The Los Angeles Declaration Continues to Shape the Regional and Global Migration Response – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Migration through the Darien Gap remains a challenge.

A record number of migrants have crossed the Darien Gap in the years following the coronavirus pandemic, and countless innocent lives have been lost. Smuggling networks have earned hundreds of billions of dollars on the backs of these migrants, advertising the Darien as ecotourism. In addition to the humanitarian toll, there is an environmental toll: the large number of people transiting the Darien Gap is destroying the rainforest and contaminating the water source for local communities. It is the responsibility of the entire region to address the grave humanitarian, environmental, public health, and security situation in the Darien Gap.

There are reasons to be optimistic. The Darien Gap was a central topic of discussion at the LA Declaration ministerial meeting in Guatemala in May. Blinken announced new sanctions for maritime boat operators in Colombia that are actively facilitating the mass movement of migrants in the Darien.¹⁰⁶ Also, Colombia announced that it will take additional steps to regularize an estimated 600,000 migrants in the country, expanding upon its landmark temporary protected status program.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, there are early signs that Panama’s new president, José Raúl Mulino, who was inaugurated in July 2024, will introduce new measures to reduce irregular migration through the Darien Gap.¹⁰⁸

Collectively, these recent actions should help reduce movement through the Darien Gap. However, it is likely that even more coordinated actions by LA Declaration countries will be needed to truly bring the situation under control. Panama and Colombia will need to take the lead, but the whole region needs to support them in finding solutions.¹⁰⁹

The Way Forward

On the heels of the Guatemala ministerial meeting in May and the G7 Summit in June, there is growing momentum for the LA Declaration. In the coming months, leaders in the Western Hemisphere will need to work to capitalize on this momentum to jointly confront new and intensified displacement crises in the region, most notably Venezuela.

The July 28, 2024, presidential elections in Venezuela, which many saw as an opportunity for positive change in the country, instead brought new uncertainty and instability. Maduro claimed victory, even though voting tallies indicate that he lost decisively.¹¹⁰ The election has been widely condemned by the international community and international observers as fraudulent and undemocratic, and the United States and numerous other LA Declaration countries have officially recognized the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, as the victor.¹¹¹

A survey in early July found that 17 percent of Venezuelans planned to leave the country within six months if Maduro took the presidency.¹¹² Migrant activists in the United States are expecting an influx of Venezuelan refugees into South Florida.¹¹³ The election is also a lost opportunity for displaced Venezuelans living abroad, who may have returned home if the opposition had gained power and restored hope for a better economic and political future in Venezuela.

In moments like this, the LA Declaration is most needed. To ensure it continues to be an effective and flexible framework for cooperation, signatories should work in the coming year to (1) foster new LA Declaration champions, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean; (2) take more risks and test new ideas, building on recent successes; and (3) globalize their three-pronged approach.

Fostering New Champions

In 2024, new leaders are coming to power in many of the countries that originally adopted the LA Declaration. Panama and Mexico just held presidential elections, and the United States and Uruguay will do so later this year. In order for the LA Declaration to serve as an enduring framework for regional cooperation, it must continuously generate new champions at the highest levels of government.

Guatemala’s new president Bernardo Arévalo recently emerged as a new champion when he hosted the latest LA Declaration meeting in May 2024, just four months after his inauguration. In the coming year, it will be important for other Latin American and Caribbean leaders to step forward to bring leaders together and test bold new ideas to manage the migration challenge.

Guatemala’s new president Bernardo Arévalo recently emerged as a new champion when he hosted the latest LA Declaration meeting in May 2024, just four months after his inauguration.

Mexico is an obvious choice to host the next major LA Declaration event. Mexico has emerged in recent years as a strong regional leader on migration. Under López Obrador, the country took steps to open new labor and humanitarian visa programs, launch its own root causes strategy in Central America, and increase enforcement at its borders. López Obrador has also urged other countries to do more, including the United States. Hosting the next LA Declaration event would be a way for Mexico’s incoming leader, Claudia Sheinbaum, to send a strong message that Mexico will continue to be a regional leader on this issue. Colombia is another strong option, as an original champion of the LA Declaration and a long-standing regional leader on migration.

Bringing the Dominican Republic on board as an LA Declaration signatory will also be important, particularly as the host of the next Summit of the Americas in 2025. The Dominican Republic is significantly impacted by migration from Haiti and other parts of the Caribbean and could benefit from being part of a regional framework that explicitly prioritizes support for top host countries.

Taking Risks and Testing Ideas Together

Some of the initiatives LA Declaration countries have tested together since 2022 have had an unexpected and dramatic impact on reducing irregular migration. The CHNV Initiative that the United States and Mexico launched in January 2023 is perhaps the best example. It proved the concept that pairing expanded legal pathways with strong border enforcement can drastically reduce unlawful border crossings. Efforts to prioritize economic investment for top host countries are also having a positive impact, resulting in a wave of countries taking actions to integrate migrants and stabilize migration.

These positive outcomes should give LA Declaration leaders confidence to take more risks and do even bigger things together in the coming years to manage the migration flows. At the closing of the LA Declaration ministerial meeting in Guatemala in May, U.S. Special Coordinator Marcela Escobari encouraged her peers to do just this.¹¹⁴ She said,

“What I see around this table is an emerging ‘Coalition of the Brave’—governments making hard decisions for the good of their countries, and our region, and in rejection of xenophobia and the politics of hate . . . Our joint progress should be a source of pride and continued collaboration for the good of all our citizens.”

