other LRZ members returned to
Chicona’s house, and Medina told Regina Juarez that they had done a drive-
by and he fired the gun. Medina bragged about the murder, and people saw
him with the murder weapon. He pointed the gun at someone he suspected
to have a brother who was in a rival gang, and shot the gun into the air before
Chicona’s brother restrained him in a headlock. The LRZ members left when
Chicona’s father fired a shotgun into the air and told everybody to leave.
After Medina’s arrest, he called Regina Juarez and told her to get rid
of the murder weapon which was at India’s house. Regina, Holmes, Moore,
and another gang member got rid of the gun. Medina also directed gang
members to lay the blame on Holmes, and China and India helped with his
plan. Specifically, China and India told Pelon to blame Holmes and that if
Pelon told the truth they would come after his family or try to do something
to him.
B. The Defense
The trial court appointed John A. Millin, and Gerald “Jerry”
Guerinot to represent Medina at trial. The focus of their strategy was to place
the blame on Holmes through two primary themes: (1) Holmes made
incriminating statements, and (2) Medina disclaimed being the shooter. The
defense supported this theory with testimony that Holmes told Medina’s
sister that the police “had to know it was him, but they had to find him before
they could arrest him.” Holmes had also stated to other friends that he “put
them hoes to rest” and “made the hoes lie down.”
The Defense had Slim testify that he had not left Candyman’s house
to do the drive-by, and that Slim had not seen Medina with a weapon at
Candyman’s house. Slim claimed that neither Holmes nor Medina claimed
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responsibility for the shootings. Medina also took the stand and testified that
he did not participate in the crime, but stayed at Candyman’s house until
around 3:30am, and that he saw a weapon in Moore’s car and Moore and
Holmes left around the time of the murders. The jury found Medina guilty of
capital murder.
III. Punishment Phase
There was a variety of evidence presented against Medina at the
punishment phase, including that:
1. Medina and one Edward Johnson skipped school almost daily and
slashed the tires on cars, and Medina drove his SUV into other cars to
push them into the intersection or to damage them, and that they stole
items from the cars after smashing the windows with a sledgehammer.
2. Medina was arrested in October 1993 on multiple counts of burglary
of a motor vehicle, and Medina failed to comply with the terms of his
probation.
3. Medina received ten years probation in December 1994 in four arson
cases; Medina violated probation and was sentenced in these cases
and the burglary cases.
4. Testimony from a sixteen-year-old Dante Medrano that Medina and
another person committed a drive-by where bullets hit Medrano’s
house.
5. Rocio Pedrosa testified that she was shot at the Rodriguez house and
had to have a three-hour surgery, was in the hospital for eleven days,
and still had a colostomy bag at the time of the trial and needed further
surgery. She also had not returned to school, had nightmares and
flashbacks, and was afraid to be alone.
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6. Jesus Rodriguez, the father of the deceased, was in the house when he
heard the shots and ran outside after. He testified that his wife could
not sleep and was sick and nervous after the shooting; that his son
Francisco was different after the shootings, and his daughter Jennifer
gave him a poem about her feelings.
The Defense presented evidence where: Medina’s family members testified
about his “childhood, his early speech impediment, his family relationships,
his behavior, his church activities, his interaction with children and adults,
his attendance at Bellaire Christian Academy, his protective attitude towards
others, and their lack of knowledge of his gang activities.” 1 The jury
answered Texas’ special issue questions in a manner requiring imposition of
a death sentence.
IV. Procedural History
Medina first raised twenty-two points of error on direct appeal. The
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence on October
6, 1999. Medina filed his first state habeas application on November 23, 1998,
which was dismissed as untimely. With new counsel, Medina filed a second
habeas application on November 21, 2001, raising fourteen points of error.
The Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief on September 16, 2009. While
the second habeas application was pending, Medina filed a third and fourth
habeas application, which the Court of Criminal Appeals denied as an abuse
of the writ.
_____________________
1
A full discussion of the Defense’s evidence is presented in the Argument section
below.
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On October 5, 2009, Medina filed his federal petition, and amended
his petition on May 31, 2011. Respondent filed an answer and motion for
summary judgment on January 17, 2012. Medina requested a stay while the
Supreme Court considered a case addressing a petitioner’s ability to
overcome procedural barriers to habeas review. The district court stayed and
administratively closed the case. While the stay was in effect, Medina filed a
Second Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus on March 21, 2013,
alleging fourteen grounds for relief. On August 13, 2013, the court reopened
the case, only to issue another stay to permit Medina to exhaust at least one
claim he had not raised in state court. The court permitted Medina to raise
any issue needing exhaustion before returning to federal court.
On December 16, 2015, Medina filed his fifth state habeas application,
which raised three issues: “(1) police and prosecutorial misconduct violated
his constitutional rights; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel at the
guilt/innocence phase of trial; and (3) actual innocence.” On January 25,
2017, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the application as an abuse of
the writ.
The parties then returned to federal court and Medina argued that he
had exhausted all claims. Medina also filed a motion for discovery and an
evidentiary hearing. The district court found that Medina was not entitled to
federal habeas corpus relief, and thus granted Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, denied Medina’s petition for the writ, and denied his
motion for discovery. Medina now seeks review of the district court’s denial
of his habeas claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For Medina to appeal the district court’s denial of his claims, he
“must first seek a (COA) from this court pursuant to 

