Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 1 – TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research

Posted on October 1, 2024 by Vaseline

Practices between 1945 and 2021

By Denys Shatalov and Mykola Homanyuk

On February 27, 2022, a video spread on Ukrainian social media showing Russian military vehicles that had encroached into the city of Bucha firing at a Ukrainian armored vehicle (BRDM stands for Bronirovannaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina) on the move. The BRDM, however, was not in combat position, but was standing on a pedestal as a monument to local participants in the Soviet war in Afghanistan(1). This is the most famous story, but not the only one – a BRDM monument in the village of Hurivshchyna in the Kyiv region or a cannon at the entrance to the village of Bilozirka in the Mykolaiv region also fell victim to shelling. During the defense of Lysychansk in the summer of 2022, a T-34 tank was removed from its pedestal and placed in the street, probably used by Ukrainian soldiers as a barricade.(2)

*BRDM monument with signs of damage from shelling in the village of Hurivshchyna, Kyiv region.*
*Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023.*

In July 2022, during a briefing, representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry accused Ukraine of using the building of school No. 23 in the city of Dnipro to accommodate the soldiers and to place military equipment nearby. The Russians lied only partially – the equipment was indeed located near the school. But it had been there since 1975 – as part of the Dnipro National Museum’s outdoor exhibition, i.e. tanks and guns from the Second World War.(3) However, next to it stands the military equipment from the Anti-Terrorist Operation (the War in Donbas) Museum’s outdoor exhibition installed between 2016 and 2018. Earlier, a similar story happened in Odesa. After the Russians’ statements about the deployment of artillery and setting up of positions near school No. 56 by the Ukrainian army, a Soviet anti-aircraft gun (model of 1939), installed as a monument to the servicemen of the Red Army anti-aircraft brigade of WWII, was removed from its pedestal in front of the school and trenches dug by utility workers during repair work nearby were filled up.(4) Probably for similar reasons, a fuel truck installed on a pedestal near a military unit in Mykolaiv region was covered with camouflage nets to prevent the monument from being identified as a military target.

In these cases, we can argue that old military equipment, installed on pedestals as monuments in Soviet times, has been involved in the ongoing war. These guns and armored vehicles were misidentified as legitimate military targets. At the same time, the ongoing full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war has affected a larger number of military vehicle-monuments installed in Ukraine, more than those targeted by the enemy. In this essay, the authors share their general reflections on the fate of such monuments after 24 February 2022. As sources of information, the essay relies on own field observations and intensive monitoring of the situation through online media.

Military Equipment on Pedestals as a Soviet Tradition

During the Second World War, military equipment could become a kind of temporary monument to its crew when they were buried immediately near a hit combat vehicle. However, the vehicles were later taken away for repair or scrapped, and the remains of the fallen were transferred to mass graves. We know of at least one similar case in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, when in 2022 the crew of a Ukrainian armored personnel carrier (APC) was buried on the side of the road, next to the remains of their vehicle, near the village of Husarivka, in the Kharkiv region.

*A damaged Soviet SU-100 self-propelled gun and a grave of tankers, probably its crew, in the center of Vienna, 1945–1946.*
*Photo from the Denys Shatalov collection.*

*The grave and memorial to the fallen reconnaissance unit soldiers in the village of Husarivka, Kharkiv region.*
*Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023.*

The installation of military equipment on pedestals as monuments to the Second World War (or, rather, the Great Patriotic War) started in Ukraine almost immediately after its end. For example, the first war monument erected in Dnipropetrovs’k (modern Dnipro) was a T-70 light tank placed on a pedestal. It was a monument in honor of the tank corps commander Yefim Pushkin, who distinguished himself in the battles for the city and was killed in March 1944.(5) Around the same time, a damaged T-34-76 was placed on a pedestal in Donetsk as a monument to the tank brigade commander Franz Grinkevich, who fell in October 1943.(6) Like the vast majority of other monuments, obelisks, and sculptures erected in the first postwar decades, these tank monuments honored the fallen. In 1967, the monument to General Pushkin in Dnipropetrovsk was reconstructed, replacing the light T-70 with a medium T-34-85 tank. In the same period, a similar replacement took place in Donetsk with the monument to Grinkevich. Instead of the tanks that were actually in service in their units, the new monuments became tanks that were introduced into service after the deaths of who operated them.(7) The fact that T-34-85s are visually more powerful vehicles and became the iconographic “weapon of victory” in the Soviet discourse of the Second World War was important. The tank monuments no longer commemorated the deaths of tankmen, but rather the power of the Soviet tank forces.

This replacement of tanks on pedestals was one of the forms of a new stage of Soviet memorialization of the Second World War, the creation of a heroic myth during the Brezhnev era, and the glorification of the Victory.(8) From the 1960s to the 1980s, new monuments to the war were erected on a large scale. During this period, the installation of military equipment on pedestals became a standard Soviet memorial practice. During these years, almost every district placed a tank, large villages placed a cannon, and cities usually had several pieces of military equipment placed in their centers. Military equipment on pedestals became a normal part of the landscape for settlements, similar to Lenin’s monuments in their central squares(9).

*A ZIS-3 cannon at the entrance to the village of Bilozirka, Mykolaiv region.*
*Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023.*

It became common practice during this period to install military equipment as Second World War monuments on the territory of European countries of the socialist block. Designed as “monuments of gratitude”, monuments to Soviet liberators, they had an obvious political function, marking Soviet domination and control(10). This form of war monuments can be seen as a specifically Soviet visual marker, given that such practices were not widespread outside the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, this does not mean that there are no tanks and guns installed as monuments in the West, either at the sites of former tank battles or in front of military units in memory of their personnel of past generations.

Unlike early postwar memorials or monuments to the fallen, new monuments with the use of military equipment on Soviet territory were usually erected to honor the liberators of a place, fellow countrymen who participated in the war, to commemorate a particular military unit, or they could also be placed on mass graves. In this case, the functions of the military equipment monument did not differ from the functions of other Second World War monuments; tanks and guns were simply a special type of them. However, if the standard sculptures installed on mass graves, such as the “Grieving Mother” or a soldier bowed in sorrow, often referred to a sense of mourning, the military equipment raised on a pedestal symbolized power and victory, not grief.

Starting from the mid-1960s, apart from being used as monuments, old wartime and postwar military equipment was placed in front of museums, military colleges, on sites near war memorials, or even near children’s art centers. In such cases, they were not monuments per se, but served as sites of memory of the Second World War (although postwar equipment was placed near Second World War memorials as well).

The installation of a tank or a cannon on a pedestal can be seen in the context of the common practice of using standard models for monuments offered by Soviet artistic associations. Due to this, identical monuments stood in many settlements. Military equipment was also a ready-made template form of a monument, repeated in different places. Unlike sculpture, which involves an artistic element, military equipment is an artifact with authenticity. So, if a sculpture can be considered an artistic monument, a piece of military equipment can be considered a documentary one.

The wave of installation of military equipment as monuments coincided with the final decommissioning of old weaponry from military units, primarily T-34-85 tanks and various types of artillery.(11) Most often, it was these models used during the war (although often of postwar production) that were placed on pedestals.(12) At the same time, the first postwar generation of equipment, such as IS-3, T-55, and T-10 tanks, and Mig-15 and Mig-17 jet fighters, were also installed as monuments to the Second World War. Meanwhile, their symbolism as documentary monuments to a war in which they did not participate seems rather doubtful. At the same time regarding the wartime models of tanks, local myths often arose in two variations: either this exact tank installed on the pedestal was first to enter the city during the battle for its liberation, or that this combat vehicle reached Berlin and participated in its liberation.