Globalizing the Three-Pronged Approach

With record levels of displacement globally, migration has become a vexing challenge and political lightning rod for nearly every government. Migration was a hot topic in the EU parliamentary elections earlier this year, and it is polling as a top issue for U.S. voters in November.¹¹⁵

At the G7 Summit in Italy in June of this year, migration was on the agenda for the first time in the group’s history.¹¹⁶ During the summit, leaders adopted the LA Declaration’s three-pronged approach to collectively manage migration. The approach provided a more humane and balanced rebuttal to the enforcement-only approaches pursued by some world leaders in recent years. For instance, various European leaders have pursued arrangements with African countries that would allow them to send migrants that they apprehend at their borders to these countries.¹¹⁷ The migration deals with Tunisia, Egypt, and Rwanda have each been mired in controversy and allegations of human rights abuses.¹¹⁸ In July 2024, the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Keir Starmer, ended the agreement with Rwanda as his first major policy action.¹¹⁹

The Role U.S. Leadership Played in Advancing the LA Declaration

In many ways, the LA Declaration is emblematic of how the forty-sixth U.S. president tackles major foreign policy challenges: he consistently brings leaders together, despite differences, and builds coalitions. It is this approach that unified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization behind Ukraine in 2022 after Russia’s invasion, for example, and he has also worked to bring key players in Asia together, despite differences, to counter China.¹²⁰

The LA Declaration is emblematic of how the forty-sixth U.S. president tackles major foreign policy challenges.

Biden had established strong ties with Latin America over the course of his career. He traveled there sixteen times as vice president and even more as a U.S. senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In 2016, as vice president, Biden gave a major public speech on Latin America, where he emphasized the importance of partnership. “It’s not about what we can do for you,” he stated, “it’s about what we can do with you” (emphasis added).¹²¹ In May 2024, Sullivan reflected on Biden’s 2016 speech and how it represents the president’s approach to foreign policy in Latin America.

“That’s been our key focus since day one of the Biden-Harris Administration: leveraging the power of partnership. Not only to build a strong business case for the Americas . . . but to build a strong region writ large. A region that can lead the world. A region that can overcome any challenge.”¹²²

The LA Declaration also demonstrates that when the United States asserts leadership on these issues, the world pays attention. This was true after World War II when the United States led the ad hoc committee to draft the 1951 Refugee Convention.¹²³ It was also true in 2016 when Obama convened the Refugee Summit at the United Nations General Assembly in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, catalyzing the development of the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration. U.S. leaders, Republican and Democrat alike, should do more to harness the influence they have to shape global refugee and migration response. It is a privilege and responsibility.

Conclusion

The migration response of the United States or any country cannot start and end at its borders. Thoughtful foreign policy on this issue is critical, especially at a moment when the world is facing historic levels of displacement.

The LA Declaration has introduced a simple, three-pronged approach for governments to engage and partner on this issue. It is starting to yield results in the Western Hemisphere. In the last two years, the creativity and risk-taking it has ignited is perhaps its greatest achievement. With elections across the region this year, including the United States, the strength and lasting impact of the LA Declaration will depend largely on new leaders stepping forward, trying new things, and working together.

About the Author

Katie Tobin is a nonresident scholar in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She also serves as a Pritzker fellow at the University of Chicago’s Institute of Politics and is a frequent press contributor. From 2021 to 2024, Tobin served as a deputy assistant to the president and a coordinator for the Los Angeles Declaration in the White House National Security Council.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Chris Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner from Carnegie’s American Statecraft Program for their contributions to this paper. I would also like to thank the regional experts who reviewed and provided meaningful feedback on the piece: Dan Restrepo, Ryan Berg, and Juan Gonzalez. Finally, I am grateful to the many dedicated individuals inside and outside government and across the Americas who were the architects and visionaries behind the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection and who continue to carry its torch in the name of regional migration cooperation.

Notes

¹ “Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” White House, June 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/.

² “It looks very different if you look at migration across the hemisphere rather than standing on the U.S.-Mexico border, which is what the United States has tried to do for the last 30 years,” said Dan Restrepo, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who served as an adviser to Obama on Latin America. See Miriam Jordan, “The U.S. and Latin American Countries Will Commit to Receive More Migrants,” New York Times, June 9, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/world/americas/summit-migrants-latin-america.html.

³ In June 2022, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported 6.13 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the world. See R4V Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela Refugee and Migrants in the Region – June 2022, August 10, 2022, https://www.r4v.info/en/document/r4v-latin-america-and-caribbean-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-region-june-2022. As of June 2024, UNHCR reports 7.77 million Venezuelans, See R4V Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela Refugees and Migrants in the Region, June 3, 2024, https://www.r4v.info/en/document/r4v-latin-america-and-caribbean-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-region-may-2024. In June 2023, UNHCR reported 6.48 million Ukrainians and 4.98 million Syrians. These figures do not include internally displaced persons (IDPs). See Ukraine Situation Flash Update #70, UNHCR, June 14, 2024, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/109336; Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response, UNHCR, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria.

⁴ In 2020, Latin America and the Caribbean’s GDP dropped by 7 percent—the worst of any region tracked by the International Monetary Fund. See “Why Latin America’s Economy Has Been So Badly Hurt by COVID-19,” Economist, May 13, 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2021/05/13/why-latin-americas-economy-has-been-so-badly-hurt-by-covid-19.

⁵ Venezuela only represents part of the displacement challenge in the Americas. With large-scale outflows from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Central America, and other pockets of the region, the Americas represent only 8 percent of the total global population but over 20 percent of the world’s displaced population. UNHCR, “The Americas,” https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/regions/americas; European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, “Forced Displacement,” https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/forced-displacement_en.

⁶ In May 2024, Guatemala’s new president Bernardo Arévalo hosted the third LA Declaration ministerial in two years. Secretary of State Antony Blinken represented the United States. Beth Carter, “Guatemala Hosts Third Los Angeles Declaration Ministerial With Blinken to Tackle Migration Issues, US Commits $578M in Aid,” Hoodline, May 8, 2024, https://hoodline.com/2024/05/guatemala-hosts-third-los-angeles-declaration-ministerial-with-blinken-to-tackle-migration-issues-u-s-commits-578m-in-aid/.

⁷ “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communique,” White House, June 14, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/14/g7-leaders-statement-8/.

