Why don’t they get it?

When the powerful elite of a country considers one of its territories as a resource to be exploited and treats its people arrogantly, and when people’s basic needs are not met, they are likely to resort to illegal means of survival, such as smuggling, crime or ideologically motivated violent behavior.

The current misery in Balochistan essentially stems from two major problems. One is the internal sense of deprivation, rooted in the continued, often contemptuous neglect by the powerful elites in Islamabad and Quetta. The other overriding problem is the external factors that affect life in the province.

One of the major issues pertains to the undisputed federal support for tribal chiefs, all those who are included in the security and political matrix as “pro-federation” Nawabs, Sardars, Jamalis, Jams, etc. Being leaders of their respective regions, they live and enjoy life to the fullest as uncrowned princes, unlike the average Baloch citizens, many of whom are skilled and educated but are toiling in poverty, unemployment and socio-political deprivation.

This nexus with the elites of Islamabad serves as a carte blanche for the Baloch chieftains in particular, resulting in rampant embezzlement of scarce public resources.

A 19-kilometer-long Turbat-Buleda road in the hilly northern Kech district provides a sad but glaring illustration of this plunder by almost all successive rulers of Balochistan. This road has been constructed and opened several times, including once by former army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Even in the current budget, another Rs 39.19 million has been allocated for the completion of this road, which has so far cost almost Rs 3 billion on paper, but is still largely cratered, dilapidated and partly washed away by torrential rains over the past two years.

Zahoor Buledi, a multiple MP from the region, remained the finance minister for almost three years. An investigative report in a national daily reveals that the documented funds for this project increased from Rs599 million to about Rs2.8 billion during his tenure, but there was no indication that any work was being done on this 19 km stretch.

The recovery of some Rs 730 million in cash from the official residence of former finance minister Mushtaq Raisani in Quetta in 2016 or at least Rs 10 million in cash by another official who also served in Gwadar are just the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the province. The official who was caught with Rs 100 million in 2016 is now out of jail but in London and is reportedly pursuing a PhD in Baloch insurgency.

Such officials are in fact facilitators of the loot and plunder of public funds. They, and also the deputy commissioners, are often referred to as the ATMs for the political elite because of their role in project financing. It is no surprise that officials are sitting on piles of money worth hundreds of millions of rupees.

Balochistan is rife with such examples, creating public outrage which is then exploited by the Baloch militants and their surrogate terrorists.

And this brings us to the external dimension of the province’s security problems. Baloch leaders such as Brahamdagh Bugti and Allah Nazar enjoy a good rapport in India, which at one point in 2015-16 was almost ready to host a Baloch government-in-exile. Prime Minister Modi had only reinforced the perception of strong ties with some Baloch militants by expressing concern about the “poor human rights record in Balochistan” in his Independence Day speech in 2015.

Feelings of socio-economic injustice, discontent and unemployment among the educated and exclusion from the mainstream clearly act as fault lines that the established outsiders – with the support of local facilitators – can easily exploit to sow discontent and perpetrate terror in the region. This also serves as a cover for new anti-state alliances and subversive activities. It is no surprise that the year 2022 saw the emergence of a vicious triad consisting of TTP, BLA and Daesh Afghanistan (ISKP) leading the rise of terror in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

The young Dr. Mahrang Baloch also represents the sense of discontent among the Baloch youth in particular. Her grievances require a genuine political response and not negative labeling. We need to embrace the resentful Baloch through relief and justice to prevent vested interests from exploiting them.

The civil and security leadership must come together to find ways to extinguish the fires of discontent in Balochistan and heal the wounds of the Baloch youth. Mere promises, nationalist rhetoric or bravado against the “thugs and militants” are not enough to address the dual challenge that Balochistan is currently facing.

As far as proxy terrorism is concerned, it is now clear that Pakistan’s conventional security approach in Balochistan has largely failed. If the authorities are convinced that the country is mainly dealing with externally-driven proxy terrorism through ISKP, BRA, BLF, BRA, TTP and the like, then they need to devise a multifaceted, smarter and more modern security regime. There is much to learn from China, India, Indonesia and Egypt in dealing with transnational terror and criminal groups. Physical surveillance and monitoring of terrorists and criminal gangs in the vast province of Balochistan is no longer feasible with today’s modern means of warfare and communication. This is evident from the nearly half-dozen simultaneous attacks of 25-26 August. The dire situation certainly warrants a rethinking of whether Pakistan can handle this alone or whether it is ready for a multinational counter-terrorism campaign involving Iran, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan.