Italy’s normalization towards the Assad regime: lessons from the Arabs’ experiences? – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Italy recently appointed an ambassador to the Assad regime, ending thirteen years of severed diplomatic ties. Italy made this decision independently of the EU’s collective foreign policy, despite significant sanctions imposed on the Assad regime by Western states. The Italian government, led by Giorgia Meloni and backed by seven European countries, is aiming – optimistically – to repatriate Syrian refugees and accommodate Italy’s right-wing and populist claims, in addition to neglecting human rights values. However, this article highlights Arabs’ diplomatic experience with the Assad regime and the potential risks of ‘free normalization’.

The Arab normalization – Limits of the step-by-step approach

The Arab countries were primarily motivated by three major issues that directly affect their security and reflect geopolitical concerns, namely: reducing Iranian influence in Syria and reintegrating Syria into the Arab community, addressing of illegal drugs targeted at Arab countries, and creating conditions for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees.

For example, Arab countries have adopted a negotiating approach known as “step by step” with the Assad regime, which involves building trust between the parties through mutual concessions on contentious issues. However, after demonstrating its good intentions, the Assad regime was readmitted to the League of Arab States in May 2023, with the aim of encouraging the regime to bring about tangible and practical changes that meet the three key demands of the Arab countries. But after more than a year of normalization, the situation in Syria can be evaluated as follows:

First, regarding Iranian engagement in Syria, there has been no tangible change in Assad’s response to Arab demands. Iran continues to deploy its armed forces and proxies in regime-controlled areas, with the presence of the IRGC leadership, where Israeli attacks on sensitive Iranian locations occur regularly, indicating that Iran’s commitment in Syria remains unchanged, especially in terms of the Iranian doctrine known as “forward strategy.”

Second, the activities of illegal drug networks have at least tripled since normalization under the Assad regime. This development reflects the regime’s continued use of drug activities as a means to exert more pressure on Arab countries by exporting security-related crises to neighboring countries in order to achieve greater political gains.

Third, conditions for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees have not improved under the Assad regime. Several human rights observers reported that the Assad regime arrested a significant number of returnees, indicating the regime’s reluctance to welcome Syrians back to their homeland.

In conclusion: what lessons can European countries learn from the experiences of Arabs? The failed normalization attempts with the Assad regime, which Syria expert Charles Lister has described as a disaster Foreign policy– emphasized the regime’s inability to fulfill its obligations in relation to the demands of other parties. Building on negotiations with a party that is not fulfilling its obligations, especially since this regime still faces many internal dilemmas, as an indecisive solution to the conflict in Syria, which remains unfinished business. The loss of more than 30 percent of Syria’s territory to the other three main parties in the conflict, with the widespread influence of Iran and Russia. And the proliferation of transnational organized crime activities, especially the drug networks that intersect with the Assad regime. Moreover, it is important to note that normalizing relations with the Assad regime will not resolve the refugee crisis as some countries had hoped.

The most promising approach to pressure the regime to make concessions may lie in maintaining a unified and consistent policy by Europe and its Western allies. This would entail coordinated economic and political pressure, targeted sanctions, and the continued isolation of the Assad regime until significant progress is made in political reforms or humanitarian improvements. A collective approach has the potential to exert greater influence on the regime compared to fragmented bilateral efforts. Experience has shown that Assad often takes advantage of the divisions within the international community. A united Western position could also help soften the influence of external actors such as Iran and Russia, who have used the divisions between Western countries to strengthen their positions in Syria. Otherwise, piecemeal efforts at normalization would only serve to strengthen the Assad regime without solving the root causes. of the conflict.

Furthermore, Italy’s original intentions were to address domestic issues such as repatriating Syrian refugees and assuaging populist sentiments. However, it is unclear whether these objectives have been achieved. Early signs indicate that the refugee situation remains largely unresolved and human rights concerns persist. Italy’s strategy risks being seen as a miscalculated political move, with limited returns in tackling domestic pressures.

However, several aspects of the Syrian conflict suggest that it is not yet the “Maturity“phase where political discussions and diplomatic normalization take place with regard to resolving the dispute, not to mention post-conflict issues; can be pursued effectively. Therefore, negotiating directly with the Assad regime poses significant challenges, and Italy’s divergence from the EU’s multilateral policy could have serious political implications for the Syrian dispute, especially in the absence of a viable implementation of UN Resolution 2254 -Security Council, which will result in further unresolved disputes in the Syrian conflict. Middle East, which ultimately leads to new conflicts with other far-reaching consequences.