Predicting the Reorientation – Part 2

That I was able to write this article after last night’s Trump-Harris debate was a useful development. Trump stuck to his principles, but what was new and exciting in 2016 is now priced in and understood. The race is far from over, but I’m beginning to understand what some of my colleagues are talking about when they say this is not the same Trump as in 2016 or even 2020. Either way, Trump is still Trump, and he has my support. Yet last night showed me that he, like me, is still just a man, and he has the finiteness of a man.

This display of Trump not as weak but as determined, solid in his final form, gives me a glimpse of what an inevitable future without him will look like. In Part 1, I looked at the short-term bad but long-term good future for Democrats after Trump. In this essay, I will offer my much grimmer prognosis for the Republican Party.

The Republican Party was once a serious political contender, but after the Obama years it was voluntarily relegated to the loyal, perpetually impotent opposition. It is likely that the party was on its deathbed, as its disaffected base increasingly lost faith in the party, especially after the Tea Party was abandoned. The Trump era and his subsequent takeover and reprogramming of the party is remarkable in how much it has extended the lifespan of the GOP, but the coalition dies with Trump.

Since 1968, the GOP has based its national electoral strategy on the solid South, which has always voted as a bloc (and probably will in the future). The rural and (at least situationally) conservative nature of the region gave the Republican Party a flavor in the Reagan years and after, especially with the rise of the Bush family. Trump also appealed to many rural Southerners, but as we have seen, the South is becoming less rural and therefore less blue.

So what exactly is the Trump coalition? Disaffected whites, mostly from all walks of life. The only reason Trump is called a populist is because all whites are seen as dispossessed lumpproles, and the guy who appeals to their discontent is an outsider outsider, because the consensus in the East is that whites should go away unless their daddy is giving eight-figures to Harvard.

But make no mistake, Trump is not a populist (which is a bit of an outdated term in itself) in any economic sense; he has just as many supporters among the middle class as he does among the working class. But we live in a strange circumstance in which a single demographic has actively contributed to and been complicit in its own disenfranchisement, and any appeal to the grievances of that demographic is seen as low-status. Which brings us to the problem the Republican Party will face after Trump:

Once the South starts to tip, the Republicans will have a constituency with no geographic base. Just because the Democrats are going to steal states from the solid South does not mean at all that New England or the PNW or California or the Midwest are going to vote blue. The Republicans have a shaky hold on Ohio and Indiana, which is not a base. They will hold the Mountain West, except for the one state that matters there: Colorado. They will have Florida safe forever, but Florida is not a base. This is not to say that a large portion of the electorate in all of these regions will not vote Republican, they absolutely will. But if you are the party of white Americans, the browning of America ensures that you will be irrelevant in the future.

This is the real answer to the question. For better or worse, and more often for worse, the Republican Party is the party of white Americans. The problem is that white people are not allowed to be racist or talk about race in any context, which makes the Republican Party redundant. They are forced to talk about the economy, or endless foreign wars, or trade differences, or energy policy, or how wokeness is anti-meritocracy. But they can’t talk for a second about the real problem facing their constituents, because it’s taboo; they’re not allowed to in the feminized United States. JD Vance, who occasionally throws in a dog whistle, is crucified in the media every day for doing so—although the fact that he’s gotten this far gives me a glimmer of hope.

Unless there is a wholesale redrawing of state lines (gerrymandering was a soft attempt to contain the issue of race, which is increasingly ineffective), this situation will continue. The South is the last region where a white rural majority has maintained a white majority (at least in power), and the region is rapidly fading. Unless the Republican Party pulls off something like Florida (mass relocation of whites), they will be a perpetual minority party, just like the constituency they represent.

Which brings me to the question of Hispanics. Within the mental geography of your given Latino are the two poles of his character: Spanish and Indio, and he must gravitate toward and ultimately choose one of the two. Those who choose white dissolve their schizophrenic worldview when they arrive in the United States (unlike the remittance class, which has chosen the Indio pole) and can therefore categorize themselves as such. This is the open spiral, and the deal goes something like this:

“Okay Hans, if you man the walls for a few generations, you can be white.”

