Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies

The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies, known simply as the G9, is an alliance of gangs known for its role in the ongoing Haitian gang war. Formed in 2020 by former police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, the gang is the most powerful faction in the conflict. Influenced by Chérizier’s police experience, the G9 is heavily armed and organized into a hierarchical paramilitary (1).

In the absence of a meaningful state presence, the G9 aims to establish control over the country through violence. Chérizier hopes to legitimize his power and has established a larger coalition known as Viv Ansanm, which currently controls over 80% of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. The gang was supported by assassinated Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, who provided the G9 with weapons, funding, and immunity in exchange for maintaining order on the streets when government forces could not (2).

Although Chérizier claims that the G9 is a revolutionary organization with the goal of taking back Haiti from a corrupt government and restoring power to the people, the gang is mostly focused on street-level conflict with rival gangs and police that has led to the deaths of over four thousand Haitians. It is also responsible for several massacres and jailbreaks, and its members are known for extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. The gang has thousands of members, many of them teenagers (1).

Since the colonial period and the Haitian Revolution, Haiti has long been a hotbed for violence and political turmoil. State-sponsored gangs go back to the regime of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier from 1957 to 1971, during which he employed death squads to attack his political rivals and suppress dissent (1). Recent years have brought a sequence of destabilizing events, starting with the 2010 earthquake that destroyed the country’s infrastructure, caused USD $8 billion in damage, and killed over 200 thousand people (3). After the earthquake, gang violence surged as the government and UN forces were incapable of maintaining control over the devastated nation (1). In 2017, Jovenel Moïse was hand-picked to replace Michel Martelly as president by Martelly himself. Martelly oversaw widespread corruption and government support for gangs during the country’s post-hurricane recovery (4). Moïse’s presidency was marked by parliamentary deadlock as the state crumbled and gangs stepped into its place (1). With UN forces gone, no presence of authority, and another hurricane in 2018, Haiti found itself in a dire situation (5).

Jimmy Chérizier was raised in the Delmas neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, which would go on to become his stronghold. It is disputed whether he got his nickname “Barbecue” from his mother’s chicken stand or from his alleged habit of burning his enemies alive. During the post-hurricane instability in Haiti, Chérizier served in a special unit in the Haitian National Police, where he was alleged to have overseen massacres and extrajudicial killings. He was fired from the police force in 2018, but by then he had already formed the Delmas 6 gang based out of his childhood neighborhood (6).

Chérizier began to unite with other gangs supported by then-president Moïse in 2020. With Moïse’s support, the gangs began to attack other anti-government gangs to expand their territory while committing massacres against civilians in the process. In a June 2020 YouTube video, Chérizier announced the formation of the G9 Alliance (7). Initially consisting of nine gangs, the “family” soon expanded to over 12 (8).

After the formation of the alliance, the G9 attacked the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cité Soleil, a stronghold for anti-government gangs. During the assault, the gang killed at least 111 people, including many civilians, while authorities stood by (7). The next month, the rival G-Pep alliance was formed. Based out of neighborhoods under attack by the G9 such as Cité Soleil, the gang is backed by opposition parties and prominent businessmen (9). The cycle of violence escalated, with both gangs engaging in street warfare in which civilians were often caught in the crossfire or were targeted as residents of rival neighborhoods.

The situation in the country became more desperate as gangs expanded their control, infrastructure crumbled, businesses closed, and the economy disintegrated. All the while, the police, military, and government were powerless to stop the conflict. Not only were they outmanned and outgunned by the gangs, but even if they could quell the violence they were directed not to by corrupt government officials, including President Moïse himself (10) (7).

In the middle of the night on July 7th, 2021, 28 mercenaries stormed Moïse’s home in Port-au-Prince and assassinated him (11). The mercenaries, 26 Colombians and two Haitian Americans, were hired by Counter Terrorist Unit Security, a company based out of Florida. Many of them were former Colombian military soldiers and were told that their mission in Haiti would be to provide security to government officials (29). It is still unknown who was ultimately behind the assassination. However several of Moïse’s political rivals and his widow, Martine Moïse, have been charged for their involvement (12).