*Memorial to the Defenders of the Motherland in 1941-1945 in the Markhalivka community of Kyiv region.*
*As a monument to the Second World War, a T-55 tank, a model of 1958, was used. Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2023.*

In the 1980s and 1990s, military equipment was installed as monuments in honor of participants in the Soviet war in Afghanistan, or as memorials near military bases. In these cases, decommissioned pieces of modern weapons, such as T-64 tanks and BMP-1, BRDM, BTR-60/70/80 armored vehicles, were used. They were never installed as monuments of the Second World War. Generally, these practices were less common, compared to the number of WWII military equipment monuments.(5) We find such commemoration practices even during the War in Donbas. On the Day of Defenders of Ukraine (14 October 2020), a new monument was unveiled in the Park of Glory in Kramatorsk, Donetsk region – a BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle mounted on a pedestal. The plaque states that it represents “a symbol of military virtue and brotherhood and the fidelity to the oath of the veterans and servicemen of the airborne troops, marines and special forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. This dedication is reminiscent of the ethos of post-Soviet veterans’ organizations, in particular of the veterans of the war in Afghanistan. This is obvious as “the memorial sign was installed on the initiative of the Union of Paratroopers of Donetsk Region”, one of such organizations. However, although it does not differ from them in form, the monument unveiled with the participation of the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is not just another “Afghanistan” monument. One article about the event states (although this is not indicated anywhere on the monument itself) that the installed combat vehicle took part in the battles for Kramatorsk in 2014 and was damaged.(13) It is difficult not to notice the influence of the Soviet commemorative tradition in this episode, especially the idea that the equipment involved in the liberation of certain settlements was placed on pedestals.

BMD-1, placed in 2020 as “a symbol of military virtue and brotherhood and the fidelity to the Oath of the veterans and servicemen of the airborne troops, marines and special forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” in Kramatorsk.
*Photo by Illia Shatalov, 2024.*

Military equipment on pedestals has become a common feature of Ukrainian cities and towns. From 1991 through the entire period of independence until 2022, it stood almost undisturbed, intact(14) – except that from time to time, utility workers repainted it, often in some toxic green shades that diverge from the standard Soviet 4BO khaki. At the same time, tanks and other military equipment became objects of “decoration” during this period. In Soviet times, tank-monuments could only be seen with reproduced tactical numbers and sometimes guard emblems(15), rarely some slogans. Since the 2000s, it became common practice to add emblems and signs that were not present before, primarily red stars, guard emblems, marks of destroyed enemy vehicles, and some slogans such as “For the Motherland” (in Russian), which were supposed to reproduce wartime slogans. However, this did not create the effect of reconstructing the historical appearance of combat vehicles but rather gave the impression of festive decoration.

*Monument to the Tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the city of Znamianka, Kirovohrad region.*
*In 2013, the tank had an inscription “For the Motherland” in Russian, and in 2019 it was replaced with the same text in Ukrainian.*
*Photo by Mykola Homanyuk, 2022.*

The Russo-Ukrainian War (2014–2024) and Military Equipment on Pedestals

One episode of the first stage of the War in Donbas in the summer of 2014 that was widely reported in the media is the story of one of the tank monuments. The separatists managed to activate an IS-3 tank, a model of the later 1940s, which stood on a pedestal in the village of Oleksandro-Kalynove near the town of Kostiantynivka (Donetsk region). They painted red stars on the tank, wrote the slogans “On to Lviv!” and “On to Kyiv!” and equipped it with a machine gun (the cannon was inoperable). Using the same equipment, it was used for propaganda purposes, to foster the separatist narrative of a new war as a continuation of the grandfathers’ fight against the Nazis(16). Russian propaganda even claimed that “the tank of the Great Patriotic War era” (while the IS-3 is a post-war model) participated in successful attacks on several Ukrainian checkpoints – although there is no confirmation of this on the Ukrainian side. Instead, during the liberation of the Kostyantynivka area by Ukrainian troops in early July 2014, the tank was found to be inoperable and was abandoned by the separatists. The Ukrainians presented it as a trophy, first displaying it in Kyiv. Later, the tank was transferred to the Museum of Strategic Missile Forces in Pervomaisk, although the Oleksandrovo-Kalynivka community advocated for the tank’s return to its pedestal in the village.(17)