28 USC§

                                        7
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2253(c)(1).” Nelson v. Davis, 

952 F.3d 651

, 658 (5th Cir. 2020). To obtain a
COA, Medina “must demonstrate ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.’” Id.; 

28 USC§ 2253

(c)(2). If the district court denied
his claims on the merits, Medina “must show that ‘jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or
that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.’” 

Proof of identity.

 (citation omitted). For claims the
district court denied on procedural grounds, Medina “must show that
‘jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.’” 

Proof of identity.

 (quoting Segundo v. Davis, 

831 F.3d 345

, 350 (5th Cir. 2016)).
“The COA standard is less burdensome in capital cases, as ‘in a death
penalty case any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved
in the petitioner’s favor.’” 

Proof of identity.

 (quoting Clark v. Thaler, 

673 F.3d 410

, 425
(5th Cir. 2012)).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) (

28
USC Article 2254

) “requires a district court to defer to a state habeas court’s
determination of the merits of a prisoner’s claims unless the state decision
‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law . . .’ or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”
Hughes v. Vannoy, 

7 F.4e 380

, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2021). “(T)he state court
decision must be ‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.’” 

Id. at 387

 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 

562
US 86

, 103, (2011)). “When reviewing a state habeas court’s decision under
AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, we review ‘only the ultimate legal
determination by the state court—not every link in its reasoning.’” Charles
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v. Stephens, 

736 F.3d 380

, 387 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Trottie v. Stephens, 

720
F.3d 231

, 241 (5th Cir.2013)). For claims not adjudicated on the merits in
state court, we apply a de novo standard of review. Nelson, 952 F.3d at 658.
DISCUSSION
Prior to discussing the merits of Medina’s claims, we must first
determine which level of review applies to which claims. Medina and the
State argue about whether AEDPA’s deferential review applies, and to which
claims it applies. The “statutory authority of federal courts to issue habeas
corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 

28 USC§ 2254

, as
amended by (AEDPA).” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 VS 86

, 97-98 (2011).
The statute states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.

28 USC§ 2254

(d). A federal claim will be deemed to have been adjudicated
on the merits when, “in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural
principles to the contrary,” it has been presented to the state court and the
state court has denied relief. Harrington, 

562 US out of 99

. “The presumption
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may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for
the state court’s decision is more likely.” 