After Moïse’s assassination, Chérizier and other gang leaders exploited the weakness of the government to further expand their control. Despite calling for the president’s resignation a week before his death, Chérizier held a memorial for Moïse filled with G9 members and had his men participate in the manhunt for the assailants (13) (14). He began to espouse more explicitly political rhetoric, stating that Haiti’s elite, opposition politicians, and foreign imperialists conspired to assassinate Moïse. He declared that he was leading an armed revolution against these parties, marking a shift in the G9’s role in the conflict (15). Instead of solely fighting for control of territory against rival gangs, Chérizier sought to unite Haiti’s gangs against his political enemies, such as the new government. The G9 took control of Terminal Varreux, Haiti’s major oil terminal, for leverage over Ariel Henry, the country’s new president (16).

However, all the while the G9 and G-Pep continued fighting. In April 2022, the G9 and their allies Chen Mechan clashed with the 400 Mawozo, the largest gang in Haiti, in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac suburb of Port-au-Prince. Over 200 people were killed in the span of two weeks, the vast majority of whom were civilians murdered for associating with a rival gang. Following the battle, the 400 Mawozo joined the conflict on the side of G-Pep, giving them a fighting chance against the G9. Another 89 people were killed in two days in July of 2022 during a battle for control of the Cité Soleil neighborhood, a G-Pep stronghold (17). Both battles resulted in little change in territory. In the wake of the violence, vigilante groups formed against gangs and law enforcement (18).

With almost all of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area in the hands of gangs, the United Nations Security Council signed off on a resolution allowing a foreign intervention of troops led by Kenya and supported by the United States. The resolution came after the Haitian government requested international help fighting the G9 and other gangs the previous year (19). However, when President Ariel Henry flew to Kenya to sign off on the intervention on February 29, 2024, the G9 attacked the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Haiti’s largest airport, to prevent Henry’s return. In the days following, gangs stormed two prisons and freed almost 5,000 inmates. They took control of the country’s main port and attacked government and police buildings while Chérizier demanded Henry’s resignation. Henry gave in to the demands on March 12th (20).

In February 2024, G9, G-Pep, and other gangs united to form the Viv Ansanm coalition, meaning “Living Together,” to take on government and foreign forces. The coalition is led by Chérizier, as he hopes to use it to achieve his political ambitions. However, members of the coalition do occasionally still fight amongst each other (2).

In June 2024, the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti was deployed to bolster the local police’s efforts against the G9 and other gangs. So far, Kenya, Benin, The Bahamas, and Jamaica have deployed personnel on the ground, with several other countries having pledged troops. The mission is backed by the UN and has received over USD $18 million in funding from the United States, Canada, and France (21). Chérizier sees the intervention as an act of imperialism and has mobilized the G9 and the Viv Ansanm to fight against it (22).

The G9 is unlike other gangs in the sense that it is not a criminal enterprise with the goal of profit. The gang war in Haiti is fueled by competing factions vying for control. With its well-organized structure and the ambitious Chérizier at its head, the G9 has come to be the strongest of these factions. At the onset of the conflict, the G9 and other gangs were backed by politicians in exchange for political support. The gangs were allowed to do as they pleased and even received material support, as was the case with the G9 and the Moïse government. Politicians would send resources to the areas controlled by aligned gangs while neglecting those controlled by rivals. This arrangement also allowed politicians to control neighborhoods that the police could not due to the rampant violence (7).

As their power became legitimized through government support, the G9 found itself filling a power vacuum. However as the state deteriorated following Moïse’s assassination and the ousting of Henry, it became clear that the politicians created a monster they could not control, and the gangs began focusing their efforts on police, infrastructure, and government institutions (2). Chérizier has done everything in his power to accelerate the collapse of the government so he can seize power in its place.