⁸ According to the UNHCR, over 117 million people were displaced globally at the end of 2023, the highest number ever recorded. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023, June 13, 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/global-trends-report-2023.pdf.

⁹ “A Conversation With Amy Pope,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-amy-pope.

¹⁰ “Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/us/media/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection-refugees-central.

¹¹ Neither the United States nor Canada signed onto the Cartagena Declaration. However, both countries have been active observers and donors under the framework.

¹² Luisa Feline Freier and Nicolas Parent, “A South American Migration Crisis: Venezuelan Outflows Tests Neighbors Hospitality,” Migration Policy Institute, Jule 18, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-american-migration-crisis-venezuelan-outflows-test-neighbors-hospitality.

¹³ Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 22, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis; and Figure 1 in Alex Nowrasteh, “Venezuela: The Biggest Humanitarian Crisis You Haven’t Heard of,” Cato Institute, July 20, 2018, https://www.cato.org/blog/venezuela-biggest-humanitarian-crisis-you-havent-heard.

¹⁴ Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate”; and Figure 1 in Alex Nowrasteh, “Venezuela: Tthe Biggest Humanitarian Crisis You Haven’t Heard of.”

¹⁵ “Venezuela,” in Freedom in the World 2019, Freedom House, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/country/venezuela/freedom-world/2019.

¹⁶ “Number of Refugees, Migrants From Venezuela Reaches 3 Million,” International Organization for Migration, November 9, 2018, https://www.iom.int/news/number-refugees-migrants-venezuela-reaches-3-million.

¹⁷ “Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela,” R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela,” https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants.

¹⁸ In 2019, the Brookings Institution issued a report noting the stark contrast in how the Syrian and Venezuelan refugee crises were funded. “In response to the Syrian crisis, for example, the international community mobilized large capital inflows, spending a cumulative $7.4 billion on refugee response efforts in the first four years. Funding for the Venezuelan crisis has not kept pace; four years into the crisis, the international community has spent just $580 million. On a per capita basis, this translates into $1,500 per Syrian refugee and $125 per Venezuelan refugee.” Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuela Refugee Crisis to Become Largest and Most Underfunded in Modern History,” Brookings Institute, December 9, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in-modern-history/.

¹⁹ Like those in other world regions, South American governments moved quickly in the early months of the coronavirus pandemic to introduce strict border closures, entry bans, and mandatory lockdowns. Many of these policies, which aimed to prevent the spread of the disease by stemming mobility, remained in place through much of 2020 and 2021. These measures had far-reaching consequences on migrant and refugee populations, including the millions of Venezuelans displaced in the region. Luisa Feline Freier, Andrea Kvietok, and Leon Lucar Oba, “Converging Crises: The Impacts of COVID-19 on Migration in South America,” Migration Policy Institute, March 2024, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi_covid-mobility-south-america_final.pdf.

²⁰ “Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela,” R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela,” https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants.

²¹ Worldwide, gross domestic product contracted by 3 percent in 2020, but in Latin America and the Caribbean, GDP dropped by 7 percent—the worst of any region tracked by the International Monetary Fund. See “Why Latin America’s Economy Has Been So Badly Hurt By Covid-19,” Economist.

²² In contrast to the other top host countries in South America, Chile’s economy rebounded quickly from the pandemic. Secondary migration movements from Chile after the pandemic were likely due to new, restrictive immigration policies that were instituted here. In April 20, 2021, the Sebastián Piñera administration enacted Chile’s first new migration law in almost four decades. The law expands government authorization to deport migrants and limit their protections. It curtails movement for migrants without legal status. It offers the possibility to regularize migration status but only to those who entered Chile before March 18, 2020, when the government first closed its borders due to COVID-19. “Chile, International Migration Outlook 2023,” OECD, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/bcd9b377-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/bcd9b377-en#:~:text=On%2012%20February%202022%2C%20a,resident%20status%20has%20been%20abolished.

²³ Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) took an austere approach to the pandemic and, unlike many other leaders, was reluctant to introduce robust stimulus packages or increase public spending. Mexico actually spent the least among major Latin American economies on pandemic stimulus efforts. Some say this approach brought about a quicker recovery because Mexico was able to maintain a healthier budget and more stable macroeconomic situation. Others argue that AMLO’s response to the pandemic was insufficient and that Mexico had a slow recovery. See Daniel Chiquiar, “Mexico Recovering From Pandemic Slowdown; Structural Issues Persist,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, March 10, 2023, https://www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2023/swe2301; and Jason Marczak and Cristina Guevara, “COVID-19 Recovery in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Partnership Strategy for the Biden Administration,” Atlantic Council, March 16, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/covid-19-recovery-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-a-partnership-strategy-for-the-biden-administration/.

²⁴ Joe Hernandez and Carrie Kahn, “Haiti’s President Jovenel Moïse Assassinated, Shocking the Unstable Nation,” National Public Radio, July 7, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/07/07/1013670543/haitian-president-jovenel-moise-was-assassinated-at-home-according-to-the-acting.

²⁵ “Latin America Wrestles With a New Crime Wave,” International Crisis Group, May 12, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/latin-america-wrestles-new-crime-wave.

²⁶ Will Freeman, “The Predatory Economy Thriving in Panama’s Darien Gap,” Americas Quarterly, July 27, 2023, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-predatory-economy-thriving-in-panamas-darien-gap/; Miriam Jordan, “Smuggling Migrants at the Border Now a Billion-Dollar Business,” New York Times, July 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/us/migrant-smuggling-evolution.html; “Latin America’s Most Powerful New Gang Built a Human-Trafficking Empire,” The Economist, November 16, 2023, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2023/11/16/latin-americas-most-powerful-new-gang-built-a-human-trafficking-empire.

²⁷ Julie Turkewitz, “‘A Ticket to Disney’? Politicians Charge Millions to Send Migrants to the U.S.,” New York Times, September 14, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/14/world/americas/migrant-business-darien-gap.html.