Id. at 99-100

.
When making the evaluation under AEDPA, “a habeas court must
determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have
supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories
are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” 

Id. at 102

.
AEDPA, “also requires that determinations of fact issued by state courts are
‘presumed to be correct,’ and that they not be disturbed unless an applicant
rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence.” Charles, 

736
F.3d at 395

. We now turn to Medina’s habeas application in state court. 2
Medina’s 2001 state court habeas action raised fourteen points of
error. Of relevance here, Medina argued that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel (claims 1 and 2); that the state withheld material
evidence, and the state violated the law by giving deals to witnesses (claim 3).
The state habeas court issued conclusions of law and an order, which the
Court of Criminal Appeals adopted. Accordingly, because Medina’s
arguments were “presented to a state court, and the state court () denied
relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the
merits.” Harrington, 

562 US out of 99

. Medina argues that he has rebutted this
presumption because “he requested discovery and an evidentiary hearing to
resolve his fact-intensive claims in state court,” and instead, the state court
abdicated its role to the prosecutor. Medina’s argument is without merit. In
Sandoval Mendoza v. Lumpkin, we answered a similar question where
_____________________
2
This refers to Medina’s second application in 2001, as his first application was
denied as untimely, and the court appointed new counsel and permitted him to file a new
habeas action without it being considered successive. This 2001 application is the one
referred to throughout this opinion.
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Mendoza asserted that “because he sought discovery in state court, but it
was denied, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals failed to provide him with
due process and his claims were not adjudicated on the merits.” 

81 F.4e 461

,
472 (5th Cir. 2023). Our court reiterated that:
we have consistently held that “a full and fair hearing is not a
precondition to according § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of
correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to
applying § 2254(d)’s standards of review.” Such a requirement
is supported neither by the plain text of Section 2254(d), which
makes no reference to a full and fair hearing, nor by the
legislative landscape against which AEDPA was passed, which
involved excising from the pre-AEPDA version of Section
2254 references to a full and fair hearing. Further, “(w)here we
have conducted an examination of whether an ‘adjudication on
the merits’ occurred, we have looked at whether the state court
reached the merits of the petitioner’s claim rather than
deciding it on procedural grounds.”
Sandoval Mendoza, 81 F.4th at 472. (Internal citations removed and at times
quoting Boyer v. Vannoy, 

863 F.3d 428

, 446 (5th Cir. 2017)) (quoting Valdez
v. Cockrell, 

274 F.3d 941

, 951 (5th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, because the state
court reached the merits of Medina’s claims, they were adjudicated on the
merits and AEDPA deference applies. 3 Thus, reasonable jurists could not
debate whether the district court was correct in applying § 2254(d)’s
relitigation bar. Next, we turn to the merits of Medina’s claims.
Medina requests a COA to appeal the district court’s denial of three
claims: (1) his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the guilt phase of his
trial; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the punishment phase of
_____________________
3
Although the broad premise of Medina’s claims were raised and thus adjudicated
on the merits, certain “sub-claims” relating to specific witnesses were not raised. Those
claims are procedurally defaulted and will be discussed in Section III.
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his trial; and (3) the deprivation of due process for withholding evidence and
presenting false testimony. We examine each claim in turn.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court has recognized that “‘the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.’” Strickland v. Washington, 

466
US 668

, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 

397 VS 759

, 771, n. 14
(1970)). The right to effective assistance of counsel is violated when the
government “interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.” 

Proof of identity.

 Counsel “can
also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by failing
to render ‘adequate legal assistance(.)’” 

Proof of identity.

 The “benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.” 

Proof of identity.