A similar story happened in Antratsyt, Luhansk region, captured by the so-called ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ militants. After several unsuccessful attempts, the separatists eventually managed to start a T-34-85 tank that had been removed from its pedestal.(18) Following the pattern of field modifications to common vehicles of that time, additional mesh anti-cumulative screens and other protective elements were welded onto the tank. Thus, the tank was going to be used for military purposes, not just presented as a “revived relic” of the Great Patriotic War. Nevertheless, there is no information on the use of this tank in combat. As of July 1, 2016, it had already been returned to its pedestal, with the screens still in place – that is, not in its authentic appearance.(19)

However, while for Donbas separatists’ attempts to use the old vehicles (removed from their pedestals)had a symbolic meaning because of their active propaganda appeal to the Great Patriotic War, there were no such efforts on the Ukrainian side. Since 2014, the landscape of military equipment-monuments on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government has remained unchanged. Like other memorials of the Second World War / Great Patriotic War, they were not touched in connection with the implementation of the “decommunization” policy. However, even then there were sporadic cases in which Soviet symbols were painted over with national colors, such as on the IS-3 tank in Pavlohrad or the jet fighter in Chornobayivka, Kherson region.

The IS-3 tank in Pavlohrad. The blue-and-yellow emblem replaced the red star on it no later than in 2016. Although it was decided to move the tank to a museum in 2022, it was still on its pedestal in June 2024.
*Photo by Illia Shatalov, 2024.*

Footnotes

(1) Iryna Burtyk, “U Buchi rosiyany vstupyly v biy z pam’yatnykom: podumaly, shcho tse tekhnika ZSU”, https://24tv.ua/buchi-rosiyani-vstupili-biy-pamyatnikom-podumali-shho-tse-btr_n1881724, accessed 15 July 2024.

(2) Militarnyi, “ U boyakh za Lysychans’k vykorystovuvaly T-34-85 z postamentu ”, https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/u-boyah-za-lysychansk-vykorystovuvaly-t-34-85-z-postamentu/, accessed 15 July 2024.

(3) The Insider, “Minoborony RF vydalo ekspozitsiyu sovetskikh vooruzheniy v istoricheskom muzeye Dnepra za razmeshchennuyu vozle shkoly artilleriyu i bronetekhniku VSU ”, https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/rf-vidala-eksponati-istorichnogo-muzeyu-u-dnipri-za-tehniku-zsu-novini-ukrajini-50259574.html, accessed 15 July 2024.

(4) dumskaya.net, “V Odesse demontiruyut ustanovlennyy u shkoly pamyatnik – sovetskuyu zenitku, kotoraya ‘bespokoit’ rossiyskikh natsistov” https://dumskaya.net/news/v-odesse-demontiruyut-ustanovlennyy-u-shkoly-pam-165100/, accessed 15 July 2024.

(5) Hanna Shvyd’ko, “Pershyy pislyavoyennyy pam’yatnyk u Dnipropetrovs’ku”, https://www.dnipro.libr.dp.ua/pamyatnik_Pushkin_istoriya, accessed 15 July 2024.

(6) Anatoliy Zharov, “Polkovnik Grinkevich: pravda i vymysel o geroye”, https://infodon.org.ua/stalino/813, accessed 15 July 2024.

(7) T-34-85s started to be transferred to the front only in February-March 1944, and Pushkin’s tank corps did not receive them prior to his death. Mikhail Baryatinskiy, “Sredniy tank T-34-85. Boyevoye primeneniye”, http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/WWII/T34_85/t34_85_3.html, accessed 15 July 2024.

(8) For the dynamics of the Soviet memorialization of WWII see Sklokina, Iryna, “Commemorating the Glorious Past, Dreaming of the Happy Future: WWII Burial Places and Monuments as Public Places in the Postwar Ukraine”, in: Guido Hausmann and Iryna Sclokina (eds.), The Political Cult of the Dead in Ukraine: Traditions and Dimensions from Soviet Times to Today, Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2021, 69–96. Konradova, Natal’ya, and Anna Ryleeva, “Geroi i zhertvy. Memorialy Velikoy Otechestvennoy in: Michail Gabovitch (ed.) Pamyat’ o voyne 60 let spustya: Rossiya, Germaniya, Yevropa, Moscow: Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, 2005, 241–261. Kalibovets’, Svitlana, “Memorialy Velykoyi Vitchyznyanoyi viyny u mistakh-heroyakh Ukrayiny ta polityka pam’yati (1942–1980-kh rr.)”, in: Naukovi zapysky (Natsional’noho pedahohichnoho universytetu im. M.P. Drahomanova), Seriya: Pedahohichni ta istorychni nauky, 103, 2012, 246–259.