²⁸ Daniel F. Runde and Thomas Bryja, “Mind the Darien Gap, Migration Bottleneck of the Americas,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 16, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mind-darien-gap-migration-bottleneck-americas.

²⁹ Adam Isacson, “Weekly U.S.-Mexico Border Update: A Large Group of Haitian Migrants in Del Rio, Texas Faces Horses, Hunger, Expulsion Flights, &—for Some—‘Notices to Report’ in the U.S.,” Washington Office on Latin America, September 27, 2021, https://www.wola.org/2021/09/weekly-border-update-large-group-haitian-migrants-del-rio-texas-faces-horses-hunger-expulsion-flights-some-notices-report-in-us/.

³⁰ The Center for a New American Security conducted an analysis on the impact the Del Rio event had on regional migration policy, noting that, “The scale and scope of the Haitian migration event—one of several that has emerged in the hemisphere in recent years and impacted its countries in different ways—demonstrated the need for a coordinated response. These events supersede the ability of individual states and, potentially, the abilities of bilateral agreements, to adequately respond to complex needs.” See Cristobal Ramon, “Beyond the L.A. Declaration on Migration and Development,” Center for a New American Security, August 31, 2022, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/beyond-the-l-a-declaration-on-migration-and-development.

³¹ This would build on efforts already underway in Colombia. In 2021, the World Bank approved an $800 loan for Colombia under the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), with substantial U.S. backing, to support the country in integrating over 2 million Venezuelans in the country. Global Concessional Financing Facility, “Program to Support Policy Reforms for the Social and Economic Inclusion of the Venezuelan Migrant Population in Colombia,” https://www.globalcff.org/gcff_project_cpt/program-to-support-policy-reforms-for-the-social-and-economic-inclusion-of-the-venezuelan-migrant-population-in-colombia/.

³² Government of Canada, “Joint Statement of North American Leaders,” November, 18, 2021, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2021/11/18/joint-statement-north-american-leaders.

³³ “President Duque Announces Historic Decision to Create TPS for Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia,” Embassy of Colombia in the United States, February 10, 2021, https://www.colombiaemb.org/post/president-duque-announces-historic-decision-to-create-temporary-protected-status-for-venezuelan-migr.

³⁴ John Otis, “Colombia’s President on Amnesty For Venezuelans: ‘We Want to Set an Example,’” National Public Radio, March 3, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/03/03/972907206/colombias-president-on-amnesty-for-venezuelans-we-want-to-set-an-example.

³⁵ “Statement of UN High Commissioner for Refugees on Colombia’s New Temporary Measure for Venezuelans,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, February 8, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/news-releases/statement-un-high-commissioner-refugees-colombias-new-temporary-protection.

³⁶ Elliot Spagat and Chris Megerian, “Leaders Close Migration Pact at Summit of the Americas,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/espanol/eeuu/articulo/2022-06-10/lideres-cierran-pacto-migratorio-en-cumbre-de-las-americas.

³⁷ For Colombia’s GDP contraction from the pandemic, see figure 1. For number of migrants in Colombia, see R4V Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants From Venezuela, “Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in the Region,” February 2022, https://www.r4v.info/en/document/r4v-latin-america-and-caribbean-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-region-february-2022.

³⁸ “Remarks by President Biden and President Duque of the Republic of Colombia Before Bilateral Meeting,” White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/10/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-duque-of-the-republic-of-colombia-before-bilateral-meeting/. Biden and Duque also issued a joint statement following their Oval Office meeting, stating that “The United States and Colombia urge leaders across the Americas to join us in developing a Regional Declaration on Migration and Protection. The Americas have a rich tradition of welcoming refugees and immigrants and showing solidarity with our neighbors. Working hand in hand, we can overcome this current crisis and truly set an example for the rest of the world.” See “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden Jr. of the United States and President Ivan Duque Marquez of the Republic of Colombia U.S.-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership,” White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez-of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/; and “Biden Calls Colombia’s Immigration Efforts the ‘Linchpin’ to Stability in Latin America,” Washington Times, March 10, 2022, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/10/biden-calls-colombias-immigration-efforts-linchpin/.

³⁹ “UNICEF: Spike in Child Migrants Crossing the Darien Gap,” Associated Press, June 17, 2022, https://keyt.com/news/2022/06/17/unicef-spike-in-child-migrants-crossing-the-darien-gap/.

⁴⁰ In March 2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported over 200,000 migrant encounters at the U.S. Southwest border. See Zachary Evans, “Over 221,000 Migrant Encounters Reported in March, Highest Since Biden Took Office,” National Review, April 18, 2022, https://www.nationalreview.com/news/over-221000-migrant-encounters-reported-in-march-highest-since-biden-took-office. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted more Haitian migrants at sea in March 2022 than it had in the entire past fiscal year. See David Goodhue and Jacqueline Charles, “Coast Guard Returns 89 People to Haiti,” Miami Herald, April 12, 2022, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article260345220.html.

⁴¹ “Border Asylum Limits Ending, but Not Biden’s Migration Woes,” Associated Press, April 2, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/immigration-biden-covid-health-mexico-941e55cb2133fbd52ed76a80a20e3cd6. The U.S. debate during this period centered around whether to lift the Trump-era public health order, Title 42, that authorized DHS to expel migrants encountered at the border without full immigration processing.

⁴² Americas Quarterly editors, “Meet the Candidates: Costa Rica,” Americas Quarterly, November 10, 2021, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/meet-the-candidates-costa-rica/; and Diana Roy, “Colombia’s 2022 Presidential Election: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 17, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/colombias-2022-presidential-election-what-know.

