What a Trump win would mean for Latin America | eSponsored

BOSTON: After the euphoric Democratic National Convention in Chicago, there is little doubt that Kamala Harris’ candidacy has changed the dynamics of the 2024 US presidential race. Democrats now have a fighting chance, which is more than they could have said a few months ago. But with polls still showing an extremely close race in the seven swing states that ultimately matter, the rest of the world must brace itself for what Donald Trump’s return to the White House would entail.

For starters, Trump has signaled that he would again abandon the Paris climate accord and intimidate America’s European allies, perhaps even going so far as to leave NATO. The South Koreans and Japanese also don’t know what to expect, given Trump’s ongoing complaints that they aren’t paying their fair share of the costs of stationing American troops within their borders.

But the region that would be most affected by a new Trump presidency is Latin America. After all, Latin American immigrants in the United States are Trump’s favorite political target, the tried and true “other” to his “real Americans.” Nine years after he announced his candidacy with a speech in which he portrayed Mexicans as “drug dealers, criminals, rapists,” Trump still relishes such language when describing migrants from the region.

In his speech at the Republican National Convention (RNC) in Milwaukee, he lashed out not only at Venezuela (predictably), but also at El Salvador, which is led by a right-wing strongman, Nayib Bukele, who has locked up 2% of the adult population and considers himself a friend of Trump. But Trump says El Salvador’s murder rate has dropped because it sends its criminals to the US.

In addition, many Republicans now support proposals to bomb cartel facilities in Mexico to stop the flow of fentanyl north. According to Trump’s vice presidential candidate, J.D. Vance, the president should have the authority to send the U.S. military to Mexican drug cartels on Mexican soil.

Then there is Trump’s central obsession, prominently displayed on signs at the RNC: “MASS DEPORTATION NOW.” He has promised that one of his first steps, if elected, will be to order the roundup of undocumented immigrants, holding them in camps along the Mexican border and then deporting them.

While estimates vary, the Migration Policy Institute calculates that there are approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S., including five million Mexicans, two million Central Americans and one million from various South American countries. While the legal, logistical and organizational challenges of such an undertaking would be monumental, the scale of the task would not deter Trump from attempting it, especially now that the Supreme Court has granted the president immunity for nearly everything he does in office.

If Trump were to deport hundreds of thousands of people, the consequences for their home countries would be enormous. The remittances that so many in the region rely on would dry up, exacerbating the economic conditions that drive many migrants north in the first place. Ironically, El Salvador, that supposed bastion of law and order, would be among the hardest hit.

Trade would also be hit hard, given Trump’s protectionist leanings. In the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Trump Risk Index, which identifies countries with deep trade, immigration and security ties to the U.S., Mexico tops the list with a score of 71 out of 100. Trump has pledged to impose a 10% tariff on all imported goods (plus a 60% tariff on all goods imported from China), and it’s unclear whether that would even apply to countries with which the U.S. has free trade agreements: Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Mexico, as well as several Central American countries.

Here too, Trump is unlikely to face many constraints, given declining bipartisan support for free trade agreements and America’s dismissive response to World Trade Organization complaints in recent years. Moreover, the pro-tariff U.S. trade representative from the first Trump administration, Robert Lighthizer, is the favorite to become Treasury secretary if Trump wins.

Countries around the Caribbean are most at risk from new tariffs, given their heavy reliance on trade with the U.S. But South America would not be spared the knock-on effects. In fact, it could suffer a double whammy if reduced U.S. trade is coupled with falling Chinese demand for South American commodities. For Latin America and the Caribbean, China is now the region’s top trading partner—worth $485 billion in 2023—and high U.S. tariffs on its goods would force it to cut production.

On the bilateral level, one could expect the imposition of further economic sanctions (if sanctions need to be imposed) on what John Bolton, one of Trump’s former national security advisers, famously identified as the “troika of tyranny”: Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. On the other hand, leaders seen as ideological allies of Trump, such as Argentine President Javier Milei, should expect invitations to the White House and other expressions of goodwill, though not necessarily any preferential market access.

Latin America is still struggling to emerge from its deepest economic recession in 120 years. Regional GDP fell 6.6% when the pandemic hit in 2020, and the region has yet to recover. Forecasts indicate that growth this year will be the slowest of any region in the world except Europe, at 1.8%. Now, Latin Americans must prepare for the political earthquake that could come in 2025.

Jorge Heine is a research professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.

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