Chérizier has branded himself as a left-wing populist, using black nationalist and anticolonial rhetoric appealing to Haiti’s long history of struggle against colonialism. He has popularized an image of himself in the likeness of Che Guevara (23). He claims that he is leading a revolution against Haiti’s corrupt elite and foreign powers that seek to encroach upon the country’s sovereignty. However, no evidence suggests the G9 rank and file are motivated by ideology, and although Chérizier has taken the fight to Haiti’s most powerful people, his talk of revolution serves as little more than a weak facade. The G9 frequently targets the civilians Chérizier claims to defend and the gang has held Haiti’s supply chain hostage to further their power, preventing vital goods from reaching a desperate population. Furthermore, before Moïse’s assassination, the G9 were affiliated with the center-right Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK). The PHTK has been accused of the same corruption that Chérizier claims to be fighting against (1).

In comparison to other gangs active in Haiti at the moment, the G9 is a well-organized, heavily armed group with an established hierarchy. Although it is not the largest gang in the country, Chérizier’s police background helped him distinguish the G9 from the numerous other disorganized gangs, allowing the G9 to establish itself at the top of the pack.

The G9 is organized in a paramilitary structure with various commanders and lieutenants. The original nine gangs that formed the coalition are Chérizier’s own Delmas 6 Gang, the Belekou gang, Baz Pilate, Baz Krache Dife, Nan Ti Bwa, Nan Boston, the Simon Pelé gang, Baz Nan Chabon, and Waf Jérémie. Many members are teenagers from poor backgrounds (1). Young Haitians have few opportunities, making the power and prestige that comes with joining gangs appealing. Although it is unknown how many members the G9 has, there are around 12,000 gang members in Haiti spread throughout over 200 different gangs (24) (9). The G9 and other gangs currently control over 80% of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area, as the local police and multinational intervention do not have the resources to combat them at this point (2).

The gang is armed with military-grade weapons trafficked from the USA, including AR-15s and AK-47s. Firearms are obtained through strawman purchases in states with weak gun control laws and then shipped to Florida, where they make their way through the Caribbean Sea to Haiti, typically hidden in shipping containers containing consumer goods. There are also smaller streams of weapons coming from Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Some weapons legally obtained by Haitian police and security forces are also resold to or stolen by gangs. The arms market in Haiti is a particularly lucrative business, as weapons sold in Haiti can fetch up to 20 times their value in the USA (10).

The G9 has solidified control over its territory through street conflict with government forces and rival gangs. Fighting is extremely close quarters, with gangs battling it out block by block. The G9 extorts and kidnaps for ransom the residents of their neighborhoods as a source of income. However, it also provides public services, such as distributing food and water, in an effort to maintain Chérizier’s image as a Robin Hood figure (1). The gang does not hold the same grace for rival neighborhoods, carrying out numerous extrajudicial killings and massacres to exert their control. During these massacres, rape and torture are common (7).

The G9 is active in drug trafficking, as Haiti is a trans-shipment point for cocaine and marijuana coming from South America to the US and Europe; however, this is not one of its main focuses. Although Haiti’s weak law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the flow of drugs in and out of the country, major drug trafficking organizations regard the situation in Haiti as too chaotic to move their merchandise through. In recent years, drug trafficking through Haiti has declined as South American traffickers have opted to use the Central American corridor instead. While Haiti is not a large drug market, the narcotics flowing through the country are also distributed by gangs domestically. The G9 controls key ports in Port-au-Prince used for arms and drug trafficking (10).

As the conflict has escalated and the gang has focused its efforts against the government, it has taken to capturing vital infrastructure, such as Terminal Varreux and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, to use as bargaining chips. These operations, as well as the 2024 jailbreaks, have also weakened the government and allowed the gang to expand its power. These destructive actions have accelerated Haiti’s collapse, allowing gangs to fill the void and Chérizier to become one of the country’s most powerful men.