⁴³ Cristián Doña-Reveco, “How Chile’s Welcome Turned Sour,” Mixed Migration Centre, April 18, 2024, https://mixedmigration.org/chiles-response-to-migration. In September 2022, Chilean voters rejected a new leftist constitution. Observers said that the stagnating economy and influx of migrants from around the region created more uncertainty, making transformational constitutional change take a back seat. Cristian Farias, “Chile’s Constitutional Moment Is Not Over,” New York Times, September 11, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/11/opinion/chile-referendum-constitution-rejection-boric.html.

⁴⁴ “U.S. Looking for Regional Help to Curb Migration at Mexico Border,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/15/us-seeks-regional-approach-to-migration-and-asylum-seekers.

⁴⁵ The core group consisted of Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and the United States. These were countries that had expressed early interest and support for the migration pact.

⁴⁶ The UN Secretary General has delegated authority to UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to advise governments around the world on refugee and migration response. Since 2018, at the request of Colombia and other governments, UNHCR and IOM have led the regional refugee and migrant response plan for Venezuela.

⁴⁷ “CHC Letter to President Biden and Secretary Blinken on the Los Angeles Declaration of Migration and Protection,” Congressional Hispanic Caucus, press release, May 31, 2022, https://chc.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/chc-letter-to-president-biden-and-secretary-blinken-on-the-los-angeles.

⁴⁸ “Readout of Vice President Harris’s Meeting with Caribbean Leaders,” White House, April 29, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/29/readout-of-vice-president-harriss-meeting-with-caribbean-leaders/.

⁴⁹ “IOM/UNHCR: Relocations in Brazil Offer Dignity and Hope to Thousands of Venezuelans,” IOM/UNHCR joint press release, April 20, 2021, https://www.iom.int/news/iom-unhcr-relocations-brazil-offer-dignity-and-hope-thousands-venezuelans.

⁵⁰ World Meteorological Organization, “State of the Climate in Latin America and the Caribbean 2023,” May 9, 2024, https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-climate-latin-america-and-caribbean-2023.

⁵¹ Paula Beltran and Metodij Hadzi-Vaskov, “How Climate Shocks Are Linked to Cross-Border Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean,” International Monetary Fund, December 8, 2023, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/12/08/cf-how-climate-shocks-are-linked-to-cross-border-migration-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean.

⁵² World Bank Group, “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration,” March 19, 2018, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell—preparing-for-internal-climate-migration.

⁵³ López Obrador publicly announced his decision not to attend the Summit of the Americas on June 6, 2022, citing Biden’s decision not to invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Oscar Lopez, “Mexico President Will Not Attend Americas Summit in Blow to Biden,” New York Times, June 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/world/americas/mexico-obrador-americas-summit.html.

⁵⁴ Despite López Obrador’s absence from Los Angeles, Mexican officials claim credit for the declaration as “co-architects.” See “Migration Flows Are Changing in the Americas: A Declaration Signed Last Month May Help Manage Them,” The Economist, July 14, 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2022/07/14/migrant-flows-are-changing-in-the-americas.

⁵⁵ “President Biden and President Lopez Obrador Joint Statement,” White House, July 12, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/12/president-biden-and-president-lopez-obrador-joint-statement/.

⁵⁶ “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, U.S. Government and Foreign Partner Deliverables,” White House, June 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/fact-sheet-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection-u-s-government-and-foreign-partner-deliverables.

⁵⁷ “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, U.S. Government and Foreign Partner Deliverables,” White House.

⁵⁸ “Fact Sheet: Update on the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Cental America,” White House, March 25, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/03/25/fact-sheet-update-on-the-u-s-strategy-for-addressing-the-root-causes-of-migration-in-central-america-3. The fact sheet states that “Since Vice President Harris announced Joint Task Force Alpha, led by the Department of Justice, in June 2021, interagency efforts have led to over 220 U.S. convictions of members of human trafficking organizations; more than 275 arrests, including against leaders, organizers, and significant facilitators; (and) more than 150 U.S. defendants sentenced.”

⁵⁹ “Fact Sheet: DHS Leads First-of-Its-Kind Campaign of Unprecedented Scale to Foil Human Smuggling Networks,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 9, 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/06/09/fact-sheet-dhs-leads-first-its-kind-campaign-unprecedented-scale-foil-human.

⁶⁰ The twenty-one countries that adopted the LA Declaration on June 10, 2022 are Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay. A year later, Suriname also joined, raising the total adopting states to twenty-two.

⁶¹ Quotation edited for clarity from a live transcript available at “Remarks by President Biden at Endorsement Event for the Los Angeles Delcaration on Migration and Protection,” White House, June 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/10/remarks-by-president-biden-at-endorsement-event-for-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection.

⁶² Michael D. Shear, “Biden and Latin American Leaders Announce Migration Deal,” New York Times, July 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/us/politics/biden-latin-america-migration-deal.html.

⁶³ Elliot Spagat and Chris Megerian, “Biden, Leaders Reach Migration Pact Despite Attendance Flap,” Associated Press, June 10, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/biden-los-angeles-central-america-venezuela-government-and-politics-81cd2b6c371a94740a1be238d72bc547. .

⁶⁴ “Biden Saves the End of the Summit With a New Regional Pact to Support Migrants,” La Nacion, June 10, 2022, https://www.lanacion.com.ar/estados-unidos/biden-salva-el-cierre-de-la-cumbre-con-un-nuevo-pacto-regional-para-respaldar-a-los-migrantes-nid10062022. El País, another major Latin America paper, focused its reporting on the inclusion of enforcement measures in the pact, including deportations. “The Summit of the Americas Pact Will Facilitate the Return of Irregular Migrants,” El País, June 10, 2022, https://elpais.com/internacional/2022-06-10/la-cumbre-de-las-americas-promueve-un-acuerdo-para-facilitar-la-devolucion-de-inmigrantes-irregulares.html.

⁶⁵ “Migration Flows Are Changing in the Americas,” The Economist.

