Perspective: Beyond Narcos – Mexico, the United States, Nearshoring and Organized Crime

Perspective: Beyond Narcos – Mexico, the United States, Nearshoring and Organized Crime

Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and John P. Sullivan

Headlines on both sides of the border continue to be dominated by speculation about the details of the July 25, 2024 arrest of two key Sinaloa cartel capos: Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada and Joaquín Guzmán López, one of the “Chapitos” (son of the legendary “Chapo” Guzmán). The saga reads like an episode of a Netflix series or in a telenovela (soap opera) with one version framing the detention as a lawful arrest, and others as extrajudicial extradition, surrender through treason (or among some as high treason). In reality, the reality may lie somewhere in between. To this day, uncertainty and contradictions surround the case. The reality could lie somewhere in between, but to this day, there are inconsistencies amid rumors, leaks and conflicting stories.

US-Mexico border near San Diego, 2019. DVIDS, Public domain

Yet the episode is exemplary of popular prejudices and the “official” prejudices of the government in both countries.(1) Organized crime in Mexico is characterized by the caricature of the “narco-like with dominant criminal cartels with legendary and “all-powerful” capos sowing violence on both sides of the border. As a result, politicians and law enforcement officials on both sides of the border are seeking symbolic relief from the “kingpin” strategy – which consists of capturing the leaders of these criminal enterprises – in an effort to supposedly alleviate public concerns about insecurity and demonstrate government competence. This view is a truism; the reality is much more complex.

Illegal transnational networks

Analyzing the Mexican criminal landscape and transnational organized crime through a vision that focuses on all-powerful drug cartels is irrelevant and incompatible with reality. There are certainly prominent criminal organizations that are recognized for their enormous influence and firepower, such as the Sinaloa cartel and its rival the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), which, among other criminal activities, are focused on drug trafficking. But instead of companies or enterprises with a centralized structure and well-defined leadership, we can think of complex ecosystems or systems formed by a network of criminal actors. These illegal networks include opportunistic alliances between the so-called cartels, subordinate gangs, mafias, sicarios (or hired killers) and other economic actors. These alliances are fueled by illegal collaboration with politicians and authorities at various levels of government.

These groups are in reality formed by a network of subordinate gangs, shaky alliances and illegal collaboration with legitimate politicians and police at all levels of government. All of these components are linked to global illicit economic flows and, contrary to the “populist” political messages on both sides of the border, there is no cross-border criminal invasion of the United States by Mexican cartels. Instead, we see a dynamic of criminal “interpenetration” and collaboration between criminal enterprises that transcends territorial boundaries, both within and across national borders – that is, we refer to illicit economic flows that crisscross the entire Mexican Republic, crossing the US-Mexico border, interacting with actors involved in legal and illegal activities in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the world throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond. This illicit political economy can be seen as a facet of what Nils Gilman called “deviant globalization.”(2)

Fueling deviant globalization

Violence and uncertainty are the outward signs of the presence and activities of organized crime groups. Some of these groups focus on drug trafficking, but others specialize in extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, fuel theft, and other illegal activities. Territorial control and criminal governance exacerbate the problems caused by the presence of these actors. When violence and conflict with the state escalate, these OCGs can be considered criminal armed groups (CAGs), competing with the state and threatening its monopoly on violence.

This dynamic seems to be at work in some regions of Mexico today. In terms of visible violence, ambushes and attacks on police and military forces are clearly detected, as well as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to attack rival groups (both state forces and other criminal gangs), kidnappings, disappearances and brutal massacres that are amplified and promoted (or glorified) on social networks in narcotic waves. In this context, corruption and impunity are the most insidious factors, posing the greatest threat to the state and its society. This allows the OCGs to transform their violence and firepower into latent economic and political power, mainly at the local level.