The G9’s alliances and rivalries frequently change based on Chérizier’s opportunistic whims. One day he may be condemning one group and the next he will find himself standing alongside them. For instance, the G-Pep alliance, which until recently was the G9’s most formidable rival, has now allied with the G9 in the Viv Ansanm coalition. G-Pep formed in reaction to the G9’s terror (9). The two gangs were backed by opposing parties, with the center-right PHTK supporting the G9 and the center-left Struggling People’s Organization and other opposition parties supporting G-Pep (25).

The gangs have a complicated relationship with the government and police. Although Chérizier claims to be fighting against a corrupt state and has attacked police and government targets, the G9 and other gangs have often been granted amnesty from the government for their affiliation with politicians (7). Furthermore, many gang members are former police officers or soldiers, including Chérizier himself (6).

The Bwa Kale vigilante movement sprung up in 2022 after the massacres in the Cité Soleil and Plaine du Cul-de-Sac neighborhoods, using brutal tactics against the G9 and other gangs. Vigilantes have been known to lynch and burn their victims alive. Vigilantes killed over 300 people in 2023 alone (26).

Chérizier has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury and the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to stop the flow of weapons to the G9 (27). The G9’s escalation of the conflict has led to the UN-backed intervention. The multinational coalition has pledged 2,500 personnel to fight the gangs, but only 600 have arrived thus far after months of delays (28). Although there is a history of human rights abuses from the previous UN intervention in the country, 63% of Haitians polled in 2023 said that they support an intervention. However, Chérizier has used that history, including widespread sexual abuse by peacekeepers and a cholera outbreak stemming from a UN facility that killed over 9,300 Haitians, to legitimize his fight against the foreign force (22) (30). Haitians living in gang-controlled areas are still reliant on gangs for basic necessities in the absence of a functioning economy and state. Meanwhile, the disoriented and corrupt Haitian National Police is ill-prepared to receive coalition forces. There is also a lack of clarity on the mission’s mandate, chain of command, and human rights oversight (31).

(1) – Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2022). Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power, and an escalating crisis. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti.pdf.

(2) – Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024). Viv Ansanm: How a gang coalition has transformed violence in Port-au-Prince. https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/ht-obs-001/01-viv-ansanm-gang-coalition-violence-port-au-prince.html.

(3) – National Centre For Environmental Information. (2010). Significant Earthquake Information: Haiti 2010. https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazel/view/hazards/earthquake/event-more-info/8732#:~:text=The%20official%20estimate%20settled%20on,170%2C000%20buried%20in%20mass%20graves.&text=Ref%20%237096%3A,the%20UN%20mission%20in%20Haiti.

(4) – Psaledakis, D. and Webber, C. (2024, August 20). US sanctions Haiti’s ex-president Martelly, citing drug trafficking. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-imposes-sanctions-former-haitian-president-over-drug-trafficking-2024-08-20/.

(5) – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). Haiti: 2018 Earthquake Situation report No. 1. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-2018-earthquake-situation-report-no-1-07-october-2018.

(6) – Coto, D. (2019, June 7). Leader or killer? A day with ‘Barbecue’ in Haiti’s capital. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/ebc2cee089f149309bd73afa07816a63.

(7) – Bui, J. and Gunasekera, N. (2021). Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti. Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf.

(8) – Coto, D. (2022, October 21). Who’s behind Haiti’s powerful gang alliance? PBS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/whos-behind-haitis-powerful-gang-alliance.

(9) – Da Rin, D. (2022, July 27). New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists.

(10) – Muggah, R. (2023). Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf.

(11) – Phillips, T., Beaumont, P. and Delone, J.D. (2021, July 8). Haiti security forces arrest six alleged gunmen after president’s assassination. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/haiti-president-assassination-arrests-gunmen-latest.

