Thailand: Srettha’s fisheries approach exposes broader policy failures – Analysis

By Prem Singh Gill and Cain Hillier

In September 2023, former Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin and a number of ministers visited the Siripairoj Ice Pier, a fishing port in southwestern Thailand. Over green fishball curry, local fishermen explained to politicians how strict rules on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, introduced in 2015 to meet EU export requirements, had cut wages and efficiency while imposing hefty fines.

To address their concerns, Srettha set up a new cabinet committee to address the industry stagnation and expressed confidence that 13 laws in the Fisheries Act would be amended in the near future.

But just months earlier, Srettha was at the Elysee Palace with French President Emmanuel Macron, proudly proclaiming that an EU-Thailand free trade agreement would be completed within 18 months. This timeline almost undoubtedly depended on Thailand maintaining the extensive reforms it had implemented in its fishing sector in response to EU pressure.

In August 2024, Srettha was removed from office by Thailand’s Constitutional Court for what it deemed a gross breach of ethical standards, amid plummeting approval ratings and a stagnant Thai economy. The now-former prime minister’s failure to act decisively on the future of Thailand’s commercial fishing industry has served as a bellwether, illustrating why Srettha’s economically liberal and internationalist agenda for Thailand largely failed for reasons both inside and outside his control.

Thailand took a tough stance against IUU fishing in 2015 to prevent a total export ban from the European Union, the world’s largest trader of fisheries and aquaculture products. While this has improved labor and sustainability protections, compliance issues and labor shortages have drastically reduced the number of fishing vessels in operation. Of Thailand’s 15,000 seaworthy fishing vessels, only 4-5,000 are legally operating.

Before the IUU regulations were introduced, Thailand exported 350 billion baht (US$10.4 billion) worth of seafood annually. However, after these laws were introduced, the local industry began to be outcompeted by less regulated neighboring states. The decline in domestic supply has also increased annual seafood imports to 150 billion baht (US$4.4 billion).

It is crucial to note that these statistics mainly reflect the situation for commercial fishing companies. While the first reforms were implemented as general regulations for the entire sector, subsequent amendments were aimed at providing solutions specifically for local fishermen.

Thailand’s parliament voted unanimously in February 2024 to ease fishing regulations to address pressures on the industry. Bills have proposed removing minimum fines for IUU violations and allowing vessels to fish for endangered species outside Thailand’s oceanic borders, provided they comply with international maritime law. Other recommendations include removing limits on the number of permits per person and expanding the Provincial Fisheries Committee.

This near-universal call for an amendment to the Fisheries Act has prompted complaints from business owners. Critics have decried the proposed exclusion of labor management, fearing it could impact Thailand’s assessment in the Trafficking In Persons Report and weaken control and protection mechanisms. Others have objected to the proposed increase in import duties to 20 baht (US$0.58) per kilogram of seafood, seeing it as protectionist.

There has also been a sustained campaign against deregulation by local and international NGOs. An open letter to the government of Srettha Thavisin on behalf of 84 civil society organisations called for intervention to stop deregulation, which they say would return the Thai fisheries to a culture of economic and sexual exploitation.

The main theme of this debate was extensive consultation and deliberation, coupled with demands for patience from the fishing industry. Srettha’s parliamentary coalition came to power with a mandate to revive the economy, boost trade and tourism, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles. But his collaborative and comprehensive approach, with an emphasis on forming joint public-private partnerships, has backfired.

Slow and steady progress has not resulted in substantive reforms to the Thai economy or clear targets for Thai trade negotiators to follow in their crucial negotiations with the European Union. The World Bank predicts that the Thai economy will grow by just 2.8 percent in 2024, lagging far behind its Southeast Asian neighbors. Instead of building political capital to complete legislation, Srettha burned it by requesting a delay.

Amending the Fisheries Act without alienating any significant domestic interests or losing the EU market will take more time than Srettha, as the leader of a resurgent but fragile democracy, has ever been given. In tackling the problem with a measured and inclusive approach, Srettha sacrificed flawed but rapid and comprehensive solutions, a trade-off that was repeated elsewhere under his government.

Srettha’s approach to fisheries reform is an example of his government’s broader predicament. His policies have been designed to please all parties but satisfy none — caught between the demands of local industry, international obligations and economic aspirations.

The transition from Srettha to new Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is unlikely to significantly alter the country’s fisheries reform policy, given their shared Pheu Thai party affiliation. Paetongtarn’s government still faces the complex challenge of balancing the demands of the local industry with international obligations, particularly EU requirements. The new leadership must also address concerns over labor protections and environmental sustainability while pursuing economic liberalization.

As Paetongtarn’s term begins, it remains to be seen how she will prioritize and address these challenges. What is clear is that Srettha’s balancing act has not been successful, leaving key fisheries issues unresolved in the midst of a major trade negotiation and Thailand’s economic recovery in limbo.

About the authors:

• Prem Singh Gill is a Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
• Cain Hillier is a junior researcher at the European Institute for Asian Studies.

Source: This article was published on East Asia Forum