In the economic and development field, extortion is committed against a range of economic actors, such as OXXO stores, tequila makers, avocado, lime and tortilla producers and a whole range of local businesses. Add to this the illegal extraction and (cross-border) trade of hydrocarbons, including oil and its derivatives such as gasoline (huachicoleo)—which mainly affects state-owned companies Mexican petroleum (Pemex), and a classic mafia economic/political mix emerges.

This corrosive and corrupt combination undermines national sovereignty and provides opportunities for both criminal governance and exploitation of Mexican society by external actors and foreign politicians, in the context of what is known as hybrid warfare. This combination also reinforces fear, social division and xenophobia. This phenomenon, in the presence of populist and authoritarian political actors, can also fuel calls for “decisive” and unilateral military action.

Of course, the solution to the corrosive effects of corruption, rent-seeking and criminal governance is to promote the rule of law and strengthen a robust and transparent civil society, as well as to strengthen judicial institutions. These entities (police, courts and corrections) are the elements needed to combat corruption and impunity while upholding and preserving the rule of law.

Nearshoring and cross-border cooperation

As the United States attempts to overcome the challenges of reconfiguring global supply chains in a new multipolar world and in the context of new international military conflicts, particularly in manufacturing and in the cyber and information spheres, Mexico (as the United States’ main trading partner) is positioned as a key geopolitical player. In this context, and amid multiple tensions focused on border security, drug trafficking and organized crime in general, U.S.-Mexico trade relations are of crucial importance for both countries.

Building a strong and sustainable nearshoring capacity will benefit both economies. The fight against organized crime is one facet of this cross-border cooperation. Promoting transparency, anti-corruption, and multilateral cooperation efforts throughout the hemisphere are essential components of creating mechanisms to reduce insecurity and uphold the rule of law. The Bicentennial Understanding laid the foundation for potentially effective, multidimensional cooperation that included Mexico’s voice while taking into account its problems and priorities. It was not a unilateral call from the dominant nation, nor an imposition of its irrelevant and ineffective narco-focused policies. Our colleague Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez has also presented an interesting proposal for a North American Security Treaty between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.(3)

The latter is a reasonable initiative consisting of feasible actions to address a hemispheric and at the same time global problem. We believe that such a “North American Security Space” could potentially form the basis of a space to promote multilateral security in America, from the North Pole to the Southern Cone. The details of the treaty proposal and the concrete actions needed to make it operational must be fully understood. Many are concerned about the dependency scheme that this perspective could generate or reinforce, as well as the unilateralism that has always characterized this type of agreements, with the United States at the forefront.

The recent saga of “El Mayo” and the “Chapitos”, the historical role of the DEA in Mexico, the distrust between neighbors, the political and geopolitical use of the so-called drug wars, as well as the corruption and impunity that prevail in Mexico (and of course in the US drug market) raise doubts and resentments about the future of treaties that could contribute to progress towards real regional and hemispheric integration. On the other hand, populist discourses of intervention and the promotion of unilateral military actions represent real obstacles to cross-border cooperation, regional security and the development of our nations under a new multipolar order.

Endnotes

(1) See Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, “Failed Anti-Drug Policy and the Narco-State.” The opinion. August 5, 2024, https://laopinion.com/2024/08/05/politica-antidrogas-fallida-y-narcoestado/ for a perspective on these popular and government prejudices.

(2) See Stewart Brand, “Interview: Nils Gilman, Deviant Globalization.” Long Now Foundation via YouTube. May 3, 2010, https://longnow.org/seminars/02010/may/03/deviant-globalization/ and Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer and Steven Weber, eds., Globalization Divergence: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century New York: Continuum, 2010.

(3) See Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, “Towards a Security Treaty for North America.” Nexo’s. February 1, 2024, https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=77510.

Earlier versions of this essay were published in Spanish as «Criminal Organization, Integration and Relations in Mexico-Estados Unidos» in La Opinión, August 26, 2024 and «More about “narco”: criminal organization, integration and relations between Mexico and the EU» at Sin Embargo MX, August 19, 2024.