 There are two requirements
that must be met to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. First, “the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” Id. at 687. Second, “the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.” Id. A defendant must make both showings to
prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The “proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
effective assistance.” Id. In assessing the performance of counsel, the inquiry
“must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the
circumstances.” Id. at 688. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must
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be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. The court must “indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. Accordingly, a court must “judge the
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690. A defendant
making the claim must “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The
court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.” Id. There is a strong presumption that counsel
“rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. Thus, “while
‘(s)urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,’ ‘(e)stablishing
that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under
§ 2254(d) is all the more difficult.’ Both the Strickland standard and the
AEDPA standard are ‘highly deferential,’ and ‘when the two apply in
tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.’” Charles, 746 F.3d at 389 (internal citations
and citation omitted). Medina first argues that counsel was ineffective at the
guilt phase of his trial.
A. Guilt Phase
Medina makes multiple arguments in raising his ineffective assistance
of counsel claim including that counsel (1) failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation, (2) failed to impeach witnesses, and (3) failed to request a
limiting instruction. We take each argument in turn.
i. Counsel’s Investigation
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Medina first argues that counsel was ineffective because counsel’s
investigation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel
“has ‘a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Wiggins v. Smith,

539 VS 510

, 521 (2003) (citation omitted). The decision “not to investigate
must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland,

466 US out of 691

. The state adjudicated Medina’s claims on the merits and
found that counsel’s performance was not deficient. Accordingly, our review
is “doubly deferential” and asks only whether the “state court’s application
of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d).” Harrington, 526 U.S. at
105.
Medina argues ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel: tried
three other unrelated death penalty cases as well as a murder case and an
aggravated sexual assault case while trying his case; on the eve of jury
selection, counsel only made ten phone calls over two days and a visit to the
crime scene; and of the twenty-eight people on the state’s witness list,
counsel contacted three. Specifically, Medina argues counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to contact:
• Dallas Nacoste, even though he gave the police a statement
implicating Holmes and reported that Holmes buried the murder
weapon.
• Becerra, who would have testified that Holmes sought promotion
within LRZ for pinning the shooting on Medina and threatened to kill
Juarez and her family if she did not go along with the plan.
• Villanueva, who would have testified that Holmes confessed to the
shooting.
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• Crawford, Holmes, and Moore’s friend, who could have testified that
Holmes repeatedly expressed a desire to avenge the death of Lopez
and saw Holmes with a long rifle shortly after the shooting.
• Carlos McNickles, who saw a black man firing an AK-type rifle out of
a car matching the description of Moore’s car.
First, the state court found that based on the affidavit of trial counsel, and the
appellate record, counsel’s caseload did not hinder preparation or
investigation in Medina’s case where trial counsel:
prepared and filed pre-trial motions, employed an investigator,
interviewed witnesses, obtained discovery from the state,
reviewed the state’s file, read the offense report, visited the
scene of the offense, interviewed the applicant’s family, talked
with the applicant numerous times about the offense and
pending trial, was familiar with the facts of the case and
relevant law, presented evidence, vigorously cross-examined
(the) state’s witnesses, made objections, presented a
reasonable defensive theory, and competently argued to the
jury.
Second, the state court found that counsel’s strategy at trial was to place the
blame on others. The state court found that Nacoste’s statement to the police
where he stated that Holmes did the shooting, was available to trial counsel,
and his habeas affidavit gives essentially the same version of the offense as
that in his statement given to police. Counsel made a strategic decision not
to call Nacoste to testify because his credibility was lower than other
witnesses. As to McNickles, his statement that he saw a black man shooting
a rifle does not exculpate Medina from the murder. As to Crawford, the
habeas affidavit states that the LRZ gang had something planned for the
HTC’s, and such an assertion is just as incriminating to Medina as to anyone
else. As to Becerra and Villanueva, counsel presented evidence through
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Juarez that Holmes told others that he was the one who committed the
murders.
Accordingly, the evidence that Medina argues should have been
brought in or would have been brought in had counsel contacted or called the
above witnesses was either: information counsel already had access to, a
strategic decision not to call the witness, not information that would
exculpate Medina, or already presented through other witnesses or evidence
at trial. Medina has failed to show that counsel’s performance was deficient,
which requires “a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 

466
US at 687

. Thus, under the high level of deference we must afford the state
court, we cannot say its application of Strickland was unreasonable, and
reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s finding of the same.
Because Medina fails on the first prong of Strickland, his claim cannot
survive. We nonetheless move to the second prong, prejudice.
Any deficiency “in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”
Strickland, 

466 US out of 692

. Medina must “affirmatively prove prejudice.”