It is worth noting that, although not as widespread, it was also a standard practice of this era to place civilian equipment on pedestals, primarily old tractors or trucks. This practice is more typical for rural settlements, although it is known in cities. Civilian vehicles became monuments that honored the first village mechanics or workers of enterprises or were placed near educational institutions of the relevant profile. Steam locomotives were installed as monuments at railway stations. Unlike Soviet military equipment monuments, civilian equipment is less often perceived as ideological objects, therefore after 2014 and 2022 its dismantling did not become a noticeable trend.

(10) Leo Schmidt, “Panzerdenkmale. Narrative vor und nach 1990”, In: Jürgen Danyel u.a. (Hg.): Kommunismus unter Denkmalschutz?: Denkmalpflege als historische Aufklärung. Forschungen und Beiträge zur Denkmalpflege im Land Brandenburg, Bd. 16. 2018, 77–82, Wiktor Szymborski, “Tanks on Monuments, Monument Tanks. On Trench Art and ‘Gratitude Memorials’”, Trimarium, In: The History and Literature of Central and Eastern European Countries, 4(4), 47–94.

(11) An interesting research question would be the questions of economic motives behind the installment of military equipment as monuments. Soviet communities and enterprises ordered sculptures for Second World War monuments at their own expense. In such circumstances, would it not have been cheaper to purchase (or perhaps even get free) decommissioned equipment from the Ministry of Defense, especially since this also saved the state money for its utilization?

(12) Other models of military equipment from the wartime period became monuments less frequently, because they were widely decommissioned and scrapped before the mass installation of military equipment monuments began.

(13) Desantno-shturmovi viys’ka Zbroynykh Syl Ukrayiny, “Na Donechchyni vidkryly pam’yatnyy znak ‘Symvol viys’kovoyi zvytyahy BMD-1’ na chestʹ muzhnosti i heroyizmu voyiniv DSHV, SSO ta mors’koyi pikhoty pid chas boyiv na Donbasi”, https://dshv.mil.gov.ua/na-donechchini-vidkrili-pamyatnij-znak-simvol-vijskovo%D1%97-zvityagi-bmd-1-na-chest-muzhnosti-i-gero%D1%97zmu-vo%D1%97niv-dshv-sso-ta-morsko%D1%97-pixoti-pid-chas-bo%D1%97v-na-donbasi/, accessed 15 July 2024.

(14) Although there were some cases of its dismantling in the 1990s, primarily in western Ukraine. Roksolyana Panych, “A shcho zamist’ tanka, abo yak zapovnyty prostir u L’vovi pislya znesennya radyans’kykh pam’yatnykiv?” https://prolviv.com/blog/2019/11/05/a-shcho-zamist-tanka-abo-iak-zapovnyty-prostir-u-lvovi-pislia-znesennia-radianskykh-pam-iatnykiv/, accessed 15 July 2024.

(15) During the Second World War most distinguished Red Army units were honored with appointing guards status, all its soldiers got special badge, depicting red banner, laurel wreath and red star. Some guard units also marked their vehicles with such emblems in times of war, but it was not common practice.

(16) Alexandr Osipian, “World War II Memory Politics in Russia and Ukraine and Their Uses During the Conflict in the Donbas (Spring–Summer 2014)”, In: Korine Amacher, Andrii Portnov, Victoriia Serhienko (eds.) Official History in Eastern Europe. Osnabrück: Fibre, 2020, 282-288; Dmytro Tytarenko, ‘“Vrah vnov’ vstupyl na nashu zemlyu…’: Velyka Vitchyznyana / II svitova viyna v politytsi pamʺyati na terytoriyi samoproholoshenoyi DNR (2014-2016 rr.)”, https://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/istoriya-i-pamyat-vazhki-pitannya/2399-dmitro-titarenko-vrag-vnov-vstupil-na-nashu-zemlyu-velika-vitchiznyana-ii-svitova-vijna-v-polititsi-pam-yati-na-teritoriji-samoprogoloshenoji-dnr-2014-2016-rr, accessed 15 July 2024.