⁶⁶ Adam Shaw, “Biden Unveils Migrant Declaration with Western Hemisphere Leaders, Decries ‘Unlawful Migration,’” Fox News, June 10, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-migration-pact-western-hemisphere-leaders-harris.

⁶⁷ Jasmine Aguilera, “Administration Cheers New International Migration Agreement. Experts Say It May Not Do Much,” Time Magizine, June 10, 2022, https://time.com/6186209/declaration-migration-americas-summit/; and Josh Wingrove et al, “Biden’s Lackluster Los Angeles Summit Reveals Waning Influence in Latin America,” Bloomberg, June 10, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-10/biden-s-lackluster-los-angeles-summit-exposes-divided-hemisphere?embedded-checkout=true.

⁶⁸ “CHC Chair Statement on the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” Congressional Hispanic Caucus, June 10, 2022, https://chc.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/chc-chair-statement-on-the-ninth-summit-of-the-americas-declaration-on.

⁶⁹ “CHC Chair Statement on the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” Congressional Hispanic Caucus.

⁷⁰ Andrew Selee, “The Los Angeles Declaration Could Represent a Big Step for Real Migration Cooperation Across the Americas,” Migration Policy Institute, June 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/los-angeles-declaration-migration-cooperation.

⁷¹ Courtney Subramanian and Cindy Carcamo, “20 Western Hemisphere Nations Sign Los Angeles Declaration on Migrants Despite Key Absences,” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2022-06-10/biden-latin-american-leaders-to-sign-migration-declaration-despite-summit-absences.

⁷² Simon Hankinson, “The Los Angeles Declaration Is Bad News for the Border,” Heritage Foundation, June 22, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/the-los-angeles-declaration-bad-news-the-us-border.

⁷³ Katie Adimora, “Summit of the Americas: Biden’s Attempt to Unite the Region on Migration Gets Off to a Shaky Start,” The Conversation, June 14, 2022, https://theconversation.com/summit-of-the-americas-bidens-attempt-to-unite-the-region-on-migration-gets-off-to-a-shaky-start-184982.

⁷⁴ In 2022, Costa Rica was overwhelmed with an influx of Nicaraguans from the north, and an increasing number of Venezuelans, Haitians, and Cubans were entering from the south. Migrants made up 10 percent of their total population. “UNHCR Factsheet Costa Rica: How Can Development Actors Support Refugees and Migrants in Costa Rica?,” UNHCR, November 16, 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/costa-rica/unhcr-factsheet-costa-rica-how-can-development-actors-support-refugees-and-migrants-costa-rica-october-2023.

⁷⁵ “Remarks by President Biden at Endorsement Event for the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” White House, June 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/10/remarks-by-president-biden-at-endorsement-event-for-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/; see also “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, U.S. Government and Foreign Partner Deliverables,” White House, which states that the United States will “provide an additional $25 million to the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) housed at the World Bank to prioritize countries in Latin America such as Ecuador and Costa Rica in their newly announced regularization programs.”

⁷⁶ “Progress Report July 1, 2023-December 31, 2023,” Global Concessional Financing Facility, December 2023, 24, https://www.globalcff.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Progress_Report_July_Dec23docx.pdf.

⁷⁷ Priscilla Alvarez, “First on CNN: White House Hosts Meeting of 19 Western Hemisphere Nations to Begin Coordinated Efforts on Migrants,” CNN, September 27, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/27/politics/white-house-western-hemisphere-migration/index.html; and “Readout of Los Angeles Declaration Implementation Launch,” White House, September 27, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/27/readout-of-los-angeles-declaration-implementation-launch/.

⁷⁸ “Media Note: Lima Ministerial Meeting on the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” U.S. State Department Office of the Spokesperson, October 6, 2022, https://preview.state.gov/lima-ministerial-meeting-on-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/.

⁷⁹ “Media Note: Lima Ministerial Meeting on the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” U.S. State Department Office of the Spokesperson.

⁸⁰ The LA Declaration also includes a fourth pillar on coordinated emergency response to mass migration events. This pillar has been less developed in the two years since the LA Declaration was launched.

⁸¹ UNHCR, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023, June 13, 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/global-trends-report-2023.pdf.

⁸² “Colombia,” UNHCR, https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/colombia.

⁸³ Jordi Amaral, “The Quiet Growth of Brazil’s Venezuelan Population,” Americas Migration Brief, October 5, 2023, https://www.migrationbrief.com/p/the-quiet-growth-of-brazils-venezuelan.

⁸⁴ “The World Bank Approves a US$530 Million Operation to Promote Inclusive, Resilient, and Low-Carbon Development in Ecuador,” World Bank, December 7, 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/12/07/-el-banco-mundial-aprueba-una-operaci-n-por-us-530-millones-para-promover-un-desarrollo-inclusivo-resiliente-y-bajo-en-c.

⁸⁵ “Costa Rica: GCFF Benefiting Country Since 2023,” Global Concessional Financing Facility, June 2023, https://www.globalcff.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GCFF-Country-Notes_Costa-Rica.pdf.

⁸⁶ In fact, only five countries in Latin America and the Caribbean meet the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) standards for lending. Nicaragua, Haiti, Bolivia, Honduras, and Venezuela qualify as low and lower-middle income countries eligible for DFC investments. See Development Finance Corporation, “DFC Finance Program FAQs,” https://www3.dfc.gov/DFCForms/Documents/DFCFinanceFAQs.pdf; World Bank Group, “GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method (Current US$) – Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZJ.

⁸⁷ The United States, Canada, South Korea, and Spain are working with the IDB to make available a combined $89 million for IDB’s Grant Facility to support countries in the region most impacted by migration. “Fact Sheet: President Biden Hosts Inagural Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit,” White House, November 3, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/03/fact-sheet-president-biden-hosts-inaugural-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity-leaders-summit/.

⁸⁸ “Safe Mobility Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/safe-mobility-initiative.