Id. at 693

. That is, Medina “must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Id. at 694

.
Medina argues that he was prejudiced because the jury did not hear
from the mentioned witnesses that Holmes had confessed to the shooting and
threatened other witnesses if they did not blame Medina. He claims the jury
also did not hear from an eyewitness whose descriptions incriminated
Holmes and Moore, not Medina, or that Holmes and Juarez lied under oath
about the murder weapon. Medina fails to prove the result of his proceeding
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would have been different. As established above, there was evidence
presented at trial that Holmes confessed to the shooting, including testimony
from Medina’s sister, Domingo Valle, and Rene Reyna. All testifying that
Holmes confessed to the shooting. Similarly, Alex Perez testified that he
never saw Medina leave the New Year’s Eve party. Accordingly, Medina fails
to demonstrate that the result of the proceeding would have been different
where the evidence he claims was missing, was already presented in another
form or through other witnesses. We next turn to Medina’s second
argument.
ii. Impeachment of Witnesses
Medina contends that he was rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because counsel failed to interview and subsequently impeach the
state’s key witnesses with their previous statements, and instead blindly
lobbed accusations at the witnesses. He also argues that counsel failed to
impeach Juarez and Holmes with their criminal histories or cross-examine
them concerning their pending charges or parole status. 4 Our review is
doubly deferential for the claim pertaining to criminal histories and is
procedurally defaulted as to impeachment surrounding previous or
inconsistent statements. 5
Medina argues that Counsel should have impeached certain witnesses
with their criminal records or cross examined them with pending charges or
parole status. Medina fails to identify with specificity which witnesses
Counsel should have impeached or cross examined, or how that would have
_____________________
4
Medina’s state habeas petition did not argue that counsel was ineffective for
failing to interview or impeach Jaurez and Holmes with prior sworn statements.
Accordingly, this claim is procedurally defaulted.
5
The procedural default doctrine is discussed in Section III.
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affected the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, this claim is inadequately
argued. “A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance
must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have
been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 

466 US at
690

. “A defendant who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his
counsel must allege with specificity what the investigation would have
revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial.” Hughes, 7
F.4th at 390 (discussing prejudice prong) (quoting United States v. Green, 

882
F.2d 999

, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, even if this
court were to consider it, the state court’s application of Strickland was not
unreasonable as it found that “much of the witnesses’ prior actions (were)
inadmissible,” and the district court agreed, noting that most of the
witnesses’ criminal histories were juvenile records that could not be used for
impeachment purposes under the Texas Criminal Rule of Evidence 609.
Accordingly, Medina’s impeachment argument fails to demonstrate that
counsel was ineffective, that the state court’s application of Strickland was
unreasonable, or that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district
court’s determination. We now turn to Medina’s final claim at the guilt
phase.
iii. Requesting a Limiting Instruction
Finally, Medina contends that counsel was ineffective because
counsel himself admitted that he was deficient for failing to request
appropriate limiting instructions regarding the July 1995 attacks on the
Rodriguez home. Our review is doubly deferential. The state court found that
the evidence concerning the Rodriguezes’ home’s being the target of
Medina’s gang “was relevant to explain the context of gang rivalries in which
the offense occurred and has some tendency to show that applicant had a
motive to shoot and kill persons at that house.” Thus, it found that trial
counsel was not ineffective for not lodging objections to the admission of the
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relevant evidence of the July 1995 attacks. The state court also found that
such evidence was relevant to Medina’s intent and motive on the night of the
offense, and such testimony was admissible as being part of the
circumstances surrounding the instant offense and was intertwined with the
instant offense. The district court noted that Texas law does not hold
evidence to a reasonable-doubt standard or require a limiting instruction
when the state relies on same-transaction contextual evidence. We cannot
say jurists of reason would disagree.
The evidence presented showed the history of violence between the
two gangs, evidence that could have implicated anyone in LRZ, not just
Medina. Further, what the evidence showed about Medina, his being a gang
member and having a grudge, was evidence that was already in the record.
Accordingly, Medina fails to show deficiency, or prejudice, where he has not
shown how it would result in a different outcome at trial. The state court’s
application of Strickland was not unreasonable, and jurists of reason would
not disagree with the district court’s resolution. Next, Medina argues that
counsel was ineffective at the punishment phase of his trial.
B. Punishment Phase
Medina argues counsel was ineffective at the punishment phase of his
trial because a reasonable lawyer would have investigated Medina’s home
life, his school performance, and his history of gang involvement.
Specifically, Medina argues that counsel (1) waited until the eve of trial to
request and obtain funding for a mental health evaluation and then failed to
procure one; (2) waited until days before trial to begin a sentencing phase
investigation; and (3) did not prepare the witnesses or go over their testimony
before calling them to the stand. Our review is doubly deferential.
At the punishment phase, “in investigating potential mitigating
evidence, counsel must either (1) undertake a reasonable investigation or (2)
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make an informed strategic decision that investigation is unnecessary.”
Charles, 