(17) Militarnyi, “Tank IS-3 v voyne na Donbasse – Polnaya istoriya”, https://mil.in.ua/uk/blogs/tank-ys-3-v-vojne-na-donbasse-polnaya-ystoryya/, accessed 15 July 2024.

(19) Nesvetaytv, “Tank T-34 Antratsit”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_N78BFiYss, accessed 15 July 2024; obozrevatel.com, “Boyovyky v Antratsyti znyaly z postamentu tank T-34”, https://incident.obozrevatel.com/ukr/crime/67108-bojoviki-v-antratsiti-znyali-z-postamentu-tank-t-34.htm, accessed 15 July 2024; karopka.ru, “T-34 Antratsit”, https://karopka.ru/community/user/11125/?MODEL=455073, accessed 15 July 2024.

About the Authors

Denys Shatalov earned his Ph.D. in History in 2016 from Oles Honchar Dnipro National University, Ukraine, with a thesis on Ukrainian Cossacks in public discourse from the second half of the 18th to the first half of the 19th century. From 2015 onwards, he has been a research fellow at the “Tkuma” Ukrainian Institute for Holocaust Studies and the Jewish Memory and Holocaust in Ukraine Museum (2015-2020). He has been a Prisma Ukraïna visiting fellow in 2019/20 and a 2022/23 non-resident Prisma Ukraïna Fellow at the Forum Transregionale Studien. He is a member of the War, Migration, Memory research group since 2022. Since October 2023, he is a Sustaining Ukrainian Scholarship Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies Sofia and a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation.

Mykola Homanyuk was born in 1974 in Kakhovka, Ukraine. He graduated from the Kherson State Pedagogical Institute in 1996 and defended his Ph.D. thesis in Sociology at V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University in 2008. Currently, he is an associate professor at the Department of Geography and Ecology at Kherson State University, where he teaches human geography. He is also a chairperson of the NGO Kherson Department of the Sociological Association of Ukraine and runs the independent theatre company Kherson Theatre Lab. In 2003/2004, he was a fellow of the Lane Kirkland’s Fellowship at the M. Coure-Skłodowska University (Poland). In 2018, he won the ADAMI Media Prize for Cultural Diversity in Eastern Europe. In 2022, Homanyuk received the Virtual Visitorship Grant from the Northwestern Buffett Institute for Global Affairs (USA) and was a fellow of the Petro Jacyk Non-Resident Scholars Program at the University of Toronto (Canada). In 2023-2024 he participated in the fellowship program “Ukraine and the Transformation of Eastern Europe”, hosted by the Research Center for the History of Transformations (RECET) at the University of Vienna (Austria). His current research is dedicated to ethnic minorities (Roma and Meskhetian Turks), memorials on temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, modern toponymic practices in Ukraine, and problems of social representation in contemporary documentary theatre. He has been a non-resident Fellow and member of the Prisma Ukraïna War, Migration, Memory research group since 2022 and is a 2024-25 Prisma Ukraïna fellow of the Gerda Henkel Foundation.

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Qianrui, Hu, War, Displacement and the Shifting Meaning of ‘Donbas’: Initial Findings from the Field, 6 August 2024

Guita Hourani, Ukrainian Women in Lebanon: Resilience, Activism, and Transnational Engagement Amid Crisis, 13 June 2024

Citation: Mykola Homanyuk; Denys Shatalov, Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 1, in: in: TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research, 01.10.2024, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/53053

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Forum Transregionale Studien (1. Oktober 2024). Soviet Weaponry on a Pedestal: Military Equipment Monuments in the Time of the Russian War in Ukraine – Part 1. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. Abgerufen am 1. Oktober 2024 von https://trafo.hypotheses.org/53053