⁸⁹ “Fact Sheet: Third Ministerial Meeting on the Los Angeles Delcaration on Migration and Protection in Guatemala,” White House, May 7, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/07/fact-sheet-third-ministerial-meeting-on-the-los-angeles-declarationon-migration-and-protection-in-guatemala/.

⁹⁰ Michael Camilleri, acting deputy administrator of the Office for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), explained that “the (new labor neighbors) initiative consists of connecting existing labor supply with demand in countries across the Americas, since some have an oversupply of workers, many that wish to work temporarily abroad, while others face the challenge of labor shortages. It’s about facilitating those connections.” Author’s translation from Rosa Maria Bolanos, “Lanzáran la Alianza de Movilidad Laboral del Las Americas,” Prensa Libre, May 6, 2024, https://www.prensalibre.com/economia/lanzaran-la-alianza-de-movilidad-laboral-de-las-americas/.

⁹¹ “The U.S. and Mexico Announce New Migration Enforcement Process for Venezuelans,” Reuters, October 12, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-mexico-announce-new-migration-enforcement-process-venezuelans-2022-10-12/.

⁹² The initiative provides lawful and orderly pathways for vetted Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan applicants to wait their turn to come to the United States, while subjecting those who cross unlawfully to prompt removal to their home country or Mexico. This combination of lawful pathways with enhanced enforcement for those who cross unlawfully works: within months of implementation, the policy dramatically drove down irregular migration from these four countries. Border encounters with migrants from Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua have remained low since the initiative launched. Venezuelan border encounters rose again in the summer of 2023, which reflects the highly adaptive nature of the migratory system and thus the need for the kind of structural responses that are at the core of the LA Declaration approach.

⁹³ “Joint Statement by President Biden and Prime Minister Trudeau,” White House, March 24, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/24/joint-statement-by-president-biden-and-prime-minister-trudeau/.

⁹⁴ Irregular asylum claims have dropped significantly (from 165 claims per day in March 2023 to an average of nine per day in December 2023). Government of Canada,“PACP- Asulum Claimants, Irregular Migration and the Safe Third Country Agreement,” December 5, 2023. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/pacp-dec-05-2023/asylum-claimants-safe-third-country-agreement.html.

⁹⁵ “Trilateral Joint Statement,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 11, 2023, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/11/trilateral-joint-statement. The document states,“Recognizing our shared interest and responsibility to prevent the risk to human life, disrupt transnational criminal organizations, and preserve the vital rainforest, the governments of Panamá, Colombia, and the United States intend to carry out a two-month coordinated campaign to address the serious humanitarian situation in the Darién.”

⁹⁶ In addition to the law enforcement efforts, the three governments pledged under the campaign to increase legal pathways and increase sustainable economic support for Darien border communities. Trilateral Joint Statement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

⁹⁷ “Panama to Increase Deportations in Face of Record Migration Through the Darian Gap,” NBC News, September 8, 2023, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/panama-increase-deportations-face-record-migration-darien-gap-rcna104147; and Kathia Martínez, “Venezuelans Halted in Panama by US Policy Change Return Home,” Associated Press, October 22, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-venezuela-caribbean-united-states-panama-f8c4136890fedc4bd3153281c029c34d.

⁹⁸ “Panama Vows to End Migrant Transit, US to Fund Repatriations,” Tico Times, July 3, 2024, https://ticotimes.net/2024/07/03/panama-vows-to-end-migrant-transit-us-to-fund-repatriations. Two weeks later, Panama President José Raúl Mulino indicated that his country might be backtracking, stating that any repatriations from Panama would be “voluntary.” See Alma Solis, “Panama President Says Repatriation of Migrants Crossing the Darien Gap Will Be Voluntary,” Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/panama-us-migrants-darien-gap-ee20be313dcbed5d4b01b74754e112f8; “Panama to Start Deporting Migrants From Darien Gap Within Months,” Reuters, July 20, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/panama-start-deporting-migrants-darien-gap-within-months-2024-07-19/. Guatemala and Costa Rica are two other countries that have indicated their willingness to conduct repatriations, with financial support from the United States or other donors. See “Costa Rica Is Studying an Agreement with the US For the Repatriation of Migrants Similar To That of Panama,” EFE, July 18, 2024, https://efe.com/mundo/2024-07-18/costa-rica-estudia-acuerdo-con-ee-uu-para-repatriar-migrantes/.

⁹⁹ “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Third Ministerial of the Los Angeles Delcaration on Migration and Protection in Guatemala,” White House, May 6, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/06/background-press-call-by-senior-administration-officials-on-the-third-ministerial-of-the-los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection-in-guatemala/.

¹⁰⁰ The Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, the economic companion to the LA Declaration, was also launched at the 2022 Summit of the Americas. The twelve countries that participate in this economic forum are by-and-large the countries most impacted by migration in the Western Hemisphere. On November 3, 2023, Biden hosted the inaugural Leaders Summit of the Americas Partnership. “East Room Declaration of the Leaders of the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity,” White House, November 3, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/11/03/east-room-declaration-of-the-leaders-of-the-americas-partnership-for-economic-prosperity/.

¹⁰¹ Carla Alvarez and Koldo Echebarria, “Why Does the Inter-American Development Bank Lag Behind in Development Effectiveness?,” Center for Global Development, April 19, 2023, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/why-does-inter-american-development-bank-lag-behind-development-effectiveness.

¹⁰² Lawrence Huang, “Why Financing Responses to Climate Migration Remains a Challenge,” Migration Policy Institute, October 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/limited-climate-financing-responses-climate-migration; and Sarah Bermeo, “Climate Migration and Climate Finance: Lessons From Central America,” Brookings Institution, November 19, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/climate-migration-and-climate-finance-lessons-from-central-america/.

¹⁰³ United Nations Climate Change, “New Report Details Dire Climate Impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean,” July 22, 2022, https://unfccc.int/news/new-report-details-dire-climate-impacts-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean.

¹⁰⁴ Lawrence Huang, Ravenna Sohst, and Camille Le Coz, “Financing Responses to Climate Migration: The Unique Role of Multilateral Development Banks,” Migration Policy Institute, November 2022, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/financing-responses-climate-migration.

¹⁰⁵ World Bank Group and Knomad, Migration and Development Brief 39, 2023, https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/publication-doc/migration_development_brief_39.pdf#page=32.

¹⁰⁶ “Actions Against Executives of Colombian Maritime Transportation Companies that Facilitate Irregular Migration,” U.S. State Department, press release, May 6, 2024, https://www.state.gov/actions-against-executives-of-colombian-maritime-transportation-companies-that-facilitate-irregular-migration/.

¹⁰⁷ At the third LA Declaration ministerial meeting in Guatemala in May 2024, Colombia’s foreign minister announced a plan for regularization of irregular migrants through special permits for parents and legal guardians of children with valid Temporary Protected Status as well as a new special permanent visa for Latin American and Caribbean migrants without regular status in the country. The Colombian government estimates these actions will benefit up to 600,000 individuals. “Fact Sheet: Third Ministerial Meeting on the Los Angeles Delcaration on Migration and Protection in Guatemala,” White House, May 7, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/07/fact-sheet-third-ministerial-meeting-on-the-los-angeles-declarationon-migration-and-protection-in-guatemala/.

¹⁰⁸ Slowing migration through the Darien Gap has become a key issue for newly elected Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino. He paid a visit to the Darien region days before he was officially sworn in on July 1. Didi Martinez and Julia Ainsley, “Panama Is Using Barbed Wire to Try to Block a Major Route for U.S.-Bound Migrants,” NBC News, July 8, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/panama-using-barbed-wire-block-darien-gap-us-bound-migrants-rcna159774.; Julia Ainsley, “Inside a U.S. and Colombian operation to Bust Human Traffickers,” NBC News, November 26, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/us-colombian-operation-bust-human-traffickers-rcna58521.

¹⁰⁹ In August 2024, Colombia hosted the latest trilateral meeting with Panama and the United States focused on the Darien Gap. Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas represented the United States. In a joint statement following the talks, the three countries emphasized the “global implications” of irregular migration through the Darien Gap and called for more dialogue to address it. “Joint Statement: Trilateral on Irregular Migration,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, August 26, 2024, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2024/08/26/joint-statement-trilateral-irregular-migration.

¹¹⁰ Anatoly Kurmanaez and Ethan Singer, “Election Results Presented by Venezuela’s Opposition Suggest Maduro Lost Decisively,” New York Times, July 31, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-election-results.html.

¹¹¹ Julie Turkewitz, “U.S. Recognizes Maduro’s Rival as Winner of Venezuelan Election,” New York Times, August 1, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/01/world/americas/venezuela-election-gonzalez-maduro.html; “Carter Center Statement on Venezuela Election,” Carter Center, July 30, 2024, https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html.

¹¹² Daniella Zambrano, “Marcharse o regresar? Una Decisión que Espera Al Resultado de las Presidenciales en Venezuela,” France24, July 27, 2024, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240726-marcharse-o-regresar-una-decisi%C3%B3n-que-espera-al-resultado-de-las-presidenciales-en-venezuela.

¹¹³ Sommer Brugal and Marina E. Franco, “South Floria Braces for Influx of Venezuelan Migrants Amid Election Crisis,” Axios, August 1, 2024, https://www.axios.com/local/miami/2024/08/01/venezuela-election-migration-florida; Laura Villagran, “Venezuelan Migration Could Surge After Maduro Claims Election Victory,” USA Today, July 29, 2024, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/07/29/venezuela-election-migration-us-border/74591032007/.

¹¹⁴ Transcript of the private event provided to the author.

¹¹⁵ “Most Important Problem,” Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx.

¹¹⁶ “G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships,” U.S. Department of State press release, April 19, 2024, https://www.state.gov/g7-italy-2024-foreign-ministers-statement-on-addressing-global-challenges-fostering-partnerships/#:~:text=Collectively%2C%20we%20will%20address%20migration,and%20other%20drivers%20of%20migration.

¹¹⁷ Katie Tobin, “To Address the Migration Crisis, the G7 Should Look to the LA Declaration,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 12, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/06/migration-g7-italy-plan-la-declaration?lang=en.

¹¹⁸ Humzah Khan, “From Tunis to Cairo: Europe Extends Its Borders Across North Africa,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 9, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/04/from-tunis-to-cairo-europe-extends-its-border-across-north-africa?lang=en.

¹¹⁹ Andrew Macaskill and Sachin Ravikumar, “New UK Leader Starmer Declares Rwanda Deportation Plan ‘Dead and Buried,’” Reuters, July 6, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/new-uk-pm-starmer-confirms-end-rwanda-asylum-deportation-scheme-2024-07-06/.

¹²⁰ The war in Ukraine has reinvigorated NATO, which has expanded its membership to include Finland and Sweden. Biden has also been working in Asia to counter China. On August 18, he hosted a summit at Camp David with the leaders of Japan and South Korea who, putting aside their old bitterness, agreed to intensify ballistic missile cooperation and establish a military hotline. Earlier Biden struck deals to let America use more military bases in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. “How Joe Biden Is Transforming America’s Asian Alliances,” Economist, August 24, 2023, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/08/24/how-joe-biden-is-transforming-americas-asian-alliances.

¹²¹ Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden at the 20th Annual CAF Conference, Washington, DC, September 7, 2016, White House Office of the Vice President, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/08/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-20th-annual-caf-conference.

¹²² Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the 54th Washington Conference on the Americas Luncheon, American Presidency Project, May 7, 2024, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-national-security-adviser-jake-sullivan-the-54th-washington-conference-the.

¹²³ “The Genesis and Development of Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention,” Journal of Refugee Studies 25, issue 1 (March 2012): 134–148, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fer054.