736 F.3d at 389

 (quoting Higgins v. Cain, 

720 F.3d 255

, 265 (5th Cir.
2013)). The Supreme Court has also stated that “trial counsel must not
ignore ‘pertinent avenues of investigation,’ . . . or even a single, particularly
promising investigation lead(.)” 

Id. at 390

 (quoting Porter v. McCollum, 

558
US 30

, 40 (2009) (citation omitted)). At the prejudice inquiry, we ask
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer—including an appellate court, to the extent it independently
reweighs the evidence—would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland,

466 US at 695

. Medina alleges that had counsel adequately investigated his
background the following information would have been revealed:
• Throughout Medina’s childhood, his father was always drunk,
creating an unstable environment and his mother coped by self-
medicating with marijuana.
• He lived in a volatile environment, where one time his aunt locked
herself, her children, and Medina in a bedroom while Medina’s father
threw his mother on the ground outside and banged her head on the
sidewalk. His mother kept a gun under her pillow and threatened to
shoot his father.
• Medina’s parents were emotionally and physically absent throughout
his childhood and other relatives recognized his need for support and
a safe environment.
• His aunt, Eva Uribe, drove Medina to school in a different
neighborhood because she was concerned about the environment he
was growing up in.
• Medina’s teachers did their best to support Medina, and Medina on
one occasion rode his bike ten miles to spend the afternoon with one
of his teachers.
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• Medina and his friends routinely endured gang members chasing and
shooting at them. Medina was targeted in a drive-by shooting, and his
best friend pushed him out of the way and was killed instead. A
postconviction mental health evaluation revealed that Medina suffers
from PTSD.
• Medina sought protection from a gang and LRZ became a surrogate
family.
• Medina’s gang activity was connected with his trauma and basic need
for love and acceptance.
At punishment, defense called seven witnesses who testified as follows:
• Verlan Pergues testified that Medina had a speech impediment
that he overcame and had good characteristics.
• Sherry Grien testified that Medina had good qualities and she did
not have as much contact with him in the last couple of years.
• David Castro, Medina’s cousin, testified that Medina lived in a
gang area, did not know Medina had problems, and that he was
respectful and courteous to family members, and helped Castro
with house repairs.
• Eva Uribe, Medina’s aunt, picked Medina up from his Christian
school, he was involved in church and would protect her younger
daughters, Medina would help his grandfather who suffered a mild
stroke and Medina was a loving and caring person who took care
of his son, and she eventually learned Medina was in a gang.
• Antonio, Medina’s grandfather testified that Medina was
intelligent, and mechanically-inclined, and helpful with errands
and auto repairs. Also that he was respectful to adults and
interacted with children.
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• Anthony, Medina’s father, testified that Medina was a good child,
got along well with children in the family and was a help to them,
that he learned about Medina’s gang activity after he was arrested,
and knew there were gangs in the neighborhood, and that Medina
was a good person whom he loved.
• Golda, Medina’s mother, testified that she and her husband had
been married twenty-two years, had three children, that Medina
was good, polite, respectful, and had no problems. That Medina’s
change in behavior came when he was a teenager and she learned
about his gang activity after the fact, that they always tried to do
what was best for Medina, and Medina tried to work hard and take
care of his family and be less part of the gang.
Reasonable jurists would not disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that Medina failed to state an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, in
an affidavit submitted by counsel, they alleged that their strategy was to
present a picture of Medina’s background and home life to show that he was
not a future danger. Counsel stated that “during the interviews no family
member told the defense that the father drank, the mother smoked, or that
they fought.” Counsel further stated that they did not consider any jail
records, which stated that the defendant had no discipline records, to be
sufficiently mitigating in the circumstances, and that juries are typically not
impressed with a no-problems jail record. Counsel also did not seek out who
reported the crime because “how the police got to the defendant and the
weapons in this case was not the relevant question.” Counsel stated they did
not present a mental health expert because Medina had a stutter which was
cured and was far-removed from the offense.
Second, counsel must have been put on notice that further
investigation or inquiry was warranted. See Martinez v. Dretke, (finding
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counsel was not ineffective when nothing put them on notice that further
investigation was needed where Martinez’s family was unwilling or unable to
help. “Moreover, nothing in counsel’s personal and professional experience,
in their interactions with Martinez, or in Martinez’s conditions of
confinement, put counsel on notice that further inquiry was warranted.”).