“Yeah, that’s a deal.”

“Okay Seamus, if you man the walls for a few generations, you can be white.”

“It’s a deal, boy.”

“Okay Giuseppe, if you man the walls for a few generations, you can be white.”

“It’s a deal, sir!”

“Okay Pedro, if you man the walls for a few generations, you can be white.”

“I’ll keep those filthy Indians south of the Rio Grande, señor.”

This is why Hispanics who come here with the intention of staying develop a rabid hatred for their (seemingly) blood relatives. But ethnogenesis crosses blood lines, and while many are called, few will listen. This is much played up by the right, especially around the idea of ​​castizo futurism. The problem is that they didn’t take the time to ask the Castizos, who want to remove the 25% Indio from their blood within two generations. This is why I argue that despite the “more conservative” tendencies of Hispanics that are often touted (and I agree that they are drifting to the edges of the Democrats), it doesn’t matter because they already get too much patronage as part of the mystery meat coalition, and only the most motivated, ambitious whites will give that up for a chance at what they see as a status upgrade.

But whiteness is currently a lowly status in the minds of everyone except the aforementioned aspirational Hispanics, and will remain so until JD Vance’s dog whistles become more explicit. Perhaps it will take a deterioration in circumstances to make this normal. It happened in the UK (although it’s been more or less eradicated last time I checked), and perhaps something similar could be facilitated much better in the US where it was possible. But unless some white nationalist deep state is planning a military coup, or Trump is that coup and we’re all left with egg on our faces, I don’t see a top-down solution to this problem. Trump really is the last chance for a truly national whiteness in the United States as it is currently constituted.

It may even be too late. If “White Guys For Harris” is any indication, most white men are so utterly broken that they functionally act like paler-skinned minorities. For that reason, they might even be welcomed into the multiracial coalition (with quotas, of course) and given back some semblance of what they once had. Democrats are usually the first to make change. But they don’t always stick around.

Now, there is one silver lining to this rather bleak prognosis, though it does require the reader to suspend disbelief for a moment. Think back to Part 1, where I said that California has more white Republicans than Texas. In many rural California counties, sheriffs and county boards exist in such a state of non-enforcement that some residents actually have more freedom than in a place like Alabama. In fact, California’s state government is so weak that it can only enforce its laws in major urban areas, much like the state governments of neighboring Oregon and Washington.

Now, while you’re considering this, consider that Trump’s Ace in the Hole is a cabal of dissident tech billionaires who, while not all of Silicon Valley, will give it an excuse to follow them away from their once-benefactors-now-vampires. If Silicon Valley folds, California folds. And if California folds, even if not enough for a base, there could be significant pressure on the PNW. And then Colorado. And so on.

Last time I made a big point about how the South is a historically Democratic region, and America has been somewhat the other way around since 1968. The Republican Party, on the other hand, is a historically Western party, with its first president from Illinois, which was California in the mid-19th century. Maybe America is correcting itself now, returning to some historical normalcy, and the Republican Party will have a solid future as a minority. But if they want to be a minority, maybe they should look west, where they can reestablish a geographic base for their constituency, the white American.

I’ve said before that California and Texas are two different responses to the browning of America. Texas takes the Mexican approach to amalgamation, while California is closer to Peru, Chile, or Brazil, where a white minority is kept at the top of a caste system. But this is only in the urban areas around LA and SF. LA is a dying city with declining relevance, and SF could very well flip if the PayPal mafia has its way.

Perhaps if the Republican Party, heir to the Hamiltonian aristocratic federalist tradition, takes its new blood (us) seriously once Trump is gone, it will have a future beyond a perpetual 46% of the vote. And now that the barrier to entry for aristocracy (in the literal sense) is white skin, the white man’s party will have a future where the white man’s future has always been:

The West.