(12) – Al Jazeera. (2024, February 20). Haiti President Moise’s widow, ex-PM among 50 charged in his assassination. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/haiti-president-moises-widow-ex-pm-among-50-charged-in-his-assassination.

(13) – Lemaire, S. and Vilme, M. (2021, July 7). Haiti Prime Minister Appeals for Calm After President Shot Dead. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/americas_haiti-prime-minister-appeals-calm-after-president-shot-dead/6207936.html.

(14) – Celiné, S. (2021, July 27). Gang boss leads protest rally against Moïse assassination. The Haitian Times. https://haitiantimes.com/2021/07/27/gang-boss-leads-protest-rally-against-moise-assassination/.

(15) – Sanon, R. and Paultre, A. (2021, June 24). Haiti gang leader launches ‘revolution’ as violence escalates. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gang-leader-launches-revolution-violence-escalates-2021-06-24/.

(16) – Wilson, M. (2021, November 18). A Faustian Bargain: The Cost of Restoring Haiti’s Fuel Supply. Insight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/a-faustian-bargain-the-cost-of-restoring-haitis-fuel-supply/.

(17) – Charles, J. (2022, July 13). Gang continues deadly attack on Haiti slum, sparking violent protests over fuel shortages. Miami Herald. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article263446333.html.

(18) – Dyer, E. (2023, May 8). In Haiti, a grassroots vigilante movement is fighting back against gang warfare. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-bwa-kale-port-au-prince-gang-warfare-1.6833758.

(19) – Nichols, M. (2023, October 3). UN approves Haiti security mission to fight gangs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-authorizes-haiti-security-mission-fight-gangs-2023-10-02/.

(20) – Coto, D. (2024, April 25). With fear and hope, Haiti warily welcomes new governing council as gang-ravaged country seeks peace. The Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/haiti-ariel-lhenry-resigns-violence-gangs-government-22868c51b5f4c9ca5a8d69fcb5df376b.

(21) – UN News. (2024, May 20). Haiti: Multinational mission and the ‘inexorable requirement to restore security conditions’. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149831.

(22) – S.L. (2023, August 8). Foreign intervention, Barbecue warns and threatens. Haiti Libre. https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-40275-haiti-flash-foreign-intervention-barbecue-warns-and-threatens-video.html.

(23) – Misra, A. (2024, March 12). Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangster-behind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514.

(24) – Besheer, M. (2024, July 3). Haiti’s prime minister vows ‘new era’ for gang-plagued nation. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/haiti-prime-minister-vows-new-era-for-gang-plagued-nation/7684245.html.

(25) – Mistler-Ferguson, S. (2022, July 21). G9 vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart. Insight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/g9-gpep-two-gang-alliances-tearing-haiti-apart/.

(26) – Woodford, I. and Morland, S. (2023, August 18). UN says over 350 killed by Haiti vigilante groups as thousands flee gang warfare. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/more-than-350-killed-by-haiti-vigilante-groups-thousands-flee-gang-warfare-says-2023-08-18/.

(27) – Besheer, M. (2022, October 21). UN Authorizes Sanctions on Haitian Gangs. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/un-authorizes-sanctions-on-haitian-gangs-/6800038.html.

(28) – Andrew-Gee, E. (2024, May 31). Haiti’s gangs ramp up violence against police as nation awaits intervention by foreign forces. The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-haitis-gangs-ramp-up-violence-as-nation-awaits-intervention-by-foreign/.

(29) – Turkewitz, J. and Kurmanaev, A. (2021, July 13). Big Dreams and False Claims: How Colombians Got Embroiled in Haiti Assassination. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/13/world/americas/haiti-colombia-military-veterans.html.

(30) – Osgood, B. (2024, March 14). What is the history of foreign interventions in Haiti? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/14/what-is-the-history-of-foreign-interventions-in-haiti.

(31) – Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024, June 18). Who is in charge of the Haiti mission? https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/who-is-in-charge-of-the-haiti-mission/.

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