404 F.3d 878

, 886 (5th Cir. 2005). See also Strickland, 

466 US out of 691

 (“the
reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially
influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.”). Accordingly,
where counsel was not put on notice of Medina’s tumultuous family history,
it cannot be said that he was ineffective. Similarly, Medina does not allege
that he made his counsel aware of the shooting he witnessed of his best friend.
As to the remaining evidence Medina claims would have been brought in,
that evidence is primarily represented by testimony that was presented at the
punishment phase, i.e. Medina’s good character (multiple people testified as
to his character), growing up in a neighborhood surrounded by gang activity
(multiple individuals testified that they knew or later found out he was in a
gang, or that his neighborhood had gangs), and his need for love and support
(his parents testified about speaking to him after finding out he was in a gang
and that they tried to do what was best for him and bring him back into the
family). See Coble v. Quarterman, 

496 F.3d 430

, 437 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding
no Strickland error where counsel presented similar mitigating evidence to
what the defendant stated should have come in and amounted to ineffective
assistance). Accordingly, even if counsel’s performance was deficient,
Medina fails to establish prejudice. Thus, the state court’s application of
Strickland was not unreasonable and reasonable jurists could not disagree
with the district court’s finding of the same. Medina’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claims fail, and this court will not grant a COA.
II. Due Process Claims
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Medina next alleges that the state deprived him of due process by
suppressing evidence favorable to him in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 

373
US 83

 (1963), and by presenting false testimony in violation of Napue v.
Illinois, 

360 VS 264

 (1959) and its progeny. The district court separately
considered Medina’s claims, finding some procedurally defaulted and others
to be without merit. We begin with the claims the state court addressed on
the merits, then move to all procedurally defaulted claims.
Under Brady, there is a due process violation when “the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request . . . is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 

373 US out of 87

. “A finding of materiality of
the evidence is required under Brady.” Tassin v. Cain, 

517 F.3d 770

, 780 (5th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The “touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable
probability’ of a different result(.) The question is not whether the defendant
would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a
trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 

514 VS
419

, 434 (1995) (citation omitted). A “‘reasonable probability’ of a different
result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression
‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” 

Proof of identity.

 (citation omitted).
Thus, “there are three components of a